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This thesis consists of three empirical essays that investigate the impact of information 
disclosure on firm corporate governance and mutual fund investment.   
The first essay studies the direct association between media tone and CEO benefits 
through the effects of media tone on CEO dominance. Using CEO pay slice (CPS) as a measure 
of CEO dominance, we find that negative media tone is associated with a reduction in CEO 
dominance. We further investigate the effect of media tone on the average of the top four (Top4) 
non-CEO executives’ compensation in moderating CEO dominance. The finding extends the 
theoretical framework explaining the importance and influence of media on corporate 
governance. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find that media serves as an effective 
external governance mechanism in firms with good internal governance. The evidence suggests 
that media tone plays an important role as an external monitor, moderating corporate 
governance through the dissemination of news. 
The second essay investigates the association between media uncertainty and a 
comprehensive set of corporate risk-taking behaviour measures that capture firm, corporate 
investment, and financial risk. We find that media uncertainty leads to greater future stock 
return volatility. Additional analysis reveals that the increase in media uncertainty is associated 
with more risky investments and higher financial risk. Our findings are robust to endogeneity 
concerns and additional tests, thereby supporting the effect of media in providing important 
external signals that influence firm risk. This essay is consistent with the view that uncertainty 




The third essay studies the relationship between mutual fund trades and financial 
disclosure. Our finding contributes to the mutual fund literature that negative financial 
disclosure tone increases funds’ sells but not funds’ buys. We further investigate that fund 
managers’ propensity to trade stocks in responding to negative financial disclosure tone 
increases subsequent fund performance. Moreover, we find that transient investors prefer to 
sell stocks that experience higher negative financial reporting tone when compared with 
dedicated and quasi-indexing investors.  
This thesis contributes to development of finance and accounting literature by 
providing insight into the effect of textual disclosure on corporate governance and mutual fund 
investment. It also contributes to the financial behavioural literature by exploring the effect of 
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It is commonly accepted by researchers and scholars that the role and impact of 
information outlets concerning the communication of information is continuously changing in 
response to cultural and technological innovation. As the breadth and freedom of information 
outlets increases, there is a more efficient dissemination of information to intermediaries, 
thereby reducing the information asymmetry between market participants and corporate 
management. This thesis is a combination of three studies that examine the role that 
information disclosure plays in influencing accounting and finance. The thesis examines the 
role of media in corporate governance, and also investigates the effect of financial reporting on 
professional investors, such as mutual fund managers.  
A large body of literature is concerned with the association between the organization 
and the external mechanism that motivates researchers’ interest in corporate governance. There 
is a substantial and growing literature that asserts media plays an external monitoring role in 
corporate governance (Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 2008; Bednar, 2012; Liu and McConnell, 
2013). An idea first introduced by Core et al. (2008) explores how a change in compensation 
policy may be difficult to detect when negative media attention imposes costs on firms. 
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However, this does not mean that the media has no influence on other CEO matters. Chapter 2 
of this thesis considers a potential link between media tone and CEO dominance. The thesis 
further considers how the difference in the pay gap between the CEO and other top executives 
may damage shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), and affect the level of 
behavioural integration and subsequent firm performance (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). 
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of media tone on the average compensation of the Top4 non-
CEO executives to moderate CEO dominance. In particular, Chapter 2 looks closely at how a 
lack of evidence for a relation between media tone and CEO characteristics may be due to 
poorly governed firms not responding to external pressure as a result of the board being 
captured by the CEO (Core et al., 2008). Chapter 2 considers both the internal and external 
governance mechanisms within the firm. 
Evidence from the literature indicates that media disclosures reflect firms’ actions and 
may even change firms’ outcomes (Deephouse, 2000; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Bednar et 
al., 2013). However, there is no research examining the association between media news 
dissemination and a firm’s preference for risk. Environmental factors leave more room for 
CEOs and increase their discretion, which influences firms’ decisions and outcomes (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Hambrick, 2007). Chapter 3 of the thesis 
uses the idea that uncertainty increases firm risk-taking behaviour by influencing managerial 
matters, such as managerial discretion. Rather than relying on common uncertainty proxies, 
such as policy uncertainty or market uncertainty (Bittlingmayer, 1998; Sarkar, 2000; Voth, 
2002; Li and Tang, 2010; Flor and Hesel, 2015), Chapter 3 quantifies information uncertainty 
using the uncertain words in media reports to investigate how media affects firms’ risk-taking 
decisions. 
Financial reporting is a proxy of information outlets which disclose and disseminate 
accounting and financial information about firms to outsiders. There is a growing stream of 
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literature on the effect of financial reporting (Botosan, 1997; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; 
Lawrence, 2013). However, previous literature pays more attention to the effect of financial 
reporting on individual investors. Chapter 4 departs from this focus and examines the effect of 
financial disclosure on professional mutual fund managers. Prior literature shows that the 
trading behaviours of mutual funds are associated with information release (Baker et al., 2010; 
Cai and Lau, 2015). The reporting of financial information may change investors’ perception 
of stocks (Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Lawrence, 2013), influencing trading behaviours and 
subsequent performance. Chapter 4 investigates the effects of financial disclosure tone on 
mutual funds’ trades and subsequent fund performance. 
 
1.2 Background 
The type of information disclosure used by firms varies. Some firms rely on the dissemination 
of information via social media, while others report using mandated disclosure practices. This 
thesis focuses on two major types of information disclosure: media coverage and financial 
disclosure. The purpose of this work is to enhance our understanding around the impact of 
information disclosure, and to provide a behavioural view of information disclosure on 
corporate governance and investment activities.   
  
1.2.1 Prior research on media coverage  
In general, media provides the public with a platform to better understand firms operating 
performance. Media delivers efficient signals to outside stakeholders by evaluating firms’ 
actions (Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013). The dissemination of 
information can benefit shareholders, to the extent that media can reduce information 
asymmetry between firm management and outsiders. 
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The literature also documents the role of media in reflecting firms’ actions, influencing 
subsequent managers’ behaviours and firms’ outcomes. The role of media as a corporate 
governance mechanism has been developed in the prior literature (Zingales, 2000; Dyck et al., 
2008; Bednar, 2012; Liu and McConnell, 2013). Media can act as a monitor to minimize 
agency costs by reducing information asymmetry between firms’ managers and external 
investors, and to influence the reputation costs of both firms and managers by disseminating 
information to the public (Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 2008; Bednar, 2012).  
The early literature provides a number of views to support the relation between media 
coverage and managers, in particular, CEOs’ performance. However, Core et al. (2008) find 
no significant association between the tone of media coverage and CEOs’ compensation and 
turnover. This finding undermines the monitoring role of media coverage to some degree. It 
also breaks the relation between media coverage and corporate governance. At the same time, 
studies by Zingales (2000) and Dyck et al. (2008) propose the importance of media coverage 
on corporate governance. Prior literature shows that information dissemination about 
managerial behaviour and firm performance has an impact on managers’ behaviour and 
influence (Bednar, 2012; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Cheng et al., 2017; You et al., 2017).  
Conversely, very few studies consider the association between the tone of media coverage and 
the dominance executed via the role of the CEO. Chapter 2 considers this issue by examining 
the relation between media tone and CEO dominance. The findings support the monitoring role 
of media on corporate governance.   
Media has received more attention in the organizational literature as scholars and 
researchers attempt to understand how media affects a variety of firms’ outcomes (Pollock and 
Rindova, 2003; Bednar et al., 2013). Media evaluation may change the legitimacy and 
performance views of multiple stakeholders on firms (Deephouse, 2000). Other streams of 
research have focused on press articles and the association between the increase or decrease of 
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firms and managerial reputation, and its impact on subsequent firm actions (Hayward et al., 
2004; Rindova et al., 2006). Recent literature asserts that the dissemination of information via 
media monitors managers and prompts their firms to make changes (Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 
2008; Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013). These studies provide a framework for investigating 
the role that media plays as an external mechanism to influence future firm behaviours and 
outcomes. At present, despite a large body of research on the topic of media tone, there is 
limited information about the relationship between media uncertainty and firm behaviour. 
Chapter 3 attempts to fill this knowledge gap by examining the potential link between media 
tone and future firm risk-taking activities.  
 
1.2.2 Prior research on financial reporting 
Continuous improvement in the accounting and financial regulation environment provides an 
authoritative and effective guarantee for the guiding role of financial reporting on investors 
(Lawrence, 2013). Borne out of the responsibility to oversee the securities markets, 
independent and authoritative agencies and institutions established securities rules and 
regulations to promote disclosure of market-related information, and to protect investors from 
fraud. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), the Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) and International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) are examples of the organizations mentioned above. 
The widespread attention by scholars and researchers has promoted interest in the effect 
of financial reporting on investors. Baker and Haslem (1973) suggest a tentative conclusion 
that the understanding of and requirements for financial information could very well differ 
widely among the various classes of investors. They propose that individual investors attach 
minor importance to financial statements as a source of information. Lev and Zarowin (1999) 
investigate the usefulness of financial information to investors in comparison with the total 
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information in the marketplace. Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that companies’ textual risk 
disclosures increase investors’ risk perception. Lawrence (2013) documents that individual 
investors benefit from financial disclosure. However, much of the research on financial 
reporting has focused on individual investors and less attention has been given to how financial 
reporting influences professional investors, in particular, mutual fund managers. Chapter 4 of 
the thesis aims to build a link between financial reporting, mutual funds’ trading, and 
performance.  
 
1.3 Research objectives and contribution 
The thesis analyses the impact of information disclosure by employing a comprehensive 
sample of media coverage and financial reporting for firms in the United States. We analyze 
the information disclosure variables using the financial dictionary developed by Loughran and 
McDonald (2011). This thesis attempts to address questions about how information disclosure 
affects organizations and market participants through three empirical studies.    
Chapter 2 reports that media plays a significant corporate governance role in monitoring 
CEOs. We rely on media tone as a proxy of media to examine the association between media 
tone and CEO dominance. In addition, we argue that top executives may play a complementary 
role in response to negative tone around the CEO and their firm by investigating the relation 
between negative media tone and the Top4 non-CEO executive’s average compensation. We 
further extend the line of financial literature examining the complementary relation between 
the internal and external governance mechanisms. The research questions are as follows: 
(i) Does media tone today influence subsequent CEO dominance?  
(ii) Does media tone increase Top4 non-CEO executives’ average compensation to 
moderate CEO dominance?   
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(iii) How do internal and external governance mechanisms interact to affect the relation 
between media tone and future CEO dominance? 
This chapter contributes to filling the gap in the literature on the effect of media tone 
on CEO dominance. This study argues that media tone influences future CEO dominance by 
disseminating information and shaping perceptions about the CEO. Our results support the 
proposition from Dyck et al. (2008) and Liu and McConnell (2013) that media can exercise a 
corporate governance role. We also find that media tone increases non-CEO executives’ 
compensation to moderate CEO dominance. The finding provides support that a smaller 
difference in pay gap can increase the alignment of interests between top non-CEO executives 
and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), which suggests the complementary role played 
by these executives in response to negative media tone about the CEO and the firm. Further 
tests show that media tone influences CEO dominance when firms have efficient internal 
monitoring, thereby providing new evidence for the complementary relation between internal 
and external governance mechanisms (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Thus, the study contributes to 
the prior literature on the real effects of media tone.  
Chapter 3 extends the view that uncertainty in the media leads to greater firm risk-
taking activities in the future. We examine if firms exposed to greater information uncertainty 
from media coverage are more risk seeking. The research questions are presented as follows: 
(i) Is there is a positive association between media uncertainty and firms’ stock return 
volatility?   
(ii) Does media uncertainty affect the aggressiveness of firm policy decisions? 
The existing literature typically focuses on policy and market uncertainty 
(Bittlingmayer, 1998; Sarkar, 2000; Voth, 2002; Li and Tang, 2010; Flor and Hesel, 2015).  
This study extends the research on the influence of uncertainty on firm risk-taking by using 
media uncertainty as a triggering mechanism. Additionally, we support the broader effects of 
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media on corporate finance by examining the role of media uncertainty on firm risk-taking 
activities. The study extends the behavioural finance literature, suggesting that greater media 
uncertainty leads to higher levels of risk-seeking behaviour. As a result, firms’ aggressive 
decision-making will be affected through the increase in information uncertainty due to media 
coverage. 
Chapter 4 points to the importance of information dissemination to financial markets 
and the influence of disclosure to investors’ trading decisions. The chapter extends the research 
topic by addressing the following two research questions. 
(i) Does textual financial disclosure influence mutual funds’ trading behaviour?  
(ii) Is subsequent fund performance affected by fund managers’ trading propensity in 
response to financial disclosure?   
This chapter contributes to the financial behavioural literature by exploring the 
relationship between financial reporting and mutual fund managers’ trading. The positive 
relation between managers’ propensity to sell stocks and fund performance suggests that fund 
managers are able to process information and make superior selling decisions. The research 
also supports prior literature, such as Ke and Petroni (2004), by providing evidence that 
financial reporting is related to transient investors’ selling behaviours.  
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters in total which include three central empirical studies. The 
structure of thesis is outlined in Figure 1.1.  
Chapter 1 presents the overview of the thesis, including research background, objective 
and contribution, and the structure of the whole thesis. Chapters 2 to 4 comprise three 
independent empirical studies related to the effect of information disclosure. Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 emphasize the effect of media tone on corporate finance by investigating the 
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relationship between media tone and subsequent CEO dominance, and the association between 
media tone and firms’ risk-taking activities in the future. These results imply that media as a 
social arbiter can have consequences for managerial behaviour and firm outcomes. Chapter 4 
presents the importance of financial reporting on mutual funds’ trading and performance. The 
finding suggests that managers make superior sell decisions in responding to negative financial 
disclosure. The overall results and conclusion are summarized in Chapter 5. The implications 





Figure 1.1 Structure of the thesis 
The figure describes the structure of the thesis. Chapter 1 presents the introduction of the thesis. Empirical studies 
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Media Tone and CEO Dominance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Previous studies show that the media can detect corporate financial fraud and convey financial 
information to boards of directors (Miller, 2006; Joe et al., 2009). Drawing primarily from 
financial perspectives, such as agency theory, these studies imply that the media acts as a type 
of governance control mechanism. This topic has been developed by scholars and researchers 
in the corporate finance literature, demonstrating that the media plays an important corporate 
governance role by collecting and disseminating information about firms (Zingales, 2000; Fang 
and Peress, 2009). However, early research on media and subsequent managers’ actions 
suggests that media had little effect on manager behaviour. Core et al. (2008) point to a lack of 
influence of media coverage on subsequent excess CEO compensation and future CEO 
turnover. In Chapter 2, we seek to examine (1) whether media tone today can influence CEO 
dominance in the future, (2) whether media tone affects top non-CEO executives’ average 
compensation to moderate CEO dominance, and (3) how internal and external governance 
mechanisms interact to affect the relation between media tone and CEO dominance.  
It is important to consider the role of media in relation to CEOs. First, for participants 
in the market, the media provides a platform to publicize news concerning the firms’ 
performance and CEOs’ abilities by disseminating information (Bednar, 2012). Second, the 
media conveys information about firm performance, influencing public attitudes and behaviour, 
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and, as a result, helps shape perceptions of a CEO’s abilities (Liu and McConnell, 2013). In 
particular, directors’ perceptions of CEO abilities may change following firm disclosures by 
the media (Wade et al., 2006). These changes may affect future CEO influence and private 
benefits. Therefore, by disseminating information, media plays a significant corporate 
governance role in monitoring CEOs. 
Similar to Cheng et al. (2017),  our research is motivated by the proposition that media 
shock can diminish CEO power to extract corporate resources for private benefit. Cheng et al. 
(2017) investigate the influence of the change in Fortune ranking on CEOs’ private benefits. 
In the research, we examine the association between media tone and CEO dominance. In 
addition, we also consider a relative measure of CEO dominance: CEO pay slice (CPS). This 
measure was first proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2011) to measure the relative importance of the 
CEO within the top executive team. CPS is used in this study to examine whether current media 
tone is associated with CEOs’ dominance in the future.  
The main idea for this study originated from the explanation by Core et al. (2008) that 
a change in compensation policy may be difficult to detect when negative media attention 
imposes costs on firms. However, this does not mean that the media has no influence on other 
CEO matters indirectly related to CEO pay, such as CEO dominance. This study proposes an 
alternative explanation using the CPS measure for the following reasons. First, CPS reflects 
the dominance of the CEO in the top management team. Second, CPS captures more CEO 
characteristics than the formal status variables, such as president, chairman, or founder 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011).   
The relation between media tone and CEO dominance may be impacted by the effect 
of media tone on top executives who report to the CEO. The alignment of interests between 
the top managers and shareholders may be affected by pay differences (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Larger pay differences can affect subsequent firm performance and damage 
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shareholders’ interests (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). In the research, CPS also captures the 
difference in pay between the CEO and the other Top4 executives. In addition, top executives 
can be considered an information-processing centre of an organization (Thompson, 2017). 
Following the release of negative corporate signals by media, behaviourally integrated top 
executives prompt the firm to adopt action. Dyck et al. (2008) find that corporate executives 
prefer to reverse decisions that adversely affect shareholders’ interests when there is greater 
press exposure. Thus, by investigating the relation between negative media tone and the Top4 
non-CEO executives’ average compensation, we argue that these top executives may play a 
complementary role in response to negative tone around the CEO and their firm. 
Although we conjecture that media tone will have a direct effect on CEO dominance, 
the effect may be moderated by a firm’s internal governance mechanisms. We examine this 
relation in more detail by considering how the board’s internal governance is associated with 
the effective influence of media tone on CEO dominance. This extends the work by Core et al. 
(2008) that suggests the lack of evidence for a relation between media coverage and CEO 
characteristics may be due to poorly governed firms not responding to external pressure due to 
the board being captured by the CEO. We address this explanation by considering the internal 
corporate governance mechanism within the firm.  
By examining firms with weak and strong internal corporate governance, we are able 
to investigate whether there is a complementary relation between the internal and external 
governance mechanisms as documented by Cremers and Nair (2005). Our contribution to this 
literature is that we consider media as the external governance mechanism, which is consistent 
with the prevailing agency logic to the extent that the perceptions of media coverage can 
effectively prompt firms to evaluate managers’ actions and policies (Bednar, 2012; Liu et al., 
2017). We also provide new evidence on the complementary relation between internal and 
external governance mechanisms in monitoring CEO dominance. We argue that media serves 
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as an effective external governance mechanism in the presence of firms with strong internal 
governance.  
We consider the role of media tone and its impact on CEO dominance using a large 
sample of CEOs in the ExecuComp database and an extensive collection of 45,934 press 
articles about each CEO and his/her respective firm from 1996 to 2014. We require the 
company’s CEO to be in office for two consecutive years in order to rule out issues concerning 
CEO turnover. This requirement also ensures that CEO media tone from the previous year can 
be used to explain CEO dominance in the subsequent year. The media tone measures are 
constructed following prior literature (Bednar, 2012; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Cheng et al., 
2017). Using the financial dictionary developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011), we 
capture the negative tone of each article using the negative word counts.1  
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating the link between media tone and CEO 
dominance. The empirical results point to the role that negative media tone plays in reducing 
CPS in the following year. The finding, consistent with prior literature by Dyck et al. (2008) 
and Liu and McConnell (2013), emphasizes the economic relevance of media in monitoring 
and constraining the CEO by disseminating information.  
We find that negative tone is positively related with the Top4 non-executives’ average 
compensation. The finding suggests a potential link between the effect of media on CEO 
dominance by influencing other top executives. Top executives may be considered as having a 
complementary role in responding to negative tone. Consistent with Henderson and 
Fredrickson (2001) and Carpenter and Sanders (2002), the top executives play an important 
role in moderating CEO behaviour.  
                                                             
1 Compared with positive press coverage, negative media coverage overcomes information asymmetry with 
management and is viewed as a credible source of information (Bednar et al., 2013). Most studies in the prior 
literature focus solely on negative tone, as there is little incremental information in positive words (Core et al., 
2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013). As such, following prior literature, our study investigates solely the negative 
tone in news. 
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Furthermore, the study finds that media exposure plays an important role even after 
controlling for the existence of an internal corporate governance mechanism. We classify the 
internal corporate governance of a firm by board size, independent directors, CEO duality, and 
key subordinate executive horizon. Then, we create a measure of internal governance, 
employing a composite measure created from the four components of internal corporate 
governance. Our finding suggests that when firms have efficient internal monitoring, media 
tone influences CEO dominance, thereby supporting our earlier conjecture about the 
complementary relation between internal and external governance mechanisms.  
In addition, the causality between media tone and CEO dominance can go in the 
opposite direction. An immediate concern with our analysis is that dominant CEOs are able to 
influence the publication of news articles and their associated tone. To address this potential 
endogeneity issue between media tone and CEO dominance, we rely on location as our 
instrumental variable in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework and we find consistent 
results.   
The study implies that media tone influences future CEO dominance by disseminating 
information and shaping perceptions about the CEO. We demonstrate an economic association 
between media tone and CEO dominance by using CPS. In addition, Core et al. (2008) may 
underestimate the impact that media has on a CEO by influencing his or her private benefit, 
which is inconsistent with the corporate governance role of media. Our results support the 
proposition from Dyck et al. (2008) and Liu and McConnell (2013) that media can exercise a 
role of corporate governance. The finding also provides a potential explanation for the relation 
between media tone and CEO dominance by focusing on the complementary role of Top4 non-
CEO executives in response to negative media tone. Furthermore, and most importantly, our 
finding suggests that firms with good internal governance are more likely to respond to external 
pressure by decreasing CEO dominance, which supports the view of a complementary relation 
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between internal and external governance mechanisms (Cremers and Nair, 2005). Thus, the 
chapter contributes to the prior literature on the real effects of media tone. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review 
and develops our research hypothesis. Section 2.3 describes the sample selection and the 
construction of our variables. The empirical results are presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 
presents the robustness tests. Finally, section 2.6 summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Media and CEO dominance 
Scholars and researchers in the corporate finance literature have developed the topic of media 
coverage. Studies by Zingales (2000) and Dyck et al. (2008) propose that media plays a 
significant role in corporate governance. The media as the external governance mechanism can 
affect CEO decisions by making external information more salient to the firms and the CEOs. 
Bednar et al. (2013) propose that negative media coverage may prompt executives to 
implement changes rather than sticking to the status quo. In addition, media can perturb CEOs’ 
benefits and costs through its impact on their behaviours. Liu and McConnell (2013) find that 
CEOs have human capital at risk in making corporate decisions and that media tone heightens 
the impact of a value-reducing acquisition on the CEOs’ human capital. You et al. (2017) 
provide a market-disciplining hypothesis that negative media tone increases the chance of 
forced top executive turnover. In their empirical analysis, the media provides a monitoring role 
on the agency problem by influencing firms and managers, adversely affecting shareholder 
interests. 
Using the annual Fortune ranking score, Cheng et al. (2017) propose that media can 
decrease (increase) the value of managers’ reputational capital and, thus, diminish (enhance) 
managerial power to extract corporate resources for private consumption. In their framework, 
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the manifestation of a decrease in media’s perception is a reduction in managers’ dominance. 
Thus, media has a significant impact on managers’ dominance. Overall, the preceding 
arguments suggest a negative relation between negative media tone and CEO domination. In 
this paper, we consider CPS as the proxy of CEO dominance (Bebchuk et al., 2011), determined 
by the CEO-executive compensation gap. It is not directly related to CEO pay but used to 
determine how much influence the CEO has within the firm. Prior studies typically use (1) the 
title of president or chairman (Morck and Shleifer, 1989), and (2) chairman, founder, and sole 
insider on the board (Adams et al., 2005) to define a powerful CEO. CPS as a measure of CEO 
dominance can capture more than formal status variables that explain only a small part of the 
variability in CPS (Bebchuk et al., 2011). Thus,  
H1: A greater negative tone is associated with a decrease in CPS. 
 
2.2.2 Top non-CEO executives’ pay 
The critical presumption proposed by prior studies underlying that interpretation is that 
more negative tone affects CEOs’ actions by influencing benefits to themselves, such as human 
capital and reputational cost (Liu and McConnell, 2013; Cheng et al., 2017). However, this 
evidence may neglect the widespread influence of the media on other top executives who may 
be adversely affected by CEOs’ actions. Core et al. (2008) report an insignificant association 
between media tone and CEO compensation. Their finding supports the view that it is hard for 
media to affect CEO compensation. Thus, it is plausible that the effect of the media on CEO 
behaviour may be driven by the compensation incentives of the top management team rather 
than those of the CEO.  
The economics perspective embodied in tournament theory contends that larger 
differences in compensation between the CEO and other executives may motivate senior 
executives in the face of agency problems (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter and 
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Sanders, 2002). However, this argument may overlook the role of coordination because the top 
management team functions as an interdependent group. Top executives play a more important 
role in coordinating firms and their activities, typically in larger firms. Behavioural theories 
propose that pay inequality undermines coordination by creating feelings of relative 
deprivation among subordinates (Cowherd and Levine, 1992; Henderson and Fredrickson, 
2001).   
Jensen and Murphy (1990) document that the alignment of interests between top 
managers and shareholders can be affected by differences in pay. The determination of equity 
compensation for top managers may increase the level of behavioural integration, and 
ultimately return superior firm performance (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002). Thus, a smaller 
pay gap between the CEO and top managers may be the outcome of aligned interests between 
shareholders and managers. In addition, the top management team excluding the CEO can be 
thought of as an information-processing centre for an organization in its relationship with its 
environment (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Thompson, 2017). Behaviourally integrated top 
managers help firms to adapt to changing competitive environments by processing information 
at a more rapid pace.  
The media is a platform within the information environment. Previous literature reports 
that media coverage shapes perceptions of firms and CEOs, subsequently influencing firm 
benefits (Dyck et al., 2008; Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Liu 
et al., 2017). Presuming firms’ decisions that are adverse to shareholders’ interests, Dyck et al. 
(2008) find that executives are more likely to reverse these decisions when confronted by 
greater media coverage. Thus, top executives play a complementary role in response to media 
coverage by aligning with shareholders’ interests.  
Based on this argument, we anticipate a negative relation between negative media tone 
and CEO dominance as a consequence of increasing top managerial compensation. Therefore,  
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H2: A negative media tone increases the Top4 executives’ average compensation. 
 
2.2.3 Internal and external governance mechanism 
Early literature argues that internal and external governance mechanisms can be viewed as 
substitutes (Pound, 1992). Jensen (1993) claims that the market for corporate control is the 
most efficient monitor due to the failure of internal control mechanisms. A firm with poor 
internal governance may be more closely followed by external monitors to make up for the 
lack of sufficient internal monitoring. However, previous literature does not answer the 
question of whether firms with both strong internal and external governance mechanisms 
perform differently to firms that have only one of these two mechanisms, particularly in 
reference to the monitoring of CEO actions. 
Recent research shows that internal and external governance mechanisms complement 
each other, and that both types of governance are necessary to guarantee effective monitoring 
(Cremers and Nair, 2005; Lara et al., 2009). The main argument put forward by Cremers and 
Nair (2005) is that the market for corporate control (external governance) is important only in 
the presence of shareholder activism (internal governance). Although strong external 
governance disciplines managers to pursue shareholder interests, the internal governance 
mechanism is required for the external mechanism to function, which leads to a complementary 
relation between the two mechanisms. Specifically, external governance cannot effectively 
monitor firm management without a strong internal governance mechanism. 
Internal governance reinforces the effectiveness of external governance and vice versa. 
Lara et al. (2009) consider the complementary relation between internal and external 
governance mechanisms and its role in the implementation of accounting conservatism. The 
efficiency of internal governance mechanisms increases in the presence of strong external 
monitoring. The improved efficiency, in turn, is then directly responsible for the day-to-day 
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managerial monitoring. In other words, strong internal governance on its own is not sufficient 
to mediate CEO compensation and influence. Thus, 
H3: The negative relation between negative media tone and CEO dominance should be more 
pronounced when the firm has a good internal corporate governance mechanism. 
 
2.3 Data  
Our sample consists of the CEO and the other Top4 highest-paid executives for all S&P 500 
companies over the 19-year period from 1996 to 2014, as identified in the ExecuComp 
database.2 We consider calendar years rather than fiscal years to simplify the search. Although 
most of the S&P 500 firms have December year-ends, the difference between calendar and 
fiscal years is minimal in our sample. Media data are manually collected from articles in the 
Factiva database. We gather data on CEO characteristics and compensation for the five highest-
paid managers from the ExecuComp database. Information on firm characteristics is sourced 
from Compustat and the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Governance variables 
are obtained from RiskMetrics, ExecuComp, and the Compustat databases. 
 
2.3.1 Media tone 
To construct the negative tone measures, following the prior literature, we rely on four major 
newspapers and one magazine: (1) The Wall Street Journal, (2) The Washington Post, (3) The 
New York Times, (4) USA Today, and (5) Forbes (Core et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2008; Bednar, 
2012; Bednar et al., 2013). Media data are manually collected from news articles in the Factiva 
database by searching for the name of the CEO and the firm collectively as reported in the 
ExecuComp database. To ensure that we capture all articles regarding the CEO and the firm, 
                                                             
2 We restrict our empirical analysis to S&P 500 companies due to the extensive manual collection process of news 
articles from the Factiva database. 
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we also search for shortened names (e.g., Dan for Daniel) and common nicknames (e.g., Chuck 
for Charles). In addition, we also consider the name of the firm managed by the CEO and the 
stock ticker symbol (e.g., BLL for Ball Corporation) as search criteria.  
We develop a PERL program to analyse the text of each article following previous 
studies by Bednar (2012), Liu and McConnell (2013), Bajo and Raimondo (2017), and  Cheng 
et al. (2017). To make sure we include only relevant articles, we impose certain criteria to 
eliminate irrelevant articles which provide no valid information (e.g., a firm or a CEO included 
in a list or table). Articles containing fewer than 50 words are not included in our sample 
(Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013; Liu and McConnell, 2013). We impose one further 
requirement that the news articles contain the CEO’s family name and the firm name at least 
twice (Liu and McConnell, 2013; Cheng et al., 2017). Finally, our sample does not include 
articles that have irrelevant titles.3 We identify these titles and articles via a random reading of 
approximately 500 articles from the sample (Core et al., 2008). 
We calculate the percentage of negative words using the Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) financial dictionary relative to the total number of words in each article. Negative tone 
(Negtone) is equal to the mean score for the negative words category from all articles about a 
particular firm in a given year.4 In addition, we also consider the number of articles for each 
CEO in a given year.  
  
                                                             
3 We exclude some articles with contents unrelated to the firms and CEOs, such as a list or table, for example, an 
article entitled "Top 100 CEOs" which reports a ranking list of CEOs with the highest compensation. In addition, 
we also do not consider articles including combined and compounded news, such as “Business and Finance”, 
“What’s on Friday”, and “Insider on Time”. These articles consist of more than 10 news sections and only one of 
the sections relates to the firm and CEO that are of interest to us. 
4 The financial dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011) shows a list of negative words category, such as 
“bad”, “damage” and “deceive” (see Appendix C).   
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2.3.2 CEO pay slice  
We consider CPS as the measure of CEO dominance. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we 
compute CPS based on total compensation as presented in equation (2.1) below.  
𝐶𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐶𝐸𝑂  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑝 𝐹𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡
                                         (2.1) 
CPS is defined as the ratio of the CEO’s total compensation relative to the sum of the 
compensation paid to the top five executives (including the CEO). 5  Total compensation 
includes salary, bonus, other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock granted during the 
year, the Black and Scholes value of stock options granted during the year, long-term incentive 
payouts, and all other total compensation (as reported in ExecuComp item TDC1). Following 
the change in executive compensation reporting requirements due to FAS123R in 2006,  
ExecuComp compensation data are not comparable before and after 2006 (Coles et al., 2007; 
Brockman et al., 2016). We follow the approach proposed by Coles et al. (2007) and applied 
by Brockman et al. (2016) to adjust ExecuComp's total compensation (TDC1) data in the pre-
2006 period. Appendix A shows additional details on such adjustment. We restrict our sample 
to those observations where the CEO was in office for two consecutive years. The intuition 
behind using CPS is to capture the observable and unobservable dimensions of the firm’s top 
executives’ compensation model. We argue that CPS captures dimensions of the CEO’s role 
in the top team beyond the measure of board involvement.  
 
2.3.3 Compensation measure 
We consider CEO pay and four non-CEO executives’ pay in our sample.6 CEO pay is total 
compensation of the CEO. CEO long-term pay includes the total value of restricted stock 
                                                             
5 Firms are required to report the compensation for anyone holding office, which includes the CEO and all other 
executives. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), we restrict the sample to firms that report compensation for only 
five executives. We exclude those firms that report compensation for fewer than five executives. 
6 Four executives are the highest paid non-CEO executives. 
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granted, value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and others.  Top4 pay is 
defined as the average total pay of the Top4 executives excluding the CEO. Top4 long-term 
pay is the average long-term pay of Top4 non-CEO executives. 
 
2.3.4 Internal corporate governance 
Stakeholders in the firm, particularly subordinate managers, are more important for internal 
corporate governance. Even if the CEO acts on individual short-term private interest, 
stakeholders can force the CEO to act in a more public-spirited and far-sighted way (Acharya 
et al., 2011). Thus, we look at the corporate internal governance to assess the dominance of the 
CEO relative to the board and top management team. 
Following prior literature, we consider four common items—the board size (Baldenius 
et al., 2014), independent directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983), CEO duality (Adams et al., 2005), 
and key subordinate executives’ horizon (Cheng et al., 2015)—as metrics of the internal 
governance index.7 By combining all four items into one factor, we create a factor score that 
equally weights each of the internal governance items. The internal governance index is based 
on the average of the sum of the four metrics. A higher index score indicates better internal 
governance.  
 
2.3.5 Control variables 
Following prior literature, we construct firm and CEO characteristics as the control variables 
(Bebchuk et al., 2011; Bednar et al., 2013). CPS has a rich set of relations with firm 
performance and behaviour (Bebchuk et al., 2011). We control for industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
                                                             
7 The board size indicator equals one if board size is greater than the median value in a given year and zero 
otherwise. The independent director indicator equals one when the percentage of independent directors is greater 
than the median value in a given year and zero otherwise. The CEO duality indicator equals zero if the CEO is a 
chairman and one otherwise. The subordinate executive horizon equals one if their horizon is greater than the 
median value in a given year and zero otherwise.  
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Q as a measure of firm value, following a substantial literature on the association between firm 
value and various corporate arrangements (Yermack, 1997; Gompers et al., 2003). We also 
control for firm size using the natural log of assets,8 Leverage, ROA, Capex/Assets, R&D, 
Company age, and Diversified using data from the Compustat and CRSP databases.       
We employ CEO characteristics controls used in Bebchuk et al. (2011), including 
Relative equity, CEO age, CEO tenure, and CEO outsider. Firms with an insider CEO may be 
more heterogeneous in nature, implying CEO talent is hard to replicate in the firm (Parrino, 
1997). However, an outsider CEO can receive more compensation attributed to a unique 
individual skill set (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007).  
We also consider governance characteristics in our empirical model. We control for a 
number of board characteristics. Numerous board governance variables are obtained through 
the ExecuComp and CRSP databases. This includes CEO ownership, Number of vice 
presidents (VPs), and Insider ownership following Bebchuk et al. (2011). We also consider the 
roles of the Chairman and the Founder as control variables. The size of the board is more likely 
to influence the CEOs’ dominance. We also obtain commonly used measures of corporate 
governance quality from the RiskMetrics database, including the percentage of appointed 
directors (Appointed), percentage of independent directors (Independent), board interlocking, 
and board size.   
 
2.3.6 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables.9 We 
present the variable definitions in Appendix B. We find that the mean CPS is 40%, which is 
                                                             
8 The empirical results reported in this paper use the natural log of total assets to control for firm size, which is 
consistent with the control measure used by Bebchuk et al. (2011). However, we also estimate the models using 
the natural log of market capitalization and the natural log of revenue (Core et al., 2008), respectively, as separate 
controls for firm size. Our results using these measures of firm size from the unreported estimations are consistent 
with those reported throughout the paper. 
9 Appendix D provides descriptive statistics with the number of industries and firms for each year.  
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consistent with the number (i.e., 35.7%) reported by Bebchuk et al. (2011). As shown in the 
media variables section, the average Negtone is approximately 0.961%. Thus, on average, 
0.961% of the words in the articles about the CEO and the firm have a negative tone in a 
financial context. The summary statistics for firm and CEO characteristics are also reported in 
Table 1. The average measures for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and Leverage are similar to 
those reported by Bhagat and Bolton (2008). The mean of CEO tenure is approximately 7.2, 
which is consistent with the variable reported in Bebchuk et al. (2011). The summary statistics 
for the other variables show that the average CEO age, Chairman, and Board size are around 
56, 0.65, and 10.31, respectively. These values are comparable to the ones reported in 
Brockman et al. (2016).   
Table 2.2 presents a matrix of estimated correlation coefficients for media measures 
and control variables. Consistent with our expectation, the Negtone and CPS variables are 
negatively correlated at 3.3%. While the rank order correlation is slightly higher for some 
variables (notably, Firm size and Board size = 51.4%; Insider ownership and CEO ownership 
= 46.8%; Company age and Firm size = 45.4%; Number of article and Firm size = 43.1%; 
Leverage and R&D = 42.7%), the variance inflation factors from the empirical estimations are 
all below 3 (not reported), which indicates that multicollinearity is not a concern for the 
regression analysis. 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Univariate analysis  
We first investigate the relation between negative media tone and CPS at the univariate level. 
We categorise firms into high and low CPS based on the median value of CPS for all firms in 
a given year. We compute net change in CPS based on the difference of CPS from t-1 to t. The 
annual median negative media tone is used to divide our sample of firms into two negative 
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media-tone portfolios for each previous year. Firms with a negative media tone below (above) 
than the median are categorised as low (high) negative tone.  
The results in Table 2.3 report CPS and the net change in CPS for the current year with 
low and high negative media tone. Panel A shows that the average CPS for firms with low 
negative tone is 40.71%, while the average CPS for firms with high negative tone is 39.47%. 
The difference between the average CPS for low- and high-negative-tone groups is statistically 
significant. We observe similar patterns for both high CPS and low CPS. In Panel B, 6.67% of 
CEOs receiving a low negative media tone experience a net decrease in their CPS. In 
comparison, 7.54% of CEOs with a high negative media tone experience a net decrease in their 
CPS. The difference between net decreases in CPS for high and low negative media tone is 
negative and statistically significant. The overall findings suggest that high negative media tone 
is associated with a lower level of CPS and a higher net decrease in CPS.  
 
2.4.2 Impact of negative tone on CPS 
In this section, we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between negative 
tone and CEO dominance. As discussed above, we measure CEO dominance by relying on 
total compensation following Bebchuk et al. (2011) in year t. All standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level to account for correlations within firm observations.10 The control variables 
include Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q, Log book value, Leverage, ROA, Capex/Assets, R&D, 
Company age, Diversified, Relative equity compensation, CEO tenure, and CEO Outsider, 
along with firm and year fixed effects. We also include governance control variables as a 
subsequent robustness test. The full descriptions of the control variables are provided in 
Appendix B. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 2.4.  
                                                             
10 We also use two-way clustered standard errors for firm and year level. The coefficients of Negtone have the 
same sign and similar level of statistical significance. Similarly, we re-run regressions for Tables 2.5 and 2.6 with 
errors clustered at the firm and year levels, the unreported results do not change. 
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The pooled panel regression results, displayed in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4, indicate 
a strong negative association between negative tone and CPS. Negtone reports a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient with and without governance control variables. In Column 
1, Negtone has strong economic significance: a one-standard-deviation increase in negative 
tone (equal to 0.921) decreases CPS by 0.705.11  Similarly, in Column 2, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the negative tone of media coverage translates into a decrease in CPS of 
0.634.12 The findings imply that CEO dominance as measured by CPS is diminished when 
media coverage has a more negative tone. Thus, the more bad press a CEO and his/her firm is 
exposed to, the greater the subsequent decrease in CPS. The findings are consistent with our 
prediction and provide some evidence that media tone plays an important governance role by 
influencing CEO dominance. 
 
2.4.3 The impact of negative tone on the CEO and Top4 non-CEO executives’ 
compensation 
Next, we examine the association between negative tone and the compensation of the CEO and 
other Top4 executives. The results of tests performed are presented in Table 2.5. We present 
the estimation results for the second hypothesis in which the dependent variables include CEO 
pay, CEO long-term pay, Top4 pay, and Top4 long-term pay.  
As shown in Columns 1 and 2, the coefficient on Negtone is positive but insignificant, 
indicating that negative tone has no influence on CEO pay. Similarly in Columns 5 and 6, there 
is no association between negative and CEO long-term pay. These results are consistent with 
the finding of Core et al. (2008), who find no significant relation between media tone and CEOs’ 
compensation. 
                                                             
11 0.765 × 0.921 = 0.705 
12 0.688 × 0.921 = 0.634 
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In Columns 3 and 4, we find that the coefficient on Negtone is positive and statistically 
significant. The results in Columns 3 and 4 show that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
Negtone is associated with a $0.869 million and $0.523 million increase in median average 
Top4 compensation, respectively.13 Similarly, from Columns 7 and 8, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in Negtone translates into an increase in median average Top4 executive compensation 
of $0.777 million and $0.372 million, respectively.14 The finding implies that media tone 
affects Top4 executives’ compensation to moderate CEO dominance, but has no relation with 
the CEO’s compensation.  
 
2.4.4 Negative tone and corporate governance 
We further examine the association between negative tone and CPS by taking into 
consideration the role of a firm’s internal corporate governance mechanism. We conduct our 
analysis on the relationship between CPS and negative media tone using the subsamples of 
firms with good and poor internal corporate governance. This allows us to account for one 
potential explanation, as documented by Core et al. (2008), that poorly governed firms are 
unable or unwilling to respond to external stress, thereby resulting in media tone having no 
observed influence on the CEOs. To do this, we rely on several governance proxies (e.g., board 
size, independent directors, CEO duality, and key subordinate executives’ horizon) to construct 
a governance index. The results are reported in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6 reports the subsample analysis after separating the firms in accordance to the 
level of internal governance (poor or good) as determined by the governance index. The 
governance index is defined as the average of the four internal governance metrics: board size, 
independent directors, CEO duality, and key subordinate executives’ horizon. The internal 
                                                             
13 0.349 × 0.921 × $2.703 million = $0.869 million and 0.210 × 0.921 × $2.703 = $0.523 million. 
14 0.312 × 0.921 × $2.703 million = $0.777 million and 0.195× 0.921 × $2.703 million = 0.372 million. 
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governance index ranges from zero to one, where higher values indicate stronger internal 
corporate governance and less entrenched management. We also consider blockholders 
ownership as a control variable. In Table 2.6, we do not find any significant association 
between negative media tone and CPS for firms with poor internal governance, as shown in 
Columns 1 and 2. The result is consistent with the above explanation from Core et al. (2008). 
We then find strong evidence that negative media tone significantly decreases CEO dominance 
for firms with good internal governance. The coefficient on Negtone is negative and 
statistically significant (p<0.01), as reported in Column 3 and 4. Overall, the findings support 
our conjecture that the effect of media on CEO dominance is stronger for firms with good 
internal governance. This result is consistent with the complementary relation between the 
internal and external governance mechanisms (Cremers and Nair, 2005), whereby media serves 
as an effective external governance mechanism for firms in the presence of good internal 
governance.  
 
2.5 Robustness tests 
2.5.1 Endogeneity 
A potential concern with our empirical analysis is that CEOs with higher compensation 
experience more negative media coverage (Core et al., 2008). This association may lead to a 
reverse causality problem. To address this concern, we use an instrumental variable approach 
and estimate our model using a 2SLS framework. For media, we consider an instrument along 
the lines proposed by Gurun and Butler (2012). The finding of Gurun and Butler (2012) implies 
that a firm located near to the headquarters of media outlets receives media coverage with a 
less negative tone compared with those firms located further away. We consider a dummy 
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variable, Location, which equals one if both the firms and the headquarters of media outlets 
are located in the same state.15   
The results of the first-stage pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regression in which 
Negtone is the dependent variable are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7. The models 
in Column 1 exclude governance variables and the model in Column 2 includes these control 
variables. We find Location to be negatively related to Negtone and statistically significant, as 
shown in Columns 1 and 2, respectively. This is consistent with prior research that a firm 
located further away from the media source is more likely to receive negative media coverage 
(Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Gurun and Butler, 2012; You et al., 2017).  
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7, we report the results of the second-stage regression 
in which we use CPS as the dependent variable and the predicted variables for Negtone together 
with the other control variables used in Table 2.4. The coefficient on Negtone is negative and 
statistically significant when excluding and controlling for governance control variables 
(p<0.01). These findings are consistent with the view that CEOs will experience a decrease in 
CPS after exposure to media coverage with a negative tone in the prior year. Overall, the results 
reported in Table 2.7 support our conjecture; that is, negative media tone today reduces CEO 
dominance in the future. Therefore, these results imply that media tone plays an important 
monitoring role by influencing CEO dominance. 
 
2.5.2 Pre-2006 versus post-2006 periods 
In 2006, the vast majority of firms switched to new reporting requirements (FAS123R), making 
the disclosure of executives’ compensation relative to pre-2006 directly incomparable (Coles 
et al., 2014). Changes in compensation disclosure may affect the construction of CPS. In Table 
2.8, given this significant change in executives’ compensation disclosure, we examine the role 
                                                             
15 We find 20% of firms in our sample to be located in the same state as the main media outlets. 
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of negative tone on CEO dominance in the 1996–2005 period (Columns 1 and 2) and the 2007–
2014 period (Columns 3 and 4), respectively. We find that the coefficient of Negtone is 
negative and statistically significant during the post-2006 period. The robustness test suggests 
that the effect of negative tone on CPS is more prevalent in the recent years. The importance 
of more recent observations is consistent with the influence and prominence of the media and 
their role in society as a disseminator of information during the latter part of the study. 
Therefore, it makes intuitive sense that we find greater association in the post-2006 period 
when compared with the pre-2006 period. This result is also consistent with the technological 
and cultural change in the role and impact of the media concerning the communication of 
information. Our results on negative tone in the post-2006 period are consistent with the main 
findings presented in Table 2.4.  
 
2.5.3 Firm without media coverage  
Our primary sample includes firms without media coverage; in this case, the value of negative 
media tone is set to zero. One may argue that firms without media attention could potentially 
affect our results. We address this concern in two ways by re-estimating the model reported in 
Table 2.4. First, following Liu and McConnell (2013), we set negative media tone to the 
average negative tone in the two-digit SIC group for each year if a firm has no media exposure. 
The result is shown in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.9. The Negtone coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant, which is consistent with the results reported in Table 2.4. Second, we 
omit firms without media coverage to eliminate the influence of these firms on our results. The 
estimated coefficients for Negtone reported in Columns 3 and 4 still have the same sign and 




2.5.4 Positive favourability in media coverage 
This study only considers the influence of negative media tone on CEO dominance. It omits 
positive media tone because prior literature has shown little incremental information from 
positive words (Kothari et al., 2002; Tetlock, 2007; Liu et al., 2017). However, we define a 
new measure of media tone called positive favourability. Positive favourability is defined as 
the difference between the number of positive and negative words, divided by the number of 
words in each article. Compared with negative media tone, we argue that positive favourability 
is more likely to increase CEO dominance. We then re-estimate the models reported in Table 
2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 using this measure.   
In Table 2.10, we find the coefficient of positive favourability is positively associated 
with CPS. This suggests that CEO dominance increases when media tone conveys greater 
positive favourability. The result in Table 2.11 finds that greater positive favourability results 
in the decrease in Top4 pay (Top4 long-term pay) but has no influence in CEO pay (CEO long-
term pay). The finding is consistent with Table 2.5, suggesting top non-CEO executives play a 
complementary role in responding to media tone as way to affect CEO dominance. As shown 
in Table 2.12, the significant positive regression coefficient on the Positive favourability 
variable suggests a positive relation between positive favourability and CEO dominance for 
firms with good internal corporate governance. Consistent with the explanation as proposed by 
Cremers and Nair (2005), our finding suggests that media tone serves as an effective monitor 
in well-governed firms.   
 
2.5.5 Clustering by CEO-firm combination 
One may argue that clustering by the CEO-firm combination in a regression may yield different 
inferences in tests involving executive pay variables (Black, 2018). To address this concern, 
we re-estimate the regressions reported in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6, adjusted by CEO-firm 
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combination clustering. As shown in Tables 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15, the results show that the 
negative media tone coefficients continue to have the same regression coefficient signs and the 
same levels of statistical significance, which provide consistent estimates with those reported 
in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6.  
 
2.5.6 Interaction of negative tone and number of articles 
Unnoticed bad news is no worse than good news that goes equally unnoticed. In this section, 
we attempt to investigate the interaction of negative tone and number of articles on CEO 
dominance. We argue that the interaction effect of negative tone and number of articles should 
play an important role in corporate governance. The results are reported in Tables 2.16, 2.17, 
and 2.18.   
In Table 2.16, the sign of regression coefficients for the Negtone and Number of articles 
variables are similar to Table 2.4. We find the interaction of Negtone and Number of articles 
to be negatively related with CPS. The finding implies that the level and tone of media coverage 
appear to have an impact on CEO dominance, which supports our main findings in Table 2.4. 
The results in Table 2.17 find that negative tone, coupled with the number of articles, is 
positively associated with Top4 pay and their long-term pay. Consistent with findings in Table 
2.5, we find media tone affects CEO dominance through the influence on top executives. The 
results, as shown in Table 2.18, indicate that CEO dominance within a good internal 
governance framework decreases when his/her firm is subject to greater negative media tone 
coupled with a higher level of media coverage, which also supports our main findings in Table 




2.5.7 Media tone and residual CPS 
We examine the association between media tone and residual CPS to predict if negative tone 
does discipline CEOs to bring their CPS more in line with a firm’s ‘optimal level of CEO pay 
slice’. The results are shown in Table 2.19. Residual (CPS) is computed as the error term from 
estimating the regression of CPS on firm-specific and other factors in the regression model, as 
specified in Table 2.4, but excluding Negtone and number of articles. We then use Residual 
(CPS) as the dependent variable in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.19 to investigate the effect of 
negative tone on residual CPS. The coefficient of Negtone is negative and statistically 
significant. The finding is consistent with the results in Table 2.4 and lends additional support 
to the monitoring role of media on corporate governance. 
 
2.5.8 The effect of media tone on change in CPS, change in CEO pay, and change in Top4 
non-CEO executives’ pay 
Change in CPS may be more likely to represent the change in their fortunes within the firm. 
We further consider the impact of media tone on change in CPS, change in CEO pay, and 
change in Top4 non-CEO executives’ pay. Table 2.20 reports the regression results examining 
the association between negative tone to change in CPS, change in CEO pay, and change in 
Top4 pay. Change in CPS is a ratio of CPS in year t to CPS in year t-1. Similarly, change in 
CEO pay is the current CEO pay divided by previous CEO pay. Change in Top4 pay is the 
percentage of Top4 pay in year t compared with previous year Top4 pay. We find that the 
coefficient of Negtone is negative and statistically significant in Columns 1 and 2. The negative 
relation between negative tone and change in CPS indicates that current negative tone may 
restrict CEO dominance in the following year. We also find that negative tone is positively 
related to change in Top4 pay but does not affect change in CEO pay. The results show that 
the change in top non-CEO executives’ compensation moderates change in CEO dominance 
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when the news articles include greater negative tone. The finding is consistent with our first 
and second hypothesis.  
 
2.5.9 Alternative measures of CEO dominance 
We also consider alternative measures of CEO dominance to investigate the relation between 
negative media tone and CEO dominance. Early studies have applied different formal status 
variables to measure CEO dominance within the top executive team, such as a firm’s founder 
(Morck and Shleifer, 1989; Adams et al., 2005). The unreported results show that negative 
media tone has no impact on these formal status variables. However, these results do not mean 
that media is being ineffective in monitoring CEO dominance. Bebchuk et al. (2011) argue that 
CPS as a measure of CEO dominance captures more than the formal status variables, but these 
variables explain only a small part of the variability in CPS. Our results support the superiority 
of CPS as a proxy of CEO dominance and is consistent with the view of Bebchuk et al. (2011).  
 
2.5.10 Extreme observations 
To address concerns that the empirical associations are the spurious results of extreme 
observations, we re-estimate the models reported in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 in which variables 
are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile. The unreported finding continues to show a 
negative association between negative tone and CPS, which is consistent with our main results. 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
Media plays a powerful role for public discourse in shaping the public's perceptions of various 
issues (Rogers et al., 1993). The role of media concerning corporate governance also continues 
to be an extremely controversial topic. Core et al. (2008) show an insignificant relation between 
media tone and CEO compensation. One interpretation of this result is that a change in 
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compensation policy may be difficult to detect when negative media attention imposes a cost 
on firms. The interpretation of the Core et al. (2008) result provided an idea that the CEO 
dominance may be influenced by negative media tone. We consider CEO pay slice (CPS) as a 
proxy of CEO dominance to investigate the association between media tone and CEO benefits. 
Drawing on previous literature that provides evidence on the monitoring role of the media 
(Dyck et al., 2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013; Cheng et al., 2017), we argue that a more 
negative media tone is associated with a reduction in managerial dominance.  
This study  provides an evidence on the negative association between negative tone and 
CEO dominance, thereby supporting the presumption of Cheng et al. (2017) and the market-
disciplining hypothesis of (You et al., 2017). This is consistent with the prior literature that 
views the media as an information intermediary, and scholars believe that the media is an 
important communication tool (Bushee et al., 2010). In addition, we use CPS as a measure of 
CEO dominance given that such measure captures more CEO characteristics than the 
traditional proxy (i.e., president, chairman, and founder) to explain the association between 
media coverage and CEO dominance. Our overall findings support the role of media tone as a 
corporate governance mechanism that influences CEO dominance.  
A larger difference in the pay between the CEO and other executives affects interests’ 
alignment between these executives and shareholders (Jensen, 1979), and decreases their level 
of behavioural integration (Hambrick, 1995; Carpenter and Sanders, 2002), especially in 
responding to competitive environments. CPS also reflects the difference in pay gap among 
these top executives. Thus, we argue that the decrease in CPS driven by negative tone can be 
explained by the effect of negative tone on the Top4 executives’ compensation. Our research 
finds that negative tone is positively related with Top4 executive compensation, but is not 
associated with CEO compensation. This result is consistent with the finding of Core et al. 
(2008). Specifically, it proposes a new angle that media tone affects Top4 executives’ 
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compensation to moderate CEO dominance. The finding also provides a potential explanation 
for the relation between media tone and CEO dominance by focusing on the complementary 
role of the Top4 executives in response to negative media tone. 
Furthermore, this research seeks to find an approach that overcomes the dilemma cited 
by Core et al. (2008) by examining the association between negative tone and CEO dominance 
under poor- and well-governed firms. This is achieved by taking into consideration the firm’s 
internal corporate governance mechanism. It is possible that CEOs are more sensitive to media 
in firms with good internal governance, and, as a consequence, the media can and does play a 
monitoring role in firm governance (Cheng et al., 2017). Using a self-constructed governance 
index, we report largely consistent findings in support of our conjecture. We show that the 
negative relation between negative tone and CEO dominance is concentrated among firms with 
good internal governance. Consistent with the complementary relation between internal and 
external governance mechanisms, as documented by Cremers and Nair (2005), we find media 
serves as an effective external governance mechanism in firms with good internal governance.   
We acknowledge that this research is not the only way to investigate the association 
between media tone and CEO benefits using the influence of media tone on CPS. Future work 
may consider other potential variables with respect to CEO benefits. Furthermore, one may 
build on this research and investigate whether the current results extend to different contexts 
(i.e., similar effects on CEO matters in different countries or cultures). One could look at 
different types of media, such as websites or social news. In summary, we hope that this study 




Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics  
This table reports the number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum for each variable in the sample. The variables are grouped according to the 
following classifications: CEO dominance, media, firm-specific, CEO-specific, and 
governance-specific. The sample contains 4,534 observations for all S&P 500 firms in 
ExecuComp from 1996 to 2014. Definitions for all variables are provided in Appendix B.  
  
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std Dev.    Min     Max 
CPSt (%) 4,295 39.966 41.053 11.437 3.923 70.393 
Change in CPSt 4,030 0.006 0.006 0.342 -1.368 1.412 
CEO payt ($million) 4,534 10.167 7.576 9.870 0.399 65.319 
CEO long-term payt ($million) 4,345 6.647 4.596 8.199 0.000 56.605 
Top4 payt ($million) 4,295 3.711 2.703 3.551 0.457 23.409 
Top4 long-term payt ($million) 4,499 2.248 1.450 2.805 0.000 18.959 
Negtone (%) 4,534 0.961 0.953 0.921 0.000 3.728 
Number of articles 4,534 6.349 1.000 15.163 0.000 104.000 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 4,529 2.266 1.948 1.151 0.929 7.127 
Firm size 4,533 8.847 8.792 1.342 5.693 12.359 
Leverage 4,521 0.305 0.193 0.365 0.000 1.938 
ROA (%) 4,533 16.842 16.223 7.880 -6.896 41.885 
Capex/assets (%) 4,505 5.619 4.090 4.826 0.513 25.811 
R&D 4,534 0.044 0.006 0.088 0.000 0.649 
Company age (years) 4,348 32.787 31.917 17.918 3.917 63.917 
Diversified 4,532 0.921 1.000 0.270 0.000 1.000 
Relative equity 4,319 1.128 1.123 0.456 0.000 2.780 
CEO age (years) 4,301 55.662 56.000 6.349 40.000 74.000 
CEO tenure (years) 4,534 7.182 5.417 6.038 1.000 31.000 
CEO outsider 4,534 0.146 0.000 0.353 0.000 1.000 
CEO ownership 4,534 0.227 0.000 0.419 0.000 1.000 
Chairman 4,534 0.645 1.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
Founder 4,534 0.066 0.000 0.249 0.000 1.000 
Number of VPs 4,534 1.422 1.000 1.458 0.000 4.000 
Insider ownership 4,534 0.009 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.192 
Appointed (% ) 3,497 56.741 46.154 42.843 0.000 100.000 
Independent (%) 3,497 0.744 0.778 0.155 0.250 0.923 
Board interlock 3,497 0.042 0.000 0.200 0.000 1.000 




Table 2.2 Correlation  
This table reports the correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in this study. The table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients 
for CEO dominance, media, firm, CEO, and governance control variables. Definitions for all variables are provided in Appendix B. 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 CPS 1.000            
2 Negtone -0.033 1.000           
3 Number of articles -0.127 0.244 1.000          
4 Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q -0.090 -0.056 0.011 1.000         
5 Firm size 0.051 0.358 0.431 -0.259 1.000        
6 Leverage -0.018 0.004 0.043 -0.167 0.071 1.000       
7 ROA 0.005 -0.070 -0.049 0.303 -0.134 -0.326 1.000      
8 Capex/assets -0.039 -0.051 -0.036 -0.042 -0.027 0.105 0.172 1.000     
9 R&D -0.076 0.002 -0.010 0.165 -0.182 0.427 -0.300 -0.087 1.000    
10 Company age 0.180 0.167 0.073 -0.222 0.454 -0.064 -0.080 -0.122 -0.151 1.000   
11 Diversified 0.035 0.018 0.050 0.050 0.089 -0.066 0.025 -0.181 -0.014 0.122 1.000  
12 Relative equity  0.144 -0.016 -0.109 -0.079 0.000 0.002 0.014 0.006 -0.037 0.084 0.001 1.000 
13 CEO age 0.032 -0.030 -0.044 -0.140 0.139 -0.004 0.016 0.010 -0.095 0.113 0.032 0.030 
14 CEO tenure -0.095 -0.048 -0.017 0.037 -0.099 0.051 -0.009 0.082 0.072 -0.153 -0.023 -0.113 
15 CEO outsider -0.047 0.006 0.014 0.063 -0.121 0.020 -0.052 0.013 0.158 -0.124 -0.033 -0.035 
16 CEO ownership 0.023 -0.041 -0.063 -0.070 -0.081 0.016 -0.030 -0.041 0.002 -0.083 -0.056 -0.026 
17 Chairman 0.056 -0.040 -0.034 -0.037 0.047 -0.046 0.033 0.097 -0.107 0.114 -0.001 -0.014 
18 Founder -0.122 -0.009 0.063 0.112 -0.162 0.104 -0.110 0.149 0.258 -0.258 -0.058 -0.051 
19 Number of VPs 0.128 0.008 -0.057 -0.169 0.119 0.081 -0.075 -0.089 0.049 0.071 -0.022 0.006 
20 Insider ownership -0.085 -0.004 0.028 -0.013 -0.074 -0.005 -0.037 0.003 -0.005 -0.126 -0.010 -0.076 
21 Appointed 0.022 0.098 0.082 -0.023 0.192 0.032 -0.013 -0.090 -0.029 0.087 -0.014 0.000 
22 Independent 0.195 0.128 -0.020 -0.108 0.263 0.025 -0.061 -0.066 0.013 0.264 0.050 0.042 
23 Board interlock -0.013 -0.040 -0.001 -0.002 -0.028 -0.043 0.029 0.018 -0.034 0.002 0.016 0.038 





Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Variables       13   14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13 CEO age 1.000 
           
14 CEO tenure 0.335 1.000 
          
15 CEO outsider -0.010 0.151 1.000 
         
16 CEO ownership 0.064 0.260 0.009 1.000 
        
17 Chairman 0.079 0.105 -0.078 0.086 1.000 
       
18 Founder -0.011 0.346 0.142 0.125 0.001 1.000 
      
19 Number of VPs -0.011 0.025 -0.052 0.394 0.084 0.003 1.000 
     
20 Insider ownership -0.003 0.294 0.020 0.468 0.029 0.292 0.126 1.000 
    
21 Appointed 0.017 0.028 -0.056 0.255 -0.006 -0.055 0.371 0.089 1.000 
   
22 Independent 0.026 -0.085 0.008 0.187 0.069 -0.054 0.372 -0.005 0.193 1.000 
  
23 Board interlock 0.052 0.017 0.002 -0.092 0.024 -0.044 -0.158 -0.050 -0.082 -0.239 1.000 
 






Table 2.3 Univariate analysis 
This table reports CPS and net change in CPS for the current year with different types of 
negative media tone. Negative media tone is measured by the average ratio of negative-toned 
words to total words and the median is used to divide our sample of firms into two negative 
media-tone portfolios for each previous year: low negative tone and high negative tone. We 
categorise firms into high and low CPS based on the median value of CPS for all firms in a 
given year, and compute net change in CPS from t-1 to t. All variables are defined in Appendix 
B. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A: CPS 
  Negative media tone 
  Low High Low-High 
CPS 40.71 39.47    1.24*** 
   (3.45) 
High CPS 48.71 48.06    0.65** 
   (2.06) 
Low CPS 32.46 31.03    1.43*** 
      (3.59) 
Panel B: Net change in CPS from t-1 to t 
  Negative media tone 
  Low High Low-High 
Net increase in CPS 6.73 6.97 -0.24 
   (-0.64) 
Net decrease in CPS 6.67 7.54    -0.87** 





Table 2.4 Media tone and CPS  
This table reports the panel regression of CPS on negative tone. Following Loughran and 
McDonald (2011), Negtone is defined as the negative tone computed as the average ratio of 
negative-toned words to total words. Control variables include Number of articles, firm-
specific and CEO-specific variables. Firm-specific variables include Industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
Q, Firm size, Leverage, ROA, Capex/asset, R&D, Company age, and Diversified. CEO-
specific variables include Relative equity, CEO age, CEO tenure, and CEO outsider. 
Governance control variables include CEO ownership, Chairman, Founder, Number of VPs, 
Insider ownership, Appointed, Independent, Board interlock, and Board size. All control 
variables are measured at time t-1. The models are fitted using firm fixed-effects regressions 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The variables are as defined in 
Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at 




Negtone    -0.765***    -0.688*** 
 (-3.893) (-3.233) 
Number of articles -0.021 -0.036 
 (-0.887) (-1.081) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.097 0.133 
 (0.253) (0.281) 
Firm size -0.607 -0.801 
 (-0.853) (-0.850) 
Leverage -1.388 -1.181 
 (-1.344) (-1.046) 
ROA 0.043 0.032 
 (0.930) (0.613) 
Capex/assets 0.0570 -0.007 
 (0.775) (-0.071) 
R&D 2.502 2.112 
 (1.199) (0.863) 
Company age    0.430***  0.245* 
 (4.688) (1.794) 
Diversified 1.228 1.093 
 (1.008) (0.794) 
Relative equity 0.505 0.381 
 (1.002) (0.734) 
CEO age -0.090 -0.089 
 (-1.319) (-1.167) 
CEO tenure -0.075 -0.112 
 (-0.995) (-1.213) 
CEO outsider -0.374 -0.543 
 (-0.282) (-0.352) 
Constant    34.663***    42.656*** 
 (5.244) (4.976) 
Observations 3,690 3,038 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.055 
Firm fixed effects YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
Governance control variables NO YES 
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Table 2.5 Media tone and the compensation of the CEO and Top4 non-CEO executives  
This table reports the panel regression of the compensation of the CEO and Top4 non-CEO executives on negative tone. CEO pay is total 
compensation of the CEO. CEO long-term pay include the total value of restricted stock granted, value of stock options granted, long-term incentive 
payouts and others.  Top4 pay is defined as the average total pay of Top4 executive except for the CEO.  Top4 long-term pay is average long-term 
pay of Top4 non-CEO executive. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The models are fitted using firm fixed-effects regressions based 
on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
variables 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
CEO payt   Top4  payt   CEO long-term payt   Top4 long-term payt 
Negtone 0.169 0.060    0.349
***   0.210**  0.225 0.119    0.312
***  0.195** 
 (0.724) (0.254)  (2.828) (2.199)  (1.021) (0.551)  (2.652) (2.282) 
Number of articles  -0.143**  -0.131*    -0.052
** -0.025   -0.139
** -0.117    -0.051
** -0.018 
 (-2.244) (-1.783)  (-2.243) (-1.450)  (-2.122) (-1.593)  (-2.158) (-1.440) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 2.510 2.883  1.861
*  2.538*  2.389 2.760  1.804
*  2.584* 
 (1.523) (1.211)  (1.757) (1.896)  (1.460) (1.166)  (1.732) (1.948) 
Log book value 0.329 1.278  0.137 0.289  0.017 0.824  -0.147 -0.336 
 (0.218) (0.840)  (0.254) (0.594)  (0.011) (0.544)  (-0.262) (-0.777) 
Leverge -1.634 -1.444  0.072 0.349  -1.579 -1.289  0.069 0.576 
 (-1.409) (-1.104)  (0.117) (0.505)  (-1.398) (-1.034)  (0.115) (0.874) 
ROA 0.135 0.164  -0.037 -0.046  0.0112 0.150  -0.043 -0.071 
 (1.118) (1.174)  (-0.641) (-0.701)  (0.934) (1.075)  (-0.774) (-1.106) 
Capex/asset     0.132 -0.046  0.016 -0.041  0.170 -0.007  0.024 -0.018 
 (0.850) (-0.386)  (0.306) (-0.907)  (1.115) (-0.057)  (0.469) (-0.457) 
R&D 0.721 -0.652  -1.697 -2.728  0.428 -1.057  -1.760 -3.061
* 
 (0.352) (-0.222)  (-1.086) (-1.487)  (0.213) (-0.368)  (-1.145) (-1.650) 
Company age   0.486** 0.232   0.129
** 0.126*   0.388
** 0.175  0.096 -0.032 
 (2.496) (0.908)  (2.196) (1.947)  (2.003) (0.710)  (1.630) (-0.607) 
Diversified  -2.228*  -3.653**  -0.733 -1.233
*  -2.257
*  -3.674**  -0.699 -0.995 
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 (-1.659) (-2.106)  (-1.241) (-1.661)  (-1.716) (-2.155)  (-1.247) (-1.509) 
Relative equity 0.605 0.657  0.121 0.123  0.595 0.637  0.031 0.018 
 (0.991) (0.964)  (0.727) (0.683)  (1.046) (0.989)  (0.289) (0.159) 
CEO age  -0.336* -0.329*  -0.009 -0.009  -0.337
* -0.345*  -0.015 -0.000 
 (-1.780) (-1.707)  (-0.119) (-0.220)  (-1.756) (-1.845)  (-0.198) (-0.005) 
CEO tenure 0.265 0.243  0.063 0.065  0.234 0.230  0.065 0.013 
 (1.093) (0.877)  (0.886) (1.145)  (0.964) (0.847)  (0.948) (0.508) 
CEO outsider 1.525 3.574*  0.031 0.934
*  0.908 2.678
*  0.005 0.707 
 (0.698) (1.774)  (0.051) (1.704)  (0.472) (1.676)  (0.008) (1.395) 
Constant 1.214 4.550  -5.256 -6.875
**  4.280 6.696  -2.471 0.524 
 (0.086) (0.323)  (-0.881) (-2.091)  (0.291) (0.475)  (-0.416) (0.154) 
Observations 3,905 3,212  3,690 3,038  3,874 3,187  3,874 3,187 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.027  0.122 0.219  0.026 0.027  0.128 0.272 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 





Table 2.6 Media tone and internal corporate governance 
This table reports the panel regression of the CPS on negative tone based on subsample analysis 
of firms with internal corporate governance mechanisms. Governance index consists of four 
governance indicators (including board size, independent directors, CEO duality, and key 
subordinate executives’ horizon) that are related with internal corporate governance 
mechanism. Column 2 and 4 include governance variables but exclude Chairman, Independent, 
Board size and Blockholder ownership. All independent variables and control variables are 
measured at time t-1. The models are fitted using firm fixed-effects regressions based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CPSt 
  Poor internal governance Good internal governance 
Negtone 0.189 0.309    -1.043***    -0.979*** 
 (0.513) (0.806) (-4.245) (-3.577) 
Number of articles -0.106 -0.112 0.014 0.014 
 (-1.504) (-1.424) (0.709) (0.509) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.075 -0.116 -0.032 -0.027 
 (0.111) (-0.180) (-0.096) (-0.071) 
Firm size -0.250 0.777 -0.370 -1.124 
 (-0.152) (0.448) (-0.483) (-0.931) 
Leverage -0.686 -0.542 -1.501  -2.014* 
 (-0.359) (-0.227) (-1.434) (-1.670) 
ROA -0.035 -0.082 0.076* 0.074 
 (-0.394) (-1.007) (1.739) (1.463) 
Capex/asset 0.079 0.146 0.074 -0.067 
 (0.771) (1.259) (0.789) (-0.534) 
R&D 1.281 1.097 3.626**  4.146* 
 (0.321) (0.180) (1.973) (1.750) 
Company age  0.466** 0.291   0.404*** 0.245* 
 (2.009) (0.884) (3.982) (1.684) 
Diversified -0.047 -1.171 1.145 0.719 
 (-0.022) (-0.512) (0.797) (0.434) 
Relative equity  -0.504 -0.520  1.441**   1.428** 
 (-1.177) (-1.126) (2.444) (2.175) 
CEO age -0.081 -0.211 -0.070 -0.048 
 (-0.563) (-1.336) (-0.910) (-0.613) 
CEO tenure -0.148 -0.055 -0.022 -0.060 
 (-0.891) (-0.291) (-0.280) (-0.576) 
CEO outsider    8.072***   9.873*** -0.874 -0.935 
 (3.604) (3.397) (-0.667) (-0.597) 
Constant 32.577**  30.329**  30.316***   37.771*** 
 (2.353) (2.054) (4.372) (3.511) 
Observations 1,079 978 2,611 2,012 
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.089 0.070 0.077 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Governance control variables NO YES NO YES 
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Table 2.7 The association between media tone and CPS by instrumental variable 
estimations 
This table presents regression results for the 2SLS analysis. Columns 1 to 2 report the results 
of the first-stage pooled OLS regression when using Negtone as the dependent variable. 
Location is a dummy variable equal to one if both the firms and the headquarters of media 
outlets are located in the same state, zero otherwise. Columns 3 to 4 present the second-stage 
regression on predicted Negtone. Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific 
and CEO-specific variables, and governance variables. T-statistics (in parentheses) are based 
on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. All independent variables and control 
variables are measured at time t-1. All variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions 
include firm and year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
        First-stage   Second-stage 
Variables (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Negtone   CPSt 
Location    -0.197**   -0.185**    
 (-2.510) (-2.086)    
Negtone          -0.604 
***   -0.633*** 
    (-14.131) (-10.615) 
Number of articles     0.008***     0.009***      0.458
***    0.503*** 
 (4.248) (4.328)  (10.563) (8.015) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q -0.025* -0.021     -1.397
***  -1.144** 
 (-1.802) (-1.441)  (-3.379) (-2.251) 
Firm size    0.118** 0.063    6.471
***   2.935** 
 (2.588) (1.044)  (5.807) (2.497) 
Leverage 0.011 0.056  -0.709   2.615
** 
 (0.219) (0.986)  (-0.688) (2.117) 
ROA    -1.144***    -1.448***       -0.640
***    -0.884*** 
 (-3.296) (-3.556)  (-10.518) (-9.794) 
Capex/assets 0.653 0.841      0.447
***     0.533*** 
 (1.498) (1.419)  (5.413) (5.285) 
R&D 0.079 -0.094     7.165
***  -4.674* 
 (0.664) (-0.548)  (3.384) (-1.826) 
Company age     -0.007***    -0.012***      1.385
***    0.861*** 
 (-3.943) (-3.556)  (20.937) (6.169) 
Diversified -0.011 0.047  0.544 3.730
*** 
 (-0.122) (0.452)  (0.447) (2.639) 
Relative equity  0.004 0.006  0.775 0.809 
 (0.209) (0.266)  (1.528) (1.552) 
CEO age    -0.013***    -0.016***       -0.889
***    -1.069*** 
 (-3.071) (-3.028)  (-10.885) (-9.625) 
CEO tenure 0.004 0.006    0.193
**    0.334*** 
 (0.985) (1.100)  (2.420) (3.314) 
CEO outsider -0.036 -0.047   -2.504
* -3.380** 
 (-0.421) (-0.473)  (-1.914) (-2.227) 
Constant   1.041**   1.336**    41.009
***    81.993*** 
 (2.335) (2.186)  (6.351) (10.928) 
Observations 3,905 3,212  3,690 3,038 
Adjusted R2 0.390 0.413  0.052 0.051 
Firm fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 
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Year fixed effects YES YES  YES YES 




Table 2.8 Media tone and CPS: pre-2006 versus post-2006 periods 
This table reports the regression of CPS on negative tone in the 1996–2005 (Columns 1 and 2) 
and 2007–2014 periods (Columns 3 and 4), respectively. Control variables include Number of 
articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. All 
independent variables and control variables are measured at time t-1. The models are fitted 
using firm fixed-effects regressions based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CPSt 
  Year<2006  Year>2006 
Negtone -0.749** -0.339       -0.700***       -0.738*** 
 (-2.327) (-0.958) (-2.874) (-2.638) 
Number of articles -0.016 -0.000 0.042 0.055 
 (-0.667) (-0.008) (1.470) (1.241) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q -0.142 -0.023 0.007 -0.375 
 (-0.470) (-0.077) (0.015) (-0.719) 
Firm size -0.706 -0.977 -1.449 -1.719 
 (-0.787) (-0.651) (-1.294) (-1.223) 
Leverage -1.286 -0.931 -0.767 -0.859 
 (-1.171) (-0.712) (-0.605) (-0.583) 
ROA 0.054 0.112 0.044 0.039 
 (0.634) (1.400) (0.964) (0.737) 
Capex/assets 0.0143* 0.037 -0.153 -0.076 
 (1.659) (0.314) (-1.518) (-0.652) 
R&D 3.560 2.895 -0.869 -2.349 
 (1.638) (1.088) (-0.385) (-0.948) 
Company age 0.841***        0.629***   0.336** 0.181 
 (5.164) (2.773) (2.298) (0.735) 
Diversified 0.680 -0.167 1.278 1.907 
 (0.369) (-0.077) (1.312) (1.622) 
Relative equity  0.178 -0.027 -0.324 -0.172 
 (0.418) (-0.075) (-0.504) (-0.261) 
CEO age -0.148 -0.066 -0.141 -0.003 
 (-1.273) (-0.418) (-1.412) (-0.032) 
CEO tenure 0.001 0.012 0.077 0.054 
 (0.013) (0.077) (0.591) (0.297) 
CEO outsider 2.903   4.210** 2.464 -0.028 
 (1.622) (2.130) (1.015) (-0.010) 
Constant 26.236*** 29.895** 50.017*** 55.360*** 
 (2.850) (2.249) (4.387) (3.403) 
Observations 1,669 1,285 2,021 1,753 
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.047 0.028 0.038 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.9 Firm without media coverage 
This table reports the regression of CPS on negative tone. In Columns 1 and 2, for each year, 
we set negative tone to the average negative tone in the two-digit SIC group if the firm is 
without media press coverage. In Columns 3 and 4, we omit firms without media coverage. 
Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and 
governance control variables. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions 
include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CPSt 
Negtone    -0.850***    -0.845***   -0.999***    -0.916*** 
 (-3.604) (-3.259) (-3.540) (-2.892) 
Number of articles -0.022 -0.036 0.001 -0.015 
 (-0.935) (-1.093) (0.026) (-0.392) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.097 0.132 0.071 0.086 
 (0.254) (0.279) (0.146) (0.160) 
Firm size -0.646 -0.805 -1.474 -2.179 
 (-0.909) (-0.853) (-1.367) (-1.584) 
Leverage -1.388 -1.162 -2.646* -2.666 
 (-1.333) (-1.019) (-1.828) (-1.374) 
ROA 0.043 0.031 0.024 0.003 
 (0.922) (0.606) (0.346) (0.046) 
Capex/assets 0.059 -0.005 0.034 -0.099 
 (0.801) (-0.058) (0.340) (-0.969) 
R&D 2.535 2.133 4.328 4.664 
 (1.209) (0.867) (1.626) (1.165) 
Company age    0.436*** 0.248*   0.342*** 0.252 
 (4.757) (1.810) (2.605) (1.453) 
Diversified 1.234 1.097 1.221 1.938 
 (1.006) (0.796) (0.738) (1.056) 
Relative equity 0.504 0.380 0.944 0.519 
 (1.000) (0.732) (1.400) (0.709) 
CEO age -0.087 -0.087 -0.089 -0.086 
 (-1.277) (-1.142) (-0.934) (-0.829) 
CEO tenure -0.077 -0.114 -0.063 -0.125 
 (-1.027) (-1.244) (-0.614) (-1.009) 
CEO outsider -0.380 -0.554 -2.308 -2.880 
 (-0.286) (-0.359) (-1.246) (-1.269) 
Constant 34.943*** 42.882***   46.454*** 55.618*** 
 (5.283) (5.012) (4.499) (4.187) 
Observations 3,690 3,038 2,386 1,978 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.055 0.048 0.054 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 





Table 2.10 The effects of positive favourability on CPS 
This table reports the regression of CPS on positive favourability in media coverage. We 
measure positive favourability using the difference between number of positive words and 
number of negative words in articles to divide by number of total words. Control variables 
include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control 
variables. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are 





Positive favourability   0.632***   0.584*** 
 (3.255) (2.815) 
Number of articles -0.023 -0.037 
 (-0.941) (-1.112) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.102 0.139 
 (0.267) (0.292) 
Firm size -0.612 -0.793 
 (-0.858) (-0.839) 
Leverage -1.375 -1.171 
 (-1.327) (-1.032) 
ROA 0.045 0.034 
 (0.967) (0.651) 
Capex/assets 0.058 -0.004 
 (0.791) (-0.053) 
R&D 2.455 2.085 
 (1.171) (0.848) 
Company age    0.405*** 0.220 
 (4.369) (1.601) 
Diversified 1.271 1.132 
 (1.044) (0.826) 
Relative equity 0.506 0.381 
 (1.008) (0.738) 
CEO age -0.090 -0.090 
 (-1.321) (-1.179) 
CEO tenure -0.074 -0.111 
 (-0.981) (-1.199) 
CEO outsider -0.374 -0.543 
 (-0.282) (-0.351) 
Constant   35.133***    43.131*** 
 (5.314) (5.037) 
Observations 3,690 3,038 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.054 
Firm fixed effects YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 





Table 2.11 The effect of positive favourability on the compensation of the CEO and Top4 non-CEO executives 
This table reports the regression of CEO pay (CEO long-term pay) and Top4 pay (Top4 long-term pay) on positive favourability in media coverage. 
Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. The variables are as 
defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
CEO payt   CEO long-term payt   Top4 payt   Top4 long-term payt 
Positive favourability -0.197 -0.097  -0.270 -0.164     -0.333
*** -0.179*    -0.315
***  -0.207** 
 (-0.834) (-0.421)  (-1.192) (-0.766)  (-2.641) (-1.827)  (-2.628) (-2.364) 
Number of articles  -0.143** -0.132*   -0.139
** -0.117    -0.052
** -0.024    -0.051
** -0.018 
 (-2.247) (-1.785)  (-2.126) (-1.595)  (-2.235) (-1.435)  (-2.156) (-1.448) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 2.510 2.883  2.389 2.760  1.860
*  2.536*   1.803
*  2.583* 
 (1.523) (1.211)  (1.461) (1.166)  (1.756) (1.895)  (1.731) (1.948) 
Firm size 0.323 1.273  0.007 0.817  0.134 0.286  -0.153 -0.342 
 (0.213) (0.837)  (0.004) (0.539)  (0.247) (0.587)  (-0.271) (-0.790) 
Leverage -1.638 -1.449  -1.585 -1.296  0.066 0.346  0.063 0.570 
 (-1.413) (-1.108)  (-1.403) (-1.040)  (0.107) (0.503)  (0.105) (0.868) 
ROA 0.135 0.165  0.113 0.150  -0.037 -0.047  -0.043 -0.071 
 (1.122) (1.181)  (0.939) (1.082)  (-0.646) (-0.710)  (-0.775) (-1.106) 
Capex/assets 0.131 -0.047  0.169 -0.008  0.015 -0.042  0.023 -0.019 
 (0.845) (-0.391)  (1.107) (-0.065)  (0.287) (-0.911)  (0.450) (-0.476) 
R&D 0.728 -0.642  0.436 -1.043  -1.679 -2.720  -1.746  -3.047
* 
 (0.355) (-0.219)  (0.218) (-0.363)  (-1.080) (-1.488)  (-1.142) (-1.650) 
Company age  0.492** 0.236    0.397
** 0.181    0.141
** 0.134**   0.107
* -0.024 
 (2.495) (0.916)  (2.032) (0.732)  (2.383) (2.006)  (1.811) (-0.436) 
Diversified  -2.241* -3.660**  -2.275
* -3.686**  -0.757  -1.245
*  -0.720 -1.009 
 (-1.663) (-2.103)  (-1.722) (-2.154)  (-1.281) (-1.677)  (-1.285) (-1.531) 
Relative equity 0.604 0.657  0.595 0.636  0.121 0.123  0.031 0.017 
 (0.990) (0.964)  (1.044) (0.988)  (0.722) (0.681)  (0.286) (0.157) 
CEO age -0.335* -0.328*  -0.335
* -0.344*  -0.008 -0.009  -0.014 0.001 
 (-1.775) (-1.706)  (-1.749) (-1.841)  (-0.109) (-0.213)  (-0.186) (0.037) 
CEO tenure 0.265 0.242  0.233 0.229  0.062 0.065  0.065 0.012 
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 (1.090) (0.876)  (0.960) (0.844)  (0.875) (1.138)  (0.938) (0.478) 
CEO outsider 1.527  3.576*  0.910  2.680
*  0.032  0.934
*  0.006 0.709 
 (0.699) (1.775)  (0.473) (1.678)  (0.053) (1.707)  (0.011) (1.403) 
Constant 1.063 4.439  4.071 6.517  -5.508   -7.022
**  -2.708 0.328 
 (0.075) (0.315)  (0.277) (0.463)  (-0.921) (-2.120)  (-0.455) (0.096) 
Observations 3,905 3,212  3,874 3,187  3,690 3,038  3,874 3,187 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.027  0.026 0.027  0.122 0.219  0.128 0.272 
Firm fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year dummy YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 





Table 2.12 Positive favourability and internal corporate governance 
This table reports the regression of CPS on positive favourability under internal corporate 
governance. Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific 
variables, and governance control variables. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All 
regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CPSt 
  Poor internal governance Good internal governance 
Positive favourability -0.254 -0.371    0.899***    0.874*** 
 (-0.661) (-0.943) (3.695) (3.221) 
Number of articles -0.106 -0.123 0.013 0.012 
 (-1.504) (-1.578) (0.641) (0.449) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.080 -0.023 -0.022 -0.033 
 (0.117) (-0.035) (-0.067) (-0.085) 
Firm size -0.255 0.429 -0.377 -1.000 
 (-0.155) (0.252) (-0.492) (-0.833) 
Leverage -0.677 -0.601 -1.496 -1.966 
 (-0.355) (-0.256) (-1.415) (-1.628) 
ROA -0.035 -0.080 0.078* 0.079 
 (-0.394) (-0.952) (1.784) (1.585) 
Capex/assets 0.078 0.128 0.078 -0.070 
 (0.769) (1.147) (0.832) (-0.566) 
R&D 1.292 1.203 3.597* 4.177* 
 (0.324) (0.201) (1.921) (1.756) 
Company age   0.472** 0.371    0.367*** 0.204 
 (2.043) (1.179) (3.588) (1.388) 
Diversified -0.073 -0.816 1.186 0.657 
 (-0.034) (-0.353) (0.824) (0.413) 
Relative equity -0.507 -0.420 1.436**   1.331** 
 (-1.182) (-0.910) (2.442) (2.101) 
CEO age -0.080 -0.174 -0.069 -0.046 
 (-0.557) (-1.109) (-0.905) (-0.588) 
CEO tenure -0.147 -0.067 -0.019 -0.060 
 (-0.889) (-0.362) (-0.247) (-0.573) 
CEO outsider    8.083***   8.761*** -0.872 -1.153 
 (3.609) (3.195) (-0.663) (-0.736) 
Constant   32.416**   35.435**   31.087***   40.793*** 
 (2.339) (2.445) (4.478) (3.915) 
Observations 1,079 990 2,611 2,048 
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.081 0.068 0.073 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 





Table 2.13 Clustering by the CEO-firm combination: media tone and CPS 
This table reports the panel regression of CPS on negative tone. Control variables include 
Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. 
All independent variables and control variables are measured at time t-1. The models are fitted 
using firm fixed-effects regressions based on robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm 
level. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are 





Negtone    -0.665***   -0.495** 
 (-3.458) (-2.395) 
Number of articles 0.001 0.004 
 (0.051) (0.214) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.118 0.209 
 (0.258) (0.395) 
Firm size -0.624 -0.104 
 (-0.633) (-0.083) 
Leverage -1.516* -1.504 
 (-1.651) (-1.355) 
ROA 0.079  0.097* 
 (1.507) (1.925) 
Capex/asset 0.083 0.056 
 (1.331) (0.764) 
R&D 3.842* 3.898 
 (1.774) (1.488) 
Company age 2.031 2.023 
 (1.109) (1.038) 
Diversified 0.256 0.541 
 (0.207) (0.397) 
Constant 29.284   53.487** 
 (1.411) (2.167) 
Observations 3,690 3,038 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.026 
CEO-firm fixed effects YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
CEO-specific variables YES YES 




Table 2.14 Clustering by the CEO-firm combination: the effect of media tone on CEO and Top4 non-CEO executives’ compensation 
This table reports the panel regression of CEO and Top4 executives’ compensation on negative tone. Control variables include Number of articles, 
firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. All independent variables and control variables are measured at time 
t-1. The models are fitted using firm fixed-effects regressions based on robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm level. The variables are 
as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Variables 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
CEO payt  CEO long-term payt  Top4 payt  Top4 long-term payt 
Negtone 0.232 0.051  0.254 0.085    0.331
*** 0.168*     0.295
*** 0.170* 
 (0.902) (0.215)  (1.043) (0.390)  (2.831) (1.837)  (2.704) (1.841) 
Number of articles -0.076 -0.099  -0.069 -0.095  -0.021
* -0.027  -0.020
* -0.026* 
 (-1.485) (-1.204)  (-1.344) (-1.148)  (-1.800) (-1.586)  (-1.873) (-1.861) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 3.013 3.338  2.904 3.210  2.318
*   2.975**   2.279
*  2.938* 
 (1.503) (1.201)  (1.462) (1.161)  (1.807) (1.993)  (1.814) (1.957) 
Firm size 0.406 0.462  0.018 0.274  0.564 -0.417  0.445 -0.403 
 (0.263) (0.252)  (0.011) (0.149)  (1.537) (-0.449)  (1.339) (-0.481) 
Leverage -0.380 -0.145  -0.397 -0.224  0.545 1.020  0.525 0.949 
 (-0.366) (-0.108)  (-0.381) (-0.169)  (0.695) (1.133)  (0.701) (1.075) 
ROA   0.144** 0.138  0.135
** 0.127  -0.047 -0.083  -0.048 -0.083 
 (2.209) (1.596)  (2.004) (1.437)  (-0.744) (-1.151)  (-0.797) (-1.137) 
Capex/asset 0.047 -0.024  0.091 0.032  -0.043 -0.060  -0.031 -0.048 
 (0.463) (-0.232)  (0.910) (0.306)  (-0.915) (-1.382)  (-0.696) (-1.156) 
R&D -1.736 -3.237  -1.840 -3.343  -2.955 -4.527
*  -2.978 -4.429
* 
 (-0.904) (-0.885)  (-0.948) (-0.914)  (-1.437) (-1.888)  (-1.496) (-1.872) 
Company age   -6.337**   -5.971**  -5.299
* -5.014*     -3.317
***    -2.973***     -3.417
***    -3.108*** 
 (-2.339) (-2.203)  (-1.802) (-1.664)  (-5.721) (-4.476)  (-6.619) (-5.160) 
Diversified   -3.760**   -5.043**   -3.524
**  -4.685**  -1.182  -2.000
*  -1.110  -1.969
* 
 (-2.482) (-2.265)  (-2.313) (-2.109)  (-1.373) (-1.802)  (-1.366) (-1.796) 
Constant 302.106*** 330.179***  289.250
*** 311.963***    71.740
*** 59.204*   74.146
***  67.076** 
 (7.251) (6.452)  (6.993) (6.049)  (3.323) (1.843)  (3.792) (2.381) 
Observations 3,905 3,212  3,874 3,187  3,690 3,038  3,874 3,187 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.025  0.024 0.026  0.149 0.268  0.152 0.263 
CEO-firm fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
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Year fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
CEO-specific variables YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 




Table 2.15 Clustering by the CEO-firm combination: media tone and internal corporate 
governance 
This table reports the panel regression of the CPS on negative tone based on subsample analysis 
of firms with internal corporate governance mechanisms. Control variables include Number of 
articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. All 
independent variables and control variables are measured at time t-1. The models are fitted 
using firm fixed-effects regressions based on robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm 
level. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. 
***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CPSt 
  Poor internal governance Good internal governance 
Negtone 0.290 0.511    -0.964
***   -0.846*** 
 
(0.826) (1.407) (-4.133) (-3.205) 
Number of articles -0.079 -0.135 0.011 0.022 
 
(-1.158) (-1.210) (0.704) (0.954) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.010 -0.293 -0.110 -0.093 
 
(0.012) (-0.379) (-0.278) (-0.204) 
Firm size 0.266 1.939 0.526 0.970 
 
(0.113) (0.787) (0.515) (0.544) 
Leverage -1.197 -1.069  -1.887
**   -2.224** 
 
(-0.573) (-0.425) (-2.141) (-2.056) 
ROA -0.074 -0.128 0.077  0.116
** 
 
(-0.708) (-1.379) (1.642) (2.304) 
Capex/asset 0.091 0.136 0.086 -0.005 
 
(0.842) (1.181) (0.962) (-0.044) 
R&D 2.229 1.783   4.410
** 4.736* 
 
(0.450) (0.274) (2.144) (1.837) 
Company age 1.784 1.404 -1.146 -0.479 
 
(0.750) (0.580) (-0.638) (-0.247) 
Diversified -0.263 -0.594 0.194 1.394 
 
(-0.099) (-0.214) (0.134) (0.886) 
Constant 76.363 72.245 17.366 38.002 
 
(1.146) (1.063) (0.749) (1.422) 
Observations 1,079 990 2,611 2,048 
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.048 0.035 0.038 
CEO-firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
CEO-specific variables YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.16 The interaction of negative tone and number of articles on CPS 
This table reports the regression of CPS on the interaction of negative tone and number of 
articles. Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, 
and governance control variables. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions 
include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 





Negtone    -0.589***   -0.499** 
 (-3.005) (-2.307) 
Number of articles 0.187* 0.191 
 (1.717) (1.508) 
Negtone × Number of articles   -0.110** -0.120* 
 (-2.084) (-1.917) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.097 0.136 
 (0.259) (0.293) 
Firm size -0.741 -0.897 
 (-1.087) (-0.978) 
Leverage -1.397 -1.148 
 (-1.355) (-1.018) 
ROA 0.034 0.021 
 (0.751) (0.407) 
Capex/asset 0.053 -0.011 
 (0.745) (-0.136) 
R&D 2.440 1.974 
 (1.169) (0.807) 
Company age    0.432***  0.229* 
 (4.800) (1.660) 
Diversified 1.215 1.041 
 (0.992) (0.755) 
Constant   34.768***   42.945*** 
 (5.389) (5.075) 
Observations 3,690 3,038 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.059 
Firm fixed effects YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES 
CEO-specific variables YES YES 




Table 2.17 The interaction of negative tone and number of articles on the compensation of the CEO and Top4 non-CEO executives 
This table reports the regression of CEO pay (CEO long-term pay) and Top4 pay (Top4 long-term pay) on the interaction of negative tone and 
number of articles. Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. The 
variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
CEO Payt   CEO long-term payt   Top4 Payt   Top4 long-term payt 
Negtone 0.222 0.299  0.264 0.374  0.205
* 0.104  0.171
* 0.094 
 (0.775) (0.924)  (0.951) (1.191)  (1.931) (1.407)  (1.734) (1.316) 
Number of articles -0.079 0.159  -0.091 0.191    -0.223
***  -0.152**    -0.223
***  -0.136** 
 (-0.442) (0.839)  (-0.497) (1.014)  (-2.799) (-1.981)  (-2.958) (-2.053) 
Negtone × Number of articles -0.034 -0.154  -0.025 -0.163    0.090
*** 0.068*    0.089
***  0.060** 
 (-0.391) (-1.435)  (-0.284) (-1.499)  (2.696) (1.953)  (2.964) (2.009) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 2.510 2.886  2.389 2.761   1.861
* 2.536*  1.804
* 2.491* 
 (1.524) (1.218)  (1.461) (1.173)  (1.766) (1.904)  (1.741) (1.866) 
Firm size 0.287 1.146  -0.015 0.687  0.247 0.342  -0.034 0.153 
 (0.195) (0.756)  (-0.010) (0.454)  (0.497) (0.752)  (-0.065) (0.356) 
Leverage -1.630 -1.411  -1.576 -1.257  0.080 0.331  0.059 0.270 
 (-1.398) (-1.070)  (-1.390) (-1.000)  (0.134) (0.490)  (0.102) (0.407) 
ROA 0.132 0.150  0.110 0.135  -0.029 -0.040  -0.036 -0.044 
 (1.125) (1.103)  (0.943) (0.996)  (-0.520) (-0.628)  (-0.656) (-0.690) 
Capex/asset 0.131 -0.052  0.170 -0.013  0.019 -0.038  0.027 -0.031 
 (0.843) (-0.438)  (1.109) (-0.111)  (0.369) (-0.887)  (0.528) (-0.759) 
R&D 0.695 -0.804  0.408 -1.212  -1.646 -2.651  -1.692 -2.587 
 (0.338) (-0.271)  (0.203) (-0.417)  (-1.075) (-1.482)  (-1.128) (-1.448) 
Company age  0.487** 0.214   0.389
** 0.156   0.126
**   0.135**   0.094
* 0.073 
 (2.502) (0.829)  (2.008) (0.625)  (2.233) (2.080)  (1.656) (1.258) 
Diversified -2.232*   -3.717**  -2.260
*  -3.743**  -0.723 -1.204  -0.689 -1.175
* 
 (-1.659) (-2.115)  (-1.713) (-2.162)  (-1.217) (-1.622)  (-1.224) (-1.654) 
Relative equity  0.607 0.686  0.597 0.667  0.118 0.112  0.025 -0.004 
 (0.995) (0.983)  (1.048) (1.010)  (0.696) (0.623)  (0.231) (-0.030) 
CEO age -0.332* -0.311*  -0.333
* -0.326*  -0.022 -0.018  -0.027 -0.022 
59 
 
 (-1.760) (-1.653)  (-1.737) (-1.787)  (-0.302) (-0.438)  (-0.367) (-0.576) 
CEO tenure 0.263 0.230  0.232 0.216  0.070 0.071  0.072 0.059 
 (1.081) (0.831)  (0.954) (0.795)  (1.007) (1.280)  (1.058) (1.114) 
CEO outsider 1.447 3.186  0.849 2.260  0.231  1.106
**  0.217  0.928
* 
 (0.670) (1.637)  (0.445) (1.455)  (0.378) (2.023)  (0.378) (1.764) 
Constant 1.270 4.995  4.320 7.148  -5.342   -7.038
**  -2.612 -4.470 
 (0.090) (0.353)  (0.294) (0.506)  (-0.918) (-2.123)  (-0.454) (-1.372) 
Observations 3,905 3,212  3,874 3,187  3,690 3,038  3,874 3,187 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.027  0.026 0.028  0.128 0.223  0.134 0.219 
Firm fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 





Table 2.18 The negative tone coupled with number of articles and CPS under internal 
and external governance  
This table reports the regression of CPS on the interaction of negative tone and number of 
articles under internal governance mechanism. Control variables include Number of articles, 
firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. The variables are 
as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables CPSt 
  Poor internal governance Good internal governance 
Negtone 0.279 0.368   -0.723
***   -0.619** 
 
(0.757) (0.949) (-3.015) (-2.287) 
Number of articles 0.016 -0.039 0.377
*** 0.433*** 
 
(0.112) (-0.265) (3.498) (3.025) 
Negtone × Number of articles -0.070 -0.047    -0.187
***    -0.217*** 
 (-0.987) (-0.662) (-3.494) (-3.017) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 0.078 -0.041 -0.027 -0.013 
 
(0.114) (-0.062) (-0.084) (-0.038) 
Firm size -0.251 0.465 -0.635 -1.331 
 
(-0.154) (0.273) (-0.873) (-1.195) 
Leverage -0.737 -0.621 -1.525 -1.924 
 
(-0.383) (-0.263) (-1.450) (-1.592) 
ROA -0.042 -0.084 0.061 0.054 
 
(-0.483) (-0.995) (1.419) (1.117) 
Capex/asset 0.080 0.130 0.067 -0.094 
 
(0.777) (1.153) (0.748) (-0.817) 
R&D 1.385 1.202 3.509
* 3.873 
 
(0.345) (0.200) (1.871) (1.627) 
Company age   0.472
** 0.351    0.399*** 0.222 
 
(2.042) (1.109) (4.045) (1.525) 
Diversified -0.039 -0.767 1.192 0.596 
 
(-0.018) (-0.333) (0.816) (0.372) 
Constant  31.715
** 35.118**   31.096***  42.097*** 
 
(2.322) (2.443) (4.725) (4.212) 
Observations 1,079 990 2,611 2,048 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.082 0.084 0.094 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
CEO-specific variables YES YES YES YES 




Table 2.19 The media tone and residual CPS 
We examine the association between media tone and residual CPS. In Columns 1 and 3, we 
compute Residual (CPS) by run regression of CPS on firm specific and other factors in the 
model in Table 2.4, but excluding Negtone and number of articles. We then use Residual (CPS) 
as dependent variable in Columns 2 and 4 to investigate the effect of negative tone on residual 
CPS. Control variables include Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, 
and governance control variables. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions 
include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CPSt Residual(CPS)  CPSt Residual(CPS) 
Negtone    -0.765
***    -0.688
*** 
  (-3.893)  (-3.233) 
Number of articles  -0.021  -0.036 
  (-0.887)  (-1.081) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q 0.122 -0.026 0.166 -0.033 
 (0.321) (-0.068) (0.352) (-0.069) 
Log book value -0.754 0.148 -0.949 0.148 
 (-1.045) (0.208) (-0.969) (0.157) 
Leverage -1.387 -0.001 -1.226 0.045 
 (-1.348) (-0.001) (-1.075) (0.040) 
ROA 0.053 -0.009 0.044 -0.012 
 (1.124) (-0.200) (0.841) (-0.234) 
Capex/asset 0.053 0.005 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.712) (0.061) (-0.127) (0.056) 
R&D 2.407 0.095 2.159 -0.047 
 (1.160) (0.045) (0.877) (-0.019) 
Company age   0.417*** 0.013 0.244* 0.001 
 (4.510) (0.139) (1.757) (0.007) 
Diversified 1.172 0.056 1.001 0.092 
 (0.961) (0.046) (0.727) (0.067) 
Relative equity 0.509 -0.003 0.380 0.001 
 (1.004) (-0.006) (0.733) (0.001) 
CEO age -0.074 -0.017 -0.070 -0.020 
 (-1.066) (-0.245) (-0.910) (-0.259) 
CEO tenure -0.082 0.007 -0.122 0.010 
 (-1.067) (0.091) (-1.301) (0.109) 
CEO outsider -0.438 0.063 -0.660 0.117 
 (-0.323) (0.048) (-0.417) (0.076) 
Constant  34.666*** -0.004   42.304*** 0.360 
 (5.258) (-0.001) (4.898) (0.042) 
Observations 3,690 3,690 3,038 3,038 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.006 0.049 0.006 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 





Table 2.20 The media tone and change in CPS, change in CEO pay and change in Top4 
non-CEO pay 
This table reports the regression of change in CPS, change in CEO pay and change in Top4 
non-CEO pay on negative tone. Change in CPS is a ratio of CPS at year t to CPS at year t-1. 
Similarly, change in CEO pay is current CEO pay divided by previous CEO pay. Change in 
Top4 pay is percentage of Top4 pay at year t to previous Top4 pay. Control variables include 
Number of articles, firm-specific and CEO-specific variables, and governance control variables. 
The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. 
variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in CPSt Change in CEO payt Change in Top4 payt 
Negtone   -0.018**   -0.017** -0.005 -0.004   0.023**  0.017* 
 (-2.231) (-2.131) (-0.417) (-0.325) (2.463) (1.746) 
Number of articles 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001  -0.003** -0.002* 
 (1.468) (1.372) (-0.977) (-1.167) (-2.116) (-1.785) 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q -0.032  -0.048** -0.028* -0.038* 0.011 0.020 
 (-1.544) (-2.131) (-1.791) (-1.765) (0.516) (0.889) 
Log book value -0.032 -0.038  -0.193***   -0.196***   -0.121***   -0.112*** 
 (-0.861) (-1.306) (-4.865) (-4.727) (-3.499) (-3.406) 
Leverage -0.011 0.009 -0.043 -0.048 -0.039 -0.068* 
 (-0.425) (0.232) (-1.180) (-1.064) (-1.146) (-1.906) 
ROA -0.002 -0.003 -0.005* -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.802) (-1.091) (-1.807) (-1.340) (-0.977) (-1.055) 
Capex/asset 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008* -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.422) (-0.231) (-0.445) (-1.721) (-1.562) (-1.346) 
R&D 0.001 0.004 -0.087 -0.040 -0.043 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.053) (-1.033) (-0.423) (-0.591) (-0.080) 
Company age 0.002 -0.002 0.009 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 
 (0.535) (-0.482) (1.583) (-0.208) (0.348) (-1.145) 
Diversified -0.061 -0.122 -0.063 -0.108 -0.027 0.021 
 (-0.844) (-1.495) (-0.757) (-1.161) (-0.512) (0.353) 
Relative equity  -0.184*** -0.153*** -0.258*** -0.213*** 0.038* 0.042* 
 (-2.938) (-2.728) (-2.951) (-2.632) (1.791) (1.784) 
CEO age -0.004* -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.670) (-1.243) (-1.124) (-1.467) (0.460) (-0.137) 
CEO tenure -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.005* 
 (-0.991) (-1.327) (-1.190) (-0.305) (0.254) (1.788) 
CEO outsider -0.009 0.047 -0.021 0.070 0.000 0.010 
 (-0.188) (0.889) (-0.307) (1.013) (0.009) (0.227) 
Constant   0.861***    1.188***    2.300*** 2.707*** -0.291 -0.354 
 (2.924) (3.758) (6.438) (5.974) (-1.052) (-1.140) 
Observations 3,485 2,867 3,904 3,212 3,486 2,867 
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.080 0.061 0.063 0.043 0.045 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 







Media Uncertainty and Firm Risk-taking 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is widely accepted that uncertainty plays a significant role in corporate decision-making.  
Prior literature suggests that greater uncertainty is associated with lower firm risk-taking 
activities (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2015; Bonaime et al., 2017). Risk-averse 
managers may implement conservative investment and financial policies to maintain a 
relatively safe position. However, uncertainty and firm risk may also exhibit a positive relation. 
Complex and uncertain environments may increase firm risk-taking behaviours driven by 
managerial choice (Palmer and Wiseman, 1999). Environmental factors can leave more room 
for CEOs and increase their discretion, which influences firms’ decisions and outcomes 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Hambrick, 2007). Li and Tang 
(2010) extend this view to propose that environmental factors may increase managerial 
discretion allowing an overconfident CEO to make risky decisions. Thus, environmental 
uncertainty has an impact on firms’ risk actions by influencing CEOs’ choices. In addition, 
greater uncertainty provides a lack of accurate feedback about firm’s fundamentals that leads 
to psychological biases (Hirshleifer, 2001). Therefore, firms’ profit predictability should be 
stronger among those firms with greater uncertainty because their managers tend to be 
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overconfident when firms’ performance is hard to value. In this research, we consider the effect 
of the information environment on firms’ risk-taking actions. The study extends the view that 
uncertainty in the media leads to greater firm risk-taking activities in the future. 
Rather than relying on common uncertainty proxies, such as policy uncertainty and 
market uncertainty, we consider information uncertainty. Specifically, we examine whether 
firms that are exposed to greater information uncertainty from media coverage are being more 
sensitive to managers’ perceptions of firm profitability, and as a result, are more risk seeking. 
Our first research question states: Is there a positive association between media uncertainty and 
firms’ stock return volatility? In addition, increasing stock return volatility may be driven by 
firms’ risky investment and financial policies (Coles et al., 2006; Cassell et al., 2012). Hence, 
the second research question states: Does media uncertainty affect the aggressiveness of firm 
policy decisions? 
Uncertainty refers to imperfect or unknown information. In this study, media 
uncertainty is a proxy for firm information. We measure information uncertainty by employing 
the “bag of words” approach using the uncertain words in media reports. Following the 
financial dictionary developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011), media uncertainty is 
defined as the percentage of uncertain words in articles to measure the uncertain tone of the 
media disclosure. In addition, media plays an important role of being an independent 
investigator (Bednar et al., 2013) and disseminator of information. Reporters and media outlets, 
through their efforts and independent investigations, discover newsworthy issues and events, 
to communicate via news reports. Market participants can use media disclosures to reduce 
information asymmetry. Thus, media uncertainty serves as a good proxy to examine the effect 
of information uncertainty on firm risk-taking.   
Underlying our analysis is the presumption that the media can affect firm outcomes in 
two ways. First, media provides a public platform that allows market participants to learn about 
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firms’ performance and CEOs’ abilities (Bednar et al., 2013). Second, the media characterizes 
firms’ performance and, thereby, helps to shape shareholder perceptions of the CEOs (Liu et 
al., 2017). Thus, we argue that media can affect firms’ outcomes by directing public attention 
to those firms and CEOs that embrace a more uncertain tone.  
Our sample consists of 4,549 firm-year observations sourced from Execucomp and 
Compustat databases during the 1996 to 2014 period. We measure the media uncertainty of all 
the news articles sourced from Factiva for each CEO during each year of the sample. Each 
article is then analysed using PERL software, categorising the tone of each article according to 
the level of uncertainty using the financial dictionary as proposed by Loughran and McDonald 
(2011).  
The results of the paper are consistent with the proposition that media uncertainty plays 
an important role in increasing stock return volatility. We find that media uncertainty is 
positively associated with a firm’s total risk. When we decompose total risk into both 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk, we find the impact of media uncertainty on firm risk to be 
driven by idiosyncratic risk and not systematic risk. This suggests that news associated with 
firm or CEO uncertainty leads to higher firm risk, as evidenced by the sensitivity of stock return 
volatility to uncertainty or vagueness in the public press. Additional analysis reveals that the 
increase in media uncertainty is associated with more risky investment and higher financial 
risk. This supports our supposition that risky firms prefer to take on investment that is more 
aggressive in nature and to adopt riskier financial policies. Overall, our findings suggest that 
uncertain information reported by media may change managers’ perceptions of firm 
profitability thereby resulting in higher risk-taking behaviours.  
Our study makes several important contributions. First, this study extends research 
examining the influence of uncertainty on firm risk-taking by relying on media uncertainty as 
a triggering mechanism. We depart from prior research using policy uncertainty and market 
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uncertainty (Bittlingmayer, 1998; Sarkar, 2000; Voth, 2002; Li and Tang, 2010; Flor and Hesel, 
2015) by proposing an association between media uncertainty and the volatility of stock 
returns, firm investment and financial activities. We provide important evidence that greater 
media uncertainty leads to firms being more risk-taking by influencing the prediction and the 
view of investors and managers on firm profitability.  
Second, we extend the effects of media on corporate finance. Previous studies generally 
consider the effect of media on: (1) detecting financial fraud (Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 2008); 
(2) impacting executive compensation (Core et al., 2008); (3) influencing strategic change 
(Bednar et al., 2013); (4) affecting managers’ capital allocation decisions (Liu and McConnell, 
2013); and (5) impacting CEO turnover (You et al., 2017). We deviate from the prior literature 
by examining the role of media uncertainty on firm risk-taking activities.  
Third, this chapter extends the research on behavioural finance. Our study provides 
evidence that greater media uncertainty leads to higher levels of risk-seeking behaviour. CEOs 
exposed to higher degrees of media uncertainty are associated with more risky policy choices 
and manage firms in a riskier manner.  
An interesting implication of our finding is that the uncertainties arising from media 
coverage influence firms’ decision-making. Investors and executives recognize that uncertain 
information dissemination plays a crucial role in determining firm decisions, while traditionally 
the focus has been on channels such as negative disclosure and bad analyst coverage (Chang 
et al., 2006; Bednar et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2017). Our finding supports the view that firms 
experiencing greater uncertainty, as measured via news disclosure, are more risk-taking.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview on the relationship 
between the media uncertainty and firm risk, and the link between media uncertainty, 
investment, and financial risk to develop our hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the source of 
the data, sample selection, and the construction of our key and control variables. The primary 
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empirical results are presented in Section 3.4, and robustness tests are reported in Section 3.5. 
Further analysis is shown in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes the paper. 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Media uncertainty and firm risk-taking 
Prior studies find that high levels of uncertainty are associated with fewer firm risk-taking 
activities (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2015; Bonaime et al., 2017). However, a 
positive relationship between uncertainty and firm risk-taking may also exist. Risk is defined 
as uncertainty about outcomes or events, especially with respect to the future (Miller and 
Bromiley, 1990). Uncertainty creates information ambiguity. When information is stable and 
reliable, the range of options for both firms and CEOs are significantly constrained (Hambrick 
and Finkelstein, 1987). In contrast, when information is unreliable or ambiguous, CEOs’ 
discretion is enhanced, which allows them to influence firm decisions and outcomes. 
Meanwhile, under uncertainty and crises, directors feel the need for greater direction and 
guidance from the CEOs (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). Thus, uncertainty can increase the 
possibility of CEO and firm risk-taking behaviours. Li and Tang (2010) report that uncertainty 
strengthens the positive relationship between CEO hubris and firm risk-taking. Therefore, 
uncertainty is an important factor influencing firm risk and, following the prior literature, we 
argue that uncertainty is associated with higher future firm risk-taking. Our paper differs from 
prior studies that consider market and policy uncertainty (Bittlingmayer, 1998; Voth, 2002). 
Instead, we examine the effect of uncertainty in a news content. 
Firm risk is commonly measured using the volatility of stock in the prior literature 
(Coles et al., 2006; Cassell et al., 2012). Engle and Ng (1993) set up a new model by defining 
the news impact curve that measures how information is incorporated into stock market 
volatility estimates. In this framework, information can increase stock return volatility. Ahmad 
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et al. (2016) propose that media content is related to financial market outcomes, especially in 
influencing stocks’ price and return. These results are consistent with the notion that 
information in news affects the riskiness of firm operations because media information is 
sensitive to the volatility of the underlying stock return. However, prior literature explains the 
importance of news focusing on investors’ perception of stocks. In this study, we posit that 
uncertain information not only affects investors’ perception of firms, but also leaves more 
space to managers to make risky decisions that influence future firm operations.   
Uncertainty generates ambiguous information which provides more options to investors 
and managers (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). More options may mean more opportunities. 
We predict that uncertain information in news reports may also reflect more opportunities for 
the CEOs, which leads to a change in their view of firm profitability and their subsequent 
investment behaviours. We compute a possible uncertainty measure (i.e., media uncertainty), 
as proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2011). Thus, 
H1: Media uncertainty is positively related to future stock return volatility. 
 
3.2.2 Media uncertainty and choice of firm policies 
The volatility of stock return will increase in the presence of higher uncertainty and that 
increase in volatility may be driven, in part, by an increase in the riskiness of firms’ investment 
and financial policies.  
The positive relation between uncertainty and firm risk-taking may be extended to 
CEOs’ concerns. Palmer and Wiseman (1999) proposed that environment’s impact on risk 
occurs primarily through managerial choices. Several studies attempt to examine specific 
environmental factors that determine the scope of managerial discretion (Hambrick and 
Finkelstein, 1987; Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Li and Tang, 2010). Managerial discretion 
allows CEOs to more strongly influence firms’ decisions and outcomes (Finkelstein and Boyd, 
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1998; Hambrick, 2007; Li and Tang, 2010). Previous literature relies on market environmental 
factors, such as market munificence, market complicity and market uncertainty. However, in 
this study, we use media uncertainty to describe unpredictable and unstable environment 
because the media captures an aspect of information environment.  
The impact of environmental uncertainty on investment and financial policies indicates 
an argument concerning media uncertainty and firm risk-taking activities. Firms exposed to 
greater information uncertainty following news reports may create more managerial discretion 
which results in managers being more risk seeking. This may explain why firms exposed to 
greater media uncertainty prefer to take on more risky decisions. 
Following the prior literature (Coles et al., 2006; Cassell et al., 2012), we consider 
investment and financial risk as potential risk seeking channels. In this research, we expect 
firms that experience media uncertainty to be more likely to engage in riskier investment and 
financial decisions. We focus on two mechanisms through which media uncertainty affects 
firm risk. First, given the high degree of uncertainty relating to the firm’s future benefits, R&D 
expenditures are typically viewed as high-risk investments (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Kothari 
et al., 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Cassell et al., 2012). We predict a positive association between 
media uncertainty and R&D expenditures because we expect that CEOs with greater media 
uncertainty will choose more risky investment policies. Second, compared with R&D 
expenditures, capital expenditure on property, plant, and equipment are deemed to be less risky 
due to its long-term focus. As such, a lower level of capital expenditure is associated with high 
firm risk. Thus, 
H2 (a): Media uncertainty is positively related to R&D expenditures. 
H2 (b): Media uncertainty is negatively related to capital expenditures. 
Reducing debt levels can decrease firm risk (Lev, 1974; Ohlson, 1980; Cassell et al., 
2012). Bhagat et al. (2015) point out that firms engage in excessive risk-taking mainly by 
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increasing leverage. We argue that firms and CEOs that are exposed to greater media 
uncertainty are more likely to hold financial debt (or to reduce liquid assets). Uncertainty in 
analysts' forecasts is highly correlated with the unpredictability in free cash flows generated by 
a firm's assets, which are a result of firm risk-taking (Hassell and Jennings, 1986). It is widely 
accepted that a lower free cash flow could be a sign that a company is making significant 
investments. We therefore expect a negative association between media uncertainty and cash 
flow.16 Thus, 
H2 (c): Media uncertainty is positively related to leverage.  
H2 (d): Media uncertainty is negatively related to free cash flow.  
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample consists of S&P 500 firms from Compustat that also have data on Execucomp and 
the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. 17  Our sample covers 
approximately 80% of the entire market capitalization. We also obtain commonly-used 
measures of corporate governance quality from the RiskMetrics database. Media uncertainty 
data are obtained from news articles in the Factiva database. We exclude financial firms 
(standard industry classification code (SIC) between 6000 and 6999) and utility firms (SIC 
between 4900 and 4999).18 We consider calendar years rather than fiscal years to simplify the 
search. Although most of the S&P 500 firms have December year-ends, the difference between 
calendar and fiscal years is minimal in our sample (Francis et al., 2008). We restrict our sample 
                                                             
16 Free cash flow (FCF) captures the net effect of its individual components. So the changes in FCF are conditional 
on how its individual components move with respect to negative media uncertainty. As such, it may be hard to 
make a prediction on the effect of media uncertainty on FCF given that there are various individual components 
that may move in opposite directions. Thus, a negative relationship between uncertainty and FCF is possible. 
17 We restrict our empirical analysis to S&P 500 companies due to the extensive manual collection process of 
news articles from the Factiva database.  
18 We exclude utilities from the test to avoid the criticism from regulation. We do these tests without utility firms 
to stay in line with common practice and to ensure that skewed data doesn’t drive our results. 
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to firm-years in which the CEO was in the office for the entire year. This avoids observations 
with less CEO media coverage due to the fact that the CEO is in office for only part of the year. 
Our final sample consists of 4,549 firm-year observations that represent 541 different firms 
from 1996 to 2014. 
 
3.3.2 Measure of media uncertainty 
We compute the yearly media uncertainty as a measure of uncertainty based on the aggregated 
textual tone in four newspapers and one magazine: The Wall Street Journal, The Washington 
Post, The New York Times, USA Today, and Forbes (Core et al., 2008; Francis et al., 2008; 
Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013). Media data are obtained from news articles in the Factiva 
database. We search for CEO-specific articles using both CEO name and firm name. We obtain 
the CEO and firm names from the Execucomp and Compustat databases and restrict our sample 
to observations where the CEO was in office for two consecutive years rather than just one 
year.19 We consider shortened names (e.g., Dan for Daniel) and common nicknames (e.g., 
Chuck for Charles). Following Liu and McConnell (2013), we search for the firm’s formal 
name and its popular name.20 In addition, we also consider the firm’s stock ticker symbol (e.g., 
IBM for International Business Machines Corporation) as a search criteria. 
To process the information from the relevant articles, we develop a PERL program to 
analyse the text of each article. Using the Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary, 
the program counts the number of words for uncertain categories in a given text.21 The PERL 
program also counts the number of times a unique word appears in an article. In addition, we 
                                                             
19 This requirement ensures that media uncertainty in the previous year can be used to explain the risk-taking 
behaviours of firms managed by the same CEO in the following year. 
20Liu and McConnell (2013) identify the formal name of each firm which includes the firm’s organization type as 
search criteria, such as “Inc.”, “Corp.” or “Ltd.”. Additionally, they characterize the firm’s popular name by 
excluding its organization type.   
21 The financial dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011) shows a list of words categorised as “uncertain”, 
such as “unpredicted”, “unsure” and “debatable” (see Appendix C). 
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impose certain criteria to eliminate irrelevant articles which provide no valid information. First, 
we require that articles contain at least 50 words (Bednar, 2012; Bednar et al., 2013; Liu and 
McConnell, 2013; Liu et al., 2017). Second, articles must contain the CEO’s family name and 
the firm’s popular name at least twice. Finally, articles having irrelevant titles are not included 
in our sample. To identify these titles, we randomly read approximately 500 articles from the 
sample. We exclude some articles with contents unrelated to the firms and CEOs, such as those 
that provide a list or a table.22 Our study relies on around 33,437 articles.  
To measure the tone of articles, we count the number of uncertain words in the articles 
following Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial dictionary via the PERL program. We 
employ a “bag of words” by controlling for an extra list of negation words, such as “not” and 
“never”, and by counting the frequency they appear before uncertain words. We exclude the 
“bag of words” in which uncertain words are negated within a range of three words (Bajo and 
Raimondo, 2017). We use the percentage of the category words relative to total words in a 
given text as our media uncertainty measure. Media uncertainty is equal to the mean score for 
the uncertain words category from all articles about a firm in previous year.  
 
3.3.3 Measure of firm risk 
We consider three measures to capture firm risk. Our first measure is total risk, which is defined 
as the standard deviation of daily stock returns in year t. The second measure is systematic risk, 
which is defined as the coefficient on the stock market portfolio from a market model 
regression. However, the firm stock return can be driven by market fluctuations and therefore 
the volatility of stock returns may not entirely reflect firm-specific risk (Goyal and Santa-Clara, 
2003; Cassell et al., 2012). Hence, we construct our third measure, idiosyncratic risk, which is 
                                                             
22 For example, an article entitled "Top 100 CEOs" which reports a ranking list of CEOs with the highest 
compensation. We further require that articles exclude combined and compounded news, such as “Business and 
Finance”, “What’s on Friday”, and “Insider on Time”. These articles consist of more than 10 news sections, and 
only one of the sections relates to the firm and the CEO that are relevant to our study 
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calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the Fama-French three-factor model 
regression in year t. We multiply the total and idiosyncratic risk measures tabulated from daily 
data by the square root of 252 to annualize them, respectively. To mitigate the concern that the 
skewness of either measure may influence our results and inference, we take the natural 
logarithm of both measures. 
 
3.3.4 Measures of firm investment and financial risk 
We adopt two measures for the riskiness of firm investment: (1) R&D expenditures, and (2) 
capital expenditures. R&D expenditures (R&D/assets) are constructed as the percentage of 
R&D expenditures to total assets measured at the end of year t. Capital expenditures are 
calculated by the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets in year t. 
Our measures for financial risk focus on debt burden and movement of money in the 
firm’s capital structure. Total book leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Free cash 
flow is earnings before interest and taxes minus change in net working capital, minus capital 
expenditures, and then plus depreciation. For those measures, inputs are measured in year t. 
 
3.3.5 Control variables 
As our empirical estimation assumes that the unobserved factors may influence media 
uncertainty and firm risk, we follow the prior literature by including a comprehensive set of 
control variables. We also control for the number of articles because media can detect corporate 
financial fraud that leads to a higher firm risk (Miller, 2006; Dyck et al., 2008). Drawn from 
previous literature (Archer and Faerber, 1966; Guay, 1999; Opler et al., 1999; Pástor and Pietro, 
2003; Coles et al., 2006; Cassell et al., 2012) on determinants of firm risk, we obtain 
commonly-used measures of firm characteristics, including firm age (Log of firm age), firm 
size (Log of market capitalization), market to book ratio (Market to book), sales growth (Sales 
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growth), stock returns (Stock returns), market leverage (Debt to equity), and cash surplus (Cash 
surplus) from the Compustat and CRSP databases. We consider trading volume, calculated as 
the number of common shares traded in the previous year, because trading volume can be used 
to predict firm idiosyncratic risk (Linsmeier et al., 2002; Brown and Kapadia, 2007). 
In addition, we also consider the governance characteristics in our empirical model. We 
control for board size, as decisions made by a large board may lead to a less risky outcome 
(Sah and Stiglitz, 1991). We include board independence (Independent) as a control variable 
because the presence of independent directors can result in a more shareholder-focused board, 
which could affect risk-taking activities (Sila et al., 2016). We also control for board 
interlocking, defined as a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least one director 
who serves on a board of another firm. 
To control for CEO risk-taking incentives, we collect data on CEO tenure, age, and 
CEO cash compensation. Long-tenured CEOs are likely to be involved in more strategic risk 
situations and may be able to manipulate firms’ risk-taking activities more easily (Simsek, 
2007). Serfling (2014) argues that older CEOs have fewer risk-taking behaviours and prefer 
less risky investment policies. We include the natural logarithm of cash compensation because 
CEOs with higher cash compensation tend to diversify their wealth and make less risk-averse 
decisions (Guay, 1999). Coles et al. (2006) find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock volatility (vega) implement riskier policy choices after controlling for CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity (delta). Therefore, we also control for CEO vega as well as CEO 
delta in our empirical model. See the Appendix B for the detailed definitions for each of the 
variables. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 3.1. The average capital 
expenditure of 0.056 is consistent with Sila et al. (2016). The mean of financial leverage (total 
book leverage) is approximately 0.567, which is consistent with Cassell et al. (2012). As shown 
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in the media variables, average media uncertainty is approximately 0.366%. This shows that, 
on average, 0.366% of the words in the articles about the CEO and the firm demonstrate media 
uncertainty in a financial context. The summary statistics for the control variables are also 
reported in Table 3.1. The average measure for market to book of 2.485 is similar to that 
reported by Cassell et al. (2012). The mean of CEO tenure is approximately 7.2 years, which 
is consistent with the variable reported in Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Humphery-Jenner et al. 
(2016). The summary statistics for the CEO incentives variables show that the average CEO 
delta and vega are around 825.82 and 190.07, respectively, which are comparable to the values 
reported in Sila et al. (2016). 
Table 3.2 presents a matrix of estimated correlation coefficients for media uncertainty 
and the control variables. While the rank order correlation is slightly higher for some variables 
(number of articles and trading volume = 44.6%; firm size and natural log of cash compensation 
= 44.9%; firm size and trading volume = 46.8%), the tabulated variance inflation factors from 
the empirical estimations are all below 3.4 (not reported), which indicates that multicollinearity 
is not a concern for the regression analysis. 
 
3.4 Empirical results 
Our main empirical tests are presented in this section. The control variables include the number 
of articles, natural log of firm age, natural log of market capitalization, market to book, sales 
growth, stock return, debt to equity, cash surplus, trading volume, board size, interlock, 
independence, CEO tenure, the natural log of CEO age, the natural log of cash compensation, 
CEO delta, and CEO vega. Each model includes year and industry fixed effects using the two-
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digit SIC level.23 All standard errors are clustered at the firm level to account for correlations 
within firm observations. 
 
3.4.1 The impact of media uncertainty on firm risk 
We examine whether firm risk is affected by media uncertainty. Firm risk is measured as total 
risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk following Cassell et al. (2012) and Sila et al. (2016). 
The results of the empirical tests investigating the association between uncertainty and firm 
risk are presented in Table 3.3. 
Column 1 reports a positive significant coefficient for the Media uncertainty estimation 
(0.048, p<0.01). After controlling for other factors, a firm where the CEO experiences strong 
media uncertainty is associated with higher total firm risk. Column 2 reports an insignificant 
relationship between media uncertainty and systematic risk. In Column 3, there is a significant 
positive association (0.068, p<0.01) between media uncertainty and total idiosyncratic risk. 
The media communicates uncertainty to the market and that generates greater firm risk. The 
result suggests that the impact of media uncertainty on firm risk is mainly attributable to 
idiosyncratic risk. 
Overall, the results reported in Table 3.3 are largely consistent with our prediction that 
there is a positive association between media uncertainty and stock return volatility. To the 
extent that the media exposes uncertain information about the CEO and the firm, our results 
suggest that media uncertainty acts as an outside signal to reflect risky firm behaviour. 
 
                                                             
23 Industry fixed-effects control for differences in risk or performance across industry sector types. Additionally, 
I follow previous papers related to firm risk-taking (Coles et al., 2006; Cassell et al., 2012) to control for industry 
and year fixed-effects. However, the results are not consistent after controlling for year and firm fixed effects. 
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3.4.2 The impact of media uncertainty on firm investment and financial risk 
We further examine the relation between media uncertainty and choice of risky policies. The 
riskiness of investment is measured by R&D expenditures and capital expenditures. The results 
of the empirical estimations performed to investigate the relation between media uncertainty 
and investment risk are presented in Table 3.4.  
Column 1 of Table 3.4 reports the regression estimated using R&D expenditures as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient on Media uncertainty is positive and significantly 
associated with R&D spending (0.012, p<0.01). The results are consistent with Sarkar (2000) 
that firms exposed to greater uncertainty are associated with risky investment activities. The 
result confirms a positive association between media uncertainty and R&D expenditures. The 
estimations reported in Column 2 of Table 4 show the results using capital expenditures as the 
dependent variable. The coefficient for Media uncertainty is negative and significant (-0.005, 
p<0.05). This suggests that a higher level of media uncertainty is associated with lower capital 
expenditures which support our initial prediction.  
Table 3.4 also reports the models used to test the relation between media uncertainty 
and financial risk. The models estimate financial risk as a function of media uncertainty by 
examining the effect of media in the prior year on total book leverage and free cash flow. The 
financial policies variables are measured in year t. 
Column 3 presents the results for the panel regression estimated using total book 
leverage. There is a significant, positive association (0.032, p<0.05) between media uncertainty 
and total book leverage. Thus, firm leverage increases with growing media uncertainty. In 
addition, Column 4 reports the models examining the association between media uncertainty 
and free cash flow. The marginal significance of media uncertainty (-0.013, p<0.10) indicates 
a negative association between subsequent annual free cash flow and media uncertainty. The 
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finding is consistent with our prediction that there exists a positive link between media 
uncertainty and risky financial policies. 
 
3.5 Robustness tests 
3.5.1 Endogeneity 
The methodology used for the analysis may be affected by the potential endogenous relation 
between the level of firm risk and the measure of media uncertainty. To address this concern, 
an instrumental variable approach is used to examine the relationships using a 2SLS 
framework. Our paper uses an instrument variable along the lines proposed by Gurun and 
Butler (2012) and implemented by Liu and McConnell (2013) and Cheng et al. (2017). Gurun 
and Butler (2012) report that firms with at least one media expert on their boards receive less 
negative tone. Li (2008) documents that managers use ambiguous language to obfuscate 
negative information rather than positive information. Thus, boards with a media expert may 
prefer to use more ambiguous information to reduce potential effects of negative information 
on firms. To address the endogeneity concerns, the models are estimated using media expert 
as the instrumental variable. We argue that media expert is more likely to provide uncertain 
news to avoid media outlets detecting bad news. Media expert is a dummy variable equals to 
one if the director’s biography states that the director is or ever has been an employee of a 
television, radio, or newspaper company. The results of the empirical tests are presented in 
Table 3.5. 
Column 1 of Panel A reports the first-stage results for Media expert as our instrumental 
variable. The coefficient for Media expert is positive and statistically significant (0.031 p<0.1). 
The regression coefficient on Media uncertainty is positive and statistically significant, as 
shown in Columns 2 and 4. Column 3 reports a positive but insignificant association between 
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media uncertainty and Systematic risk. These findings are consistent with the models estimated 
in Table 3.3. 
Panel B reports the results for the second-stage regression for investment risk 
(R&D/Asset and Capex/Asset) and financial risk (Total book leverage and Free cash flow). 
The coefficient on media uncertainty in Column 1 is positive and statistically significant. In 
Column 2, we find a significantly negative relation between our variable of interest and capital 
expenditures. The finding supports that firms with media uncertainty prefer to engage in risky 
investment activities. In Columns 3 and 4, we find firms with higher media uncertainty to be 
associated with higher total book leverage and lower free cash flow. The regression coefficients 
are providing consistent predictions as documented in Table 3.4.   
 
3.5.2 Difference-in-difference analysis 
We consider financial reporting changes after SOX section 404 to conduct a difference-in-
difference (DID) methodology. To the extent that media coverage of firms can be affected by 
previous financial reports and firms’ performance, constrained reporting is more likely when 
writing original stories is more difficult, especially when firms are being more opaque or 
complex (Gurun and Butler, 2012). Managers can withhold adverse information by using more 
complex and ambiguous information in the financial reports (Li, 2008). These results suggest 
that uncertain news appear to enhance the effectiveness in hiding bad news (or to decrease the 
likelihood of additional risk being detected), particularly in the post-SOX period, which leads 
to a future firm risk when hidden news accumulates and reaches a tipping point (Kim and 
Zhang, 2014). Furthermore, a small firm is more likely to delay SOX section 404 compliance 
and auditor’s attestation requirement (Iliev, 2010). That is, managers in small firms may prefer 
to use ambiguous information for hiding bad performance. Therefore, we predict that the 
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positive relation that we observed between media uncertainty and firm risk-taking to be more 
pronounced for small firms during post-SOX period. 
We conduct the DID analysis using the treated sample and the matched group. To 
capture meaningful influence from uncertain information, we focus on small firms as treated 
firms. Our assumption requires any trends in outcomes (i.e., risk-taking variables) for the 
treatment and control groups in the post-SOX period (i.e., after 2002). Post is dummy variable 
equal to one if year of firm observation is greater than 2002. Small firm is dummy equal to one 
if firm size is lower than median value in year t. Small firm*Post is a dummy variable that 
equals one for small firms in the post-SOX period. The results are reported in Columns 1 to 3 
of Table 3.6.  The coefficient of Small firm*Post is 0.136 (p<0.01), 0.220 (p<0.01) and 0.143 
(p<0.01), respectively. The finding is consistent with the idea that uncertain information can 
increase firm risk. In addition, we find small firms to engage in risky financial policies during 
the post-SOX period. The results support our prediction. 
 
3.5.4 Alternative measures over time t to t+2 
Another potential concern with our empirical analysis is the effect of media uncertainty on firm 
risk, investment, and financial risk over longer time horizons. We construct our dependent 
variables by calculating the average of these variables for the three-year period, measured in 
year t to year t+2. 
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 3.7 report positive, significant coefficients that show media 
uncertainty is associated with total firm risk and firm idiosyncratic risk. Media uncertainty is 
not associated with systematic risk as reported in Column 2. The findings reported in Columns 
4 and 5 report a positive association between media uncertainty and R&D expenditure and a 
negative relation between media uncertainty and capital expenditure. The positive, significant 
result for media uncertainty in Column 6 shows that firm leverage increases with greater media 
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uncertainty. However, there is no relation between media uncertainty and free cash flow. 
Collectively, these findings are consistent with our main results presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
and provide further support that media uncertainty is strongly related to firm risk, investment, 
and financial risk. 
 
3.6 Further analysis 
3.6.1 Positive uncertainty and negative uncertainty 
Prior researchers have documented that stock return volatility tends to rise following good and 
bad news (Campbell and Hentschel, 1992; Engle and Ng, 1993; Braun et al., 1995). One 
explanation is that investors overreact to good and bad news. Campbell and Hentschel (1992) 
show that the effect occurs when an unexpected drop in price (bad news) increases predictable 
volatility more than an unexpected increase in price (good news) of similar magnitude. Bad 
news is more likely to increase the volatility of stock returns. We predict that CEOs exposed 
to greater negative uncertainty are associated with increased firm risk. In addition, the effect of 
positive uncertainty on firm risk is also important. Lee and Qiu (2009) show that consumers 
facing uncertainty (rather than certainty) associated with a positive event (e.g., winning a lucky 
draw but not knowing the exact prize won) can experience greater, longer-lasting positive 
feelings. The positive feelings lead to a positive prediction of prospective outcomes or 
underestimation of investment return, resulting in the firm engaging in more risk-taking 
decisions.  
To account for the differences in effect for both good and bad news, in this paper we 
create two media uncertainty measures based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) financial 
dictionary by reclassifying media uncertainty into two groups, referred to as ‘positive (POS) 
uncertainty’ and ‘negative (NEG) uncertainty’. POS uncertainty measures the media 
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uncertainty for those firms with a positive tone that exceeds the industry median in a given 
year. Similarly, NEG uncertainty measures the equivalent effect for negative tone.  
Table 3.8 reports the estimated models for the association between positive/negative 
uncertainty and firm risk. Columns 1 and 5 report a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for POS uncertainty (0.064, p<0.01 and 0.077, p<0.01, respectively), which is 
consistent with the finding in Table 3.3. This suggests that positive uncertainty is associated 
with greater firm risk. Similarly, the positive, significant coefficients for NEG uncertainty in 
Columns 2 and 6 (0.045, p<0.01 and 0.059, p<0.01, respectively) confirm that greater negative 
uncertainty is also associated with higher firm risk. Neither POS nor NEG uncertainty is related 
to systematic risk, as shown in Columns 3 and 4. These findings are consistent with initial 
results shown in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.9 reports the models estimated to examine the relation between positive and 
negative uncertainty on firm investment and financial risk. Columns 1 and 2 all report positive 
and significant POS uncertainty (0.010, p<0.01) and NEG uncertainty (0.009, p<0.01) 
coefficients, respectively in explaining R&D expenditure. Positive uncertainty acts as a 
mechanism to signal a decrease in capital expenditure, as reported in Column 3 (0.004, p<0.1). 
Columns 5 and 6 report a positive relationship between firm leverage, positive uncertainty, and 
negative uncertainty. Columns 7 and 8 all demonstrate a negative and significant association 
between POS uncertainty (-0.013, p<0.05), NEG uncertainty (-0.011, p<0.1) and free cash 
flow. Consistent with our prediction, free cash flow is negatively related to positive and 
negative uncertainty. 
 
3.6.2 The relation between media uncertainty and firm risk-taking under CEO hubris 
There is a potential channel proposed by Li and Tang (2010), who find that greater discretion 
leave more rooms for overconfidence CEO to make risky decisions. Greater media uncertainty 
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may increase CEOs discretion, in particular hubris CEOs. In other words, high hubris CEOs 
with greater media uncertainty may take more risks when compared to their low hubris CEOs 
counterpart. We construct CEO hubris following the literature proposed by Malmendier et al. 
(2011), Ahmed and Duellman (2013) and Humphery-Jenner et al. (2016). We calculate the 
measure as defined by the ratio of average value per vested option to average strike price. 
Average value per vested option is the percentage of value of vested unexercised options to 
number of vested unexercised options. Average strike price is defined as the stock price at the 
end of the year less the average value per vested option. We then divide the measure of CEO 
hubris into five parts by year. One includes the lowest CEO hubris quintile, and five indicates 
the highest CEO hubris quintile. 
Table 3.10 report the regression estimates of the impact of media uncertainty on firm 
risk-taking under high and low CEO hubris. In Columns 1 and 3, the media uncertainty is 
insignificant associated with volatility of future stock return under low CEO hubris. However, 
media uncertainty increase riskiness of future stock return when the CEO hubris is high as 
shown in Columns 2 and 4. Furthermore, we find a positive relation between media uncertainty 
and R&D expenditure if the firm has a high CEO hubris but not for a low CEO hubris. 
Considering the effect of media uncertainty on financial leverage, the coefficient of media 
uncertainty is insignificant in Column 9 but is positive and significant in Column 10. The 
finding indicates that media uncertainty have an influence on firm risk-taking by influencing 
CEO matters. The overall result is consistent with the view of Li and Tang (2010) that CEO 
engaging in more risk-taking activities is due to environmental uncertainty that gives greater 




3.6.3 Media uncertainty and the CEO risk-taking incentives 
The assuredness, confidence, and vision of the leader is a source of psychological comfort for 
the followers, thus reducing their stress by showing how uncertainty can be turned into a vision 
of opportunity and success (Bass, 1985). In conditions of uncertainty and crises, individuals 
feel the need for greater direction and guidance from the CEOs. Thus, the CEO’s discretion is 
increased under greater uncertainty. Additionally, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) propose that 
the greater the level of the CEO discretion is associated with higher CEO compensation. Thus, 
an increasing in the level of uncertainty will lead a higher compensation for the CEO. One 
possible explanation is that, in an uncertain situation, boards of directors will tend to recognize 
the importance of the CEOs to the firms, and therefore be prepared to pay a higher 
compensation. 
The risk-taking incentives of CEOs are positively associated with firm risk and risk-
taking behaviour (Coles et al., 2006; Low, 2009). CEOs with higher risk-taking incentives may 
increase the risk of firms’ policy choices. Coles et al. (2006) find that CEOs with higher 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implement riskier policy choices, including 
relatively more investment in research and development (R&D), less investment in property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE), and higher leverage. They also find that higher risk generally leads 
to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Low (2009) reports that the CEO 
portfolio vega, not the CEO portfolio delta, encourages risk-taking. In this study, CEO vega 
measures CEO incentives to increase risk. Incentives to increase stock price are also of interest 
in the risk management decision. This incentive is measured by CEO delta based upon the 
CEO's option grants and existing common stock holdings. 
Media can be an effective mechanism in monitoring corporate governance. Media 
coverage increases CEOs’ fame and serves as the watchdog for the public (Miller, 2006; 
Bednar, 2012). Shemesh (2017) finds that the changes in CEO status affect risk-related 
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business decisions and outcomes. Hence, CEOs with higher media exposure may find their 
actions more closely scrutinized by the media. However, the media brings attribution bias in 
evaluating CEO actions. If CEOs amass more media attention, they tend to underestimate the 
risks of the projects or overestimate their own capability in managing risk and complex 
investment (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). CEOs with more media exposure will increase risk-
taking possibilities. In addition, media coverage may affect CEOs through the mix of at-risk 
pay (Bednar, 2012). Greater media uncertainty predicts a stronger association between CEOs 
and firms’ risk-taking behaviours (Li and Tang, 2010). We consider the impact of uncertainty 
on CEO risk-taking incentives. Our expectation is that uncertain information will prompt firms 
to increase the amount of at-risk CEO compensation, providing managers the opportunity to 
secure a higher percentage of equity-based compensation. 
In Table 3.11, we examine the monitoring role of media uncertainty using CEO Vega 
and CEO Delta as dependent variables. We find that the coefficients reported in Columns 1, 2, 
and 3 all demonstrate a positive and significant association between Media uncertainty (24.443, 
p<0.1), POS uncertainty (38.026, p<0.05), NEG uncertainty (34.567, p<0.05), and CEO vega. 
The results in Columns 4, 5, and 6 report a negative but insignificant association between CEO 
delta and all measures of media uncertainty. Consistent with Low (2009), CEO vega 
encourages managerial risk-taking, supporting our prediction that more information 
uncertainty increases managerial risk-taking behaviours. This is consistent with the notion that 
uncertainty strengthens CEO hubris and firms’ risk-taking because overconfident CEOs tend 
to overestimate investment returns and subsequently underestimate the level of firm risk 





Much of the financial literature predicts a negative relationship between uncertainty and firm 
risk-taking activities (Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen and Ion, 2015; Bonaime et al., 2017). 
However, a positive uncertainty-risk-taking relationship may exist. Our study empirically 
examines the proposition that uncertainty is positively correlated with firm risk-taking 
activities. We provide a potential measure of uncertainty by using media uncertainty to 
investigate the association between uncertainty and firm risk-taking as proxied by volatility of 
stock returns, the level of firm investment, and financial risk. 
We find that greater media uncertainty is associated with firms that experience 
subsequent higher stock return volatility. The explanation of positive relation between media 
uncertainty and stock return volatility implies that investors are more sensitive to the uncertain 
information in media coverage, thereby resulting in higher trading turnover and subsequently 
higher stock return volatility. The analysis highlights the effect of the media’s news 
dissemination role in the prediction of firm risk. Furthermore, the finding shows that there is a 
positive association between media uncertainty and firms’ R&D expenditures and a negative 
association between media uncertainty and firms’ capital expenditures. This suggests that firms 
implement more risky investment decisions following exposure to media uncertainty. We also 
provide empirical evidence that media uncertainty is strongly related to higher financial 
leverage and lower free cash flow. The positive association between media and the choice of 
risky policies can be explained by managers intending to gain more investment opportunities 
from uncertainty in their efforts to increase firm profitability. 
Our paper provides several important implications. First, from a practical standpoint, 
media uncertainty reflects managerial expectations on corporate governance. These 
overestimated expectations affect investment and financial decision-making. In addition, our 
findings support the view of Fang and Peress (2009) that the media play a supplementary role 
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to traditional channels of information discourse. Second, media uncertainty has an impact on 
risk-taking activities, highlighting the importance of transparent information for market 
participants and company executives. Thus, this study reports a potential missing link between 
media and components of firm risk-taking activities by investigating the influence of 




Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the number of observations, the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum observations for each variable in the sample. The sample contains 4,549 firm-
year observations for 541 different firms in Execucomp, Compustat and CRSP from 1996 to 
2014. Definitions for all variables are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total riskt 4,549 -1.143 -1.166 0.418 -2.246 0.390 
Systematic riskt 4,549 1.012 0.974 0.460 -3.085 3.898 
Idiosyncratic riskt 4,549 -1.367 -1.380 0.433 -2.469 0.211 
R&D/Assett 4,493 0.029 0.006 0.051 0.000 0.680 
Capex/Assett 4,493 0.056 0.040 0.052 0.000 0.804 
Total book leveraget 4,552 0.567 0.564 0.208 0.043 2.400 
Free cash flowt 4,493 0.112 0.107 0.105 -0.729 0.992 
Media uncertainty 4,352 0.366 0.386 0.350 0.000 2.270 
Number of articles 4,352 7.059 1.000 20.828 0.000 367.000 
Log(company age) 4,338 3.292 3.447 0.688 0.651 4.165 
Firm size 4,274 9.202 9.103 1.261 4.402 13.348 
Market to book 4,338 2.485 1.960 2.358 0.718 78.765 
Sales growth 4,340 1.157 1.086 0.938 0.218 46.239 
Stock return 4,340 0.532 0.153 1.938 -0.632 10.497 
Debt to equity 4,338 0.339 0.159 1.356 0.000 54.525 
Cash surplus 4,338 0.110 0.095 0.092 -0.912 0.966 
Trading volume 4,336 1.052 0.466 1.967 0.006 29.609 
Board size 4,304 10.361 10.000 2.186 4.000 19.000 
Board interlock 4,304 0.056 0.000 0.254 0.000 3.000 
Independent 4,565 56.962 71.429 34.402 0.000 94.737 
CEO tenure 4,352 7.203 5.417 6.298 1.000 51.000 
Log(CEO age) 4,301 4.013 4.025 0.119 3.296 4.419 
Log(cash compensation) 4,344 7.634 7.676 0.831 -4.605 11.264 
CEO delta 4,352 825.818 308.138 2739.390 0.000 72877.620 
CEO vega 4,352 190.070 74.678 320.593 0.000 4307.604 
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Table 3.2 Correlation 
This table reports the correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in this study. The table reports the Pearson correlation 
coefficients for media uncertainty and control variables. Definitions for all variables are provided in Appendix B. 
 
  Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Media uncertainty 1.000            
2 Number of articles 0.250 1.000           
3 Log(company age) 0.078 0.059 1.000          
4 Firm size 0.314 0.362 0.303 1.000         
5 Market to book -0.007 0.022 -0.234 0.141 1.000        
6 Sales growth 0.006 -0.009 -0.131 -0.036 0.211 1.000       
7 Stock return -0.002 0.094 0.019 -0.033 -0.046 -0.016 1.000      
8 Debt to equity 0.056 0.206 0.060 -0.117 -0.103 -0.020 0.164 1.000     
9 Cash surplus 0.012 0.007 -0.135 0.188 0.388 -0.052 -0.085 -0.178 1.000    
10 Trading volume 0.224 0.446 0.063 0.468 0.027 -0.023 -0.028 0.092 0.144 1.000   
11 Board size 0.136 0.117 0.330 0.332 -0.171 -0.036 0.020 0.065 -0.212 0.127 1.000  
12 Board interlock -0.029 -0.003 -0.013 -0.034 0.036 0.003 0.006 -0.007 -0.055 -0.062 0.116 1.000 
13 Independent 0.045 0.002 0.273 0.199 -0.084 -0.089 -0.253 -0.063 0.090 0.082 -0.003 -0.132 
14 CEO tenure -0.006 -0.015 -0.071 -0.027 0.030 0.015 0.013 -0.038 0.023 0.030 -0.057 0.042 
15 Log(CEO age) -0.023 -0.085 0.139 0.091 -0.138 -0.055 -0.002 0.037 -0.090 -0.005 0.134 0.048 
16 Log(cash compensation) 0.174 0.127 0.343 0.466 -0.192 -0.104 -0.051 0.022 -0.038 0.179 0.266 -0.051 
17 CEO delta 0.077 0.051 0.029 0.186 0.039 -0.015 -0.051 -0.026 0.011 0.090 0.099 -0.009 






Table 3.2 (Continued) 
  Variables 13 14 15 16 17 18 
13 Independent 1.000      
14 CEO tenure -0.075 1.000     
15 Log(CEO age) 0.028 0.334 1.000    
16 Log(cash compensation) 0.178 0.038 0.167 1.000   
17 CEO delta -0.003 0.242 0.158 0.186 1.000  












Table 3.3 Media uncertainty and firm risk 
The table reports panel data regression results. The dependent variable is either total risk, 
systematic risk, or idiosyncratic risk. Control variables include the number of articles, natural 
log of firm age, natural log of assets, market to book, sales growth, stock return, debt to equity, 
cash surplus, trading volume, board size, interlock, independence, CEO tenure, natural log of 
CEO age, natural log of cash compensation, CEO delta, and CEO vega. The models are fitted 
using industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the firm level. The sample is constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions 
are provided in Apendix B. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-statistics are 




(1)   (2)   (3) 
Total riskt  Systematic riskt  Idiosyncratic riskt 
Media uncertainty     0.048***  0.012      0.068
*** 
 (3.032)  (0.515)  (4.022) 
Number of articles 0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (1.089)  (0.583)  (0.855) 
Log(company age)    -0.091***      -0.065
***     -0.108
*** 
 (-5.870)  (-3.009)  (-6.364) 
Firm size    -0.071***  -0.015     -0.092
*** 
 (-6.106)  (-1.044)  (-7.669) 
Market to book     0.019***     0.042
***     0.016
*** 
 (4.145)  (3.980)  (3.845) 
Sales growth 0.002  0.017  0.004 
 (0.199)  (0.677)  (0.440) 
Stock return -0.006*  0.001  -0.006 
 (-1.667)  (0.337)  (-1.571) 
Debt to equity 0.002  0.004  0.002 
 (0.394)  (0.850)  (0.281) 
Cash surplus    -0.329***     -0.634
***  -0.187 
 (-2.954)  (-3.465)  (-1.518) 
Trading volume     0.019***  0.009      0.023
*** 
 (3.446)  (1.460)  (3.566) 
Board size     -0.014***     -0.021
***     -0.013
*** 
 (-3.606)  (-3.997)  (-3.003) 
Board interlock -0.001  0.007  -0.006 
 (-0.030)  (0.234)  (-0.233) 
Independent    -0.001**  0.000     -0.001
*** 
 (-2.131)  (0.716)  (-2.771) 
CEO tenure   0.003**  0.002    0.004
** 
 (2.274)  (0.937)  (2.451) 
Log(CEO age)    -0.196***  -0.133     -0.235
*** 
 (-2.733)  (-1.293)  (-3.050) 
Log(cash compensation) 0.008  -0.004  0.008 
 (0.764)  (-0.245)  (0.729) 
CEO delta -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (-0.122)  (1.011)  (-0.432) 
CEO vega -0.000  -0.000   -0.000
* 
 (-1.217)  (-0.346)  (-1.655) 
Constant    0.759**     1.595




 (2.426)  (3.462)  (3.182) 
Observations 4,176  4,176  4,176 
Adjusted R2 0.687  0.338  0.665 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES 





Table 3.4 The effect of media uncertainty on investment and financial risk 
This table reports the panel data regression models for the riskiness of firm investment and 
financial policies. Column 1 and 2 contain the models estimated using R&D expenditures and 
capital expenditures as the dependent variables, respectively. The models estimated for total 
book leverage and free cash flow are reported in Column 3 and 4, respectively. The models are 
fitted using industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. The sample is constructed as described in Table 1 and variables 
definitions are provided in Appendix B. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-
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Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table 3.5 Alternative media uncertainty and firm risk-taking 
This table reports the panel regression results for the 2SLS estimation of the relation between 
media uncertainty and firm risk in panel A. The second stage of the 2SLS regression on firm 
risk using the predicted media uncertainty is reported in Column 2, 3, and 4. Panel B reports 
regression results for the 2SLS estimation for the relation between media uncertainty and 
investment and financial risk. Investment risk measures include R&D expenditures in Column 
1 and capital expenditures in Column 2. Financial leverage and free cash flow financial risk 
measures are reported in Column 3 and 4, respectively. The models are fitted using industry 
(two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. The sample is constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions are provided 
in Appendix B. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Media uncertainty and firm risk 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Media 
uncertainty 
  Total risk t   Systematic risk t   Idiosyncratic risk t 
Media expert  0.031* 
      
 
(1.668) 
      
Media uncertainty 
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Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES   YES 
Panel B: Media uncertainty and investment and financial risk 
Variables (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
R&D/Assett   Capex/Assett   Total book leveraget   Free cash flowt 
Media uncertainty    0.012*** 
 






















































Controls YES  YES  YES  YES 












Table 3.6 Difference-in-difference analysis  
This table reports the panel regression results for the estimation of the influence of small firm on firm risk-taking in the post-SOX period. The 
regression on firm risk are reported in Column 1, 2, and 3. Investment risk measures include R&D expenditures in Column 4 and capital 
expenditures in Column 5. Financial leverage and free cash flow are measured as financial risk in Column 6 and 7, respectively. Post is dummy 
variable if year of observation firms is greater than 2002. Small firm is dummy equal to one if firm size is lower than median value for each year. 
Small*Post is a dummy variable that represents small firms in the post-SOX period. The models are fitted using industry (two-digit SIC) and year 
fixed effects based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample is constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions 
are provided in Appendix B. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
Total riskt   Systematic riskt  Idiosyncratic riskt  R&D/Assett  Capex/Assett 
 
Total book 
leveraget   
Free cash flowt 
Post -0.588***  0.127
**  -0.635
***  0.002  -0.015
***  0.002  0.015 
 (-19.330)  (2.474)  (-20.800)  (0.368)  (-3.313)  (0.090)  (1.431) 
Small firm -0.160***  -0.231
***  -0.165
***  -0.008  -0.002  -0.066
***  0.021
** 
 (-5.303)  (-4.624)  (-5.421)  (-1.378)  (-0.514)  (-3.173)  (2.048) 
Small firm*Post 0.136***  0.220
***  0.143
***  0.002  0.005  0.045
***  -0.017
** 
 (4.945)  (4.913)  (5.153)  (0.540)  (1.032)  (2.631)  (-2.014) 
Number of articles 0.001*  0.001  0.001  0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (1.674)  (1.062)  (1.402)  (1.148)  (-1.336)  (1.064)  (-1.462) 




***  0.271  -0.491
*** 
 (4.363)  (4.162)  (5.035)  (3.344)  (2.757)  (0.850)  (-3.839) 
Observations 4,176  4,176  4,176  4,175  4,175  4,178  4,175 
Adjusted R2 0.691  0.348  0.668  0.487  0.531  0.345  0.347 
Controls YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
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Table 3.7 Alternative variables estimations over time 𝒕 to 𝒕 + 𝟐 
This table reports the panel regression model for the media uncertainty measures as a function of long-term firm risk. The dependent variables are 
firm risk (total risk, systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk) and corporate investment (R&D expenditures and capital expenditures) and financial 
risk (total book leverage and free cash flow).The independent variables are media uncertainty as well as the standard controls and year and industry 
(two-digit SIC) fixed effects. Control variables include number of articles, natural log of firm age, natural log of assets, market to book, sales 
growth, stock return, debt to equity, cash surplus, trading volume, board size, interlock, independence, CEO tenure, natural log of CEO age, natural 
log of cash compensation, CEO delta, and CEO vega. The dependent variables are measured from t to t+2. All control variables are measured at 
time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Total risk t to t+2  
Systematic 
risk t to t+2 
 Idiosyncratic 
risk t to t+2 
 R&D/Assett to t+2  Capex/Assett to t+2  
Total book 
leveraget to t+2 
 Free cash 
flowt to t+2 
Media uncertainty    0.042***  -0.003     0.067***      0.013***     -0.006***     0.041***  -0.010 
 (2.599)  (-0.136)  (3.921)  (4.134)  (-2.745)  (2.816)  (-1.538) 
Number of articles -0.000  0.000  -0.000  0.000     -0.000***  0.001  -0.000 
 (-0.018)  (0.831)  (-0.570)  (0.522)  (-2.687)  (1.362)  (-0.532) 
Constant   0.884**    1.220**     1.322***     0.250***     0.191***  0.298    -0.377** 
 (2.507)  (2.297)  (3.474)  (2.961)  (3.099)  (0.906)  (-2.557) 
Observations 2,906  2,906  2,906  2,906  2,906  2,906  2,906 
Adjusted R2 0.676  0.436  0.691  0.532  0.611  0.323  0.376 
Controls YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Industry fixed effects YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Year fixed effects YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES   YES 
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Table 3.8 The impact of positive uncertainty and negative uncertainty on firm risk 
The table reports panel data regression results. The dependent variable is the total risk, 
systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. The table reports the panel regression estimations 
between media uncertainty and firm risk. Media uncertainty includes positive (POS) and 
negative (NEG) uncertainty. The models are fitted using industry (two-digit SIC) and year 
fixed effects based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample is 
constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. All 
control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Total riskt   Systematic riskt   Idiosyncratic riskt 
POS uncertainty 0.064***   0.036   0.077
***  
 (4.333)   (1.592)   (4.894)  
NEG uncertainty  0.045
***   0.011   0.059
*** 
  (3.146)   (0.585)   (3.743) 
Number of articles 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (1.014) (1.097)  (0.493) (0.587)  (0.817) (0.888) 
Constant 0.777** 0.773**  1.603
*** 1.599***  1.110
*** 1.107*** 
 (2.480) (2.472)  (3.498) (3.468)  (3.237) (3.236) 
Observations 4,176 4,176  4,176 4,176  4,176 4,176 
Adjusted R2 0.688 0.687  0.339 0.338  0.666 0.665 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 

















Table 3.9 The impact of positive uncertainty and negative uncertainty on frim investment and financial risk 
The table reports the panel data regression models for the riskiness of firm investment and financial risk. Column 1 to 4 contain the models 
estimated using R&D expenditures and capital expenditures as the dependent variables, respectively. The dependent variables are total book 
leverage and free cash flow, reported in Column 5 to 8, respectively. Media uncertainty includes positive (POS) and negative (NEG) uncertainty. 
The models are fitted using industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample 
is constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (7) (8) 
R&D/Assett   Capex/Assett   Total book leveraget   Free cash flowt 
POS uncertainty 0.010***   -0.004
*   0.026
**   -0.013
**  
 (4.152)   (-1.967)   (2.208)   (-2.251)  
NEG uncertainty  0.009
***   -0.004   0.042
***   -0.011
* 
  (3.498)   (-1.586)   (3.078)   (-1.828) 
Number of articles 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000  0.001
* 0.001*  -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.792) (0.834)  (-1.212) (-1.258)  (1.922) (1.816)  (-1.195) (-1.230) 
Constant 0.242*** 0.242***  0.178
*** 0.179***  0.139 0.141  -0.401
*** -0.401*** 
 (3.489) (3.472)  (3.076) (3.070)  (0.440) (0.451)  (-3.013) (-3.010) 
Observations 4,175 4,175  4,175 4,175  4,178 4,178  4,177 4,177 
Adjusted R2 0.490 0.488  0.532 0.531  0.303 0.305  0.274 0.274 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 







Table 3.10 The relation between media uncertainty and firm risk-taking under CEO hubris  
The table reports the panel data regression models for the riskiness of firm under low and high CEO hubris. We construct CEO hubris as defined 
by the ratio of average value per vested option to average strike price. Average value per vested option is the percentage of value of vested 
unexercised options to number of vested unexercised options. Average strike price is defined as the stock price at the end of year less the average 
value per vested option. We then divide the measure of CEO hubris into five parts by year. One includes the lowest CEO hubris quintile, and five 
indicates the highest CEO hubris quintile. The models are fitted using industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects based on robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level. The sample is constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. All 
control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
Variables 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) 
Total riskt  Idiosyncratic riskt  R&D/Assett  Capex/Assett  
Total book 
leveraget 





































Media uncertainty -0.003 0.063**  0.019 0.062**  0.004 0.016**  -0.000 -0.006  0.015 0.052**  -0.008 -0.009  
(-0.132) (2.320)  (0.775) (2.271)  (0.966) (1.981)  (-0.015) (-1.034)  (1.117) (2.530)  (-0.851) (-0.696) 
Number of articles 0.001*** 0.000  0.001** 0.000  0.000 -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  0.000 -0.000  0.000 -0.001**  
(3.102) (0.128)  (2.189) (0.845)  (0.339) (-0.794)  (-0.725) (-0.645)  (0.816) (-1.208)  (0.235) (-2.020) 
Constant 1.550*** 0.689  1.911*** 0.911*  0.273*** 0.248**  0.105 0.366***  0.685* -0.178  -0.548*** -0.748*** 
 (3.667) (1.363) 
 (4.545) (1.661)  (3.079) (2.564)  (1.035) (3.283)  (1.924) (-0.498)  (-2.996) (-2.822) 
Observations 1,035 816  1,035 816  1,035 818  1,035 818  1,035 818  1,035 818 
Adjusted R2 0.736 0.715  0.712 0.664  0.542 0.502  0.535 0.570  0.418 0.395  0.413 0.357 
Controls YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 




Table 3.11 The impact of media uncertainty on CEO risk-taking 
This table reports the panel regression of risk-taking incentives of CEO on media uncertainty. The risk-taking incentives of CEOs are measured 
as CEO vega and delta. The independent variables are media uncertainty, positive and negative uncertainty all measured at time t-1. The models 
are fitted using industry (the two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample is 
constructed as described in Table 1 and variables definitions are provided in Appendix B. All control variables are measured at time t-1. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
CEO Vegat   CEO Deltat 
Media uncertainty  24.443*    -158.322   
 (1.860)    (-0.778)   
POS uncertainty  38.026**    -158.916  
  (2.485)    (-0.851)  
NEG uncertainty   34.567**    -135.535 
   (2.370)    (-0.866) 
Number of articles -0.856 -0.886 -0.876  -3.668 -3.658 -3.721 
 (-1.373) (-1.414) (-1.407)  (-0.544) (-0.541) (-0.536) 
Log(company age) 7.705 7.688 6.901       -291.594* -290.756* -287.600* 
 (0.551) (0.551) (0.492)  (-1.836) (-1.826) (-1.795) 
Firm size     93.447***    92.766***    92.762***     335.198*** 333.954*** 333.714*** 
 (10.409) (10.391) (10.308)  (3.289) (3.312) (3.337) 
Market to book -3.841 -3.828 -3.681  34.544 34.812 34.261 
 (-1.341) (-1.340) (-1.286)  (1.264) (1.267) (1.235) 
Sales growth 1.188 0.921 1.032  -22.379 -21.849 -22.418 
 (0.406) (0.312) (0.353)  (-0.944) (-0.928) (-0.940) 
Stock return  -10.421** -10.484** -10.459**    -73.496*** -73.067*** -73.210*** 
 (-2.242) (-2.256) (-2.246)  (-2.594) (-2.598) (-2.596) 
Debt to equity  6.658* 6.729* 6.293*  -4.205 -5.158 -3.493 
 (1.823) (1.817) (1.726)  (-0.145) (-0.179) (-0.122) 
Cash surplus 82.674 81.089 81.972  -24.280 -14.786 -18.081 
 (0.935) (0.922) (0.927)  (-0.044) (-0.027) (-0.033) 
Trading volume 13.855 13.717 13.563  23.174 23.360 23.933 
 (0.956) (0.950) (0.937)  (0.306) (0.308) (0.316) 
Board size   15.517***  15.388***   15.423***    65.301* 65.350* 65.191 
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 (3.626) (3.619) (3.609)  (1.660) (1.657) (1.644) 
Board interlock 22.802 23.016 23.162  -327.611 -327.401 -327.757 
 (0.614) (0.624) (0.626)  (-1.192) (-1.191) (-1.194) 
Independent 0.080 0.090 0.079   -5.072* -5.106* -5.059* 
 (0.292) (0.333) (0.290)  (-1.920) (-1.919) (-1.926) 
CEO tenure 2.027 2.073 2.047     136.251*** 135.946*** 136.070*** 
 (1.095) (1.123) (1.109)  (2.807) (2.815) (2.812) 
Log(CEO age) -21.236 -21.458 -21.415  1,242.023 1,250.771 1,251.660 
 (-0.237) (-0.241) (-0.239)  (1.112) (1.116) (1.107) 
Log(cash compensation)   42.421*** 41.816*** 42.482***         379.748* 381.136* 378.517* 
 (3.187) (3.168) (3.181)  (1.951) (1.948) (1.963) 
CEO delta 0.006 0.006 0.006  
 
  
 (1.012) (1.017) (1.007)  
 
  
CEO vega     0.342 0.344 0.340 
     (0.614) (0.619) (0.606) 
Constant -1,175.509*** -1,163.974*** -1,165.874***  -10,949.489* -11,001.089* -10,998.025* 
 (-3.027) (-3.027) (-3.008)  (-1.927) (-1.926) (-1.930) 
Observations 4,176 4,178 4,178  4,176 4,178 4,178 
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.294 0.294  0.191 0.191 0.191 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 












The importance of information dissemination to financial markets and the influence of 
disclosure to investors’ financial decisions (Botosan, 1997; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Lawrence, 
2013) is evident from the empirical research. This study extends these findings by addressing 
the following two research questions: (i) does textual financial disclosure influence mutual 
funds’ trading behaviour? and (ii) is subsequent fund performance affected by fund managers’ 
trading propensity in response to financial disclosure?   
The majority of prior research investigates individuals’ trades and emphasises the 
significance of financial reporting information (Bushee et al., 2004; Bhattacharya et al., 2007; 
Miller, 2010). Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that companies’ textual risk disclosures increase 
investors’ risk perception. Lawrence (2013) documents that individual investors’ benefit from 
financial disclosure. We depart from this focus and examine the effect of financial disclosure 
on professional mutual fund investors. Prior studies have measured information disclosure and 
its relationship to investors using media coverage (Engelberg and Gao, 2011; Tetlock, 2011). 
To the extent that media sensationalizes articles about stock returns, fund managers are unlikely 
to earn superior returns by reacting to news reported via a mass media outlet. Evidence that 
fund managers trade stocks in response to mass media coverage documents a decrease in fund 
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performance (Fang et al., 2014). In contrast, our study examines the effect of financial reporting 
disclosures. This form of information release differs to more general media coverage. In 
particular, financial reporting must strictly adhere to accounting and financial reporting 
standards established by independent and government agencies.24 The regulatory reporting 
environment in controlling financial information disclosure provides a guarantee on the 
reliability and accuracy of the reported data that is missing from general media disclosures. 
Furthermore, ongoing improvements to the regulatory environment continually prompt the 
effectiveness of financial disclosure, giving financial statement users the opportunity to 
respond to new information in a timely fashion.25 Therefore, financial reporting is an important 
information resource that can inform professional investors, and may dictate fund manager 
trades and performance. 
When investors are buying, they can choose from a large set of available alternatives. 
However, when they are selling, they can only sell what they hold (Fang et al., 2014; Liu and 
Ye, 2016).26  Thus, we argue that a negative information to one stock can lead informed 
investors to sell the stock and buy another stock to hedge the risk. Baker et al. (2010) document 
that fund managers buy stocks with higher future return before earnings announcements, while 
they sell shares following the release of financial information disclosing lower stock return. 
Cai and Lau (2015) propose that a mutual fund manager is skilled if he or she buys stocks with 
                                                             
24  Examples include the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and by authoritative independent 
institutions, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). Currently, a top priority for the FASB, the IASB, and the SEC is to establish accounting and 
financial reporting standards and to improve the quality of reporting to better serve investors ((Lawrence, 2013) 
25 Due to the development of the SEC requirements, the reporting framework for publicly disclosed financial 
documents has had to change to ensure that investors have access to transparent financial information in a timely 
manner to assist in their investment decisions. For example, in 2009, the SEC announced the formation of the 
Investor Advisory to improve the financial reporting environment. SEC ensure that public companies are indeed 
disclosing meaningful financial and other information to the public (SEC, 2013). Moreover, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) establish and improve financial accounting and reporting standards to 
provide useful information to investors and other users of financial reports and educate stakeholders on how to 
most effectively understand and implement those standards. For example, FASB, in 2010, provided useful and 
understandable information that attempts to aid investors in predicting the future cash flows of a firm. 
26 Investors sell what they hold when they realize that these stocks may lead to a bad performance in the future 
based on negative information from financial disclosures. Compared with funds’ buys, mutual funds’ sells may 
be more sensitive to informed negative financial disclosure.  
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subsequent high earnings announcement returns. Therefore, trading behaviours of mutual funds 
is associated with information release. In addition, information is not processed 
homogeneously among investors (Kandel and Pearson, 1995; Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 
2007). Professional investors or sophisticated investors, such as mutual fund managers, may 
be better able to process information at trading (Baker et al., 2010; Blau et al., 2015). In 
particular, fund managers who predict that a stock will have a poor earnings outlook due to 
negative financial disclosures will prefer to sell the stock in order to avoid negative future 
returns. Hence, fund managers’ perception to trade stocks around financial disclosure can 
influence future fund performance. In this research, we argue that professional fund managers 
are more likely to sell stocks in response to the release of negative financial information.  
Textual disclosure in financial reporting has a significant influence on investors’ 
perceptions (Li, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Lehavy et al., 2011; Kravet and Muslu, 2013). 
Kravet and Muslu (2013) emphasize the effect of tone on investors’ trading. Li (2008) proposes 
that the tone in financial reporting is associated with future earnings and liquidity. The study 
finds that statements in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K and 10-Q 
filings concerning risk are associated with negative tone. Our paper considers negative tone as 
a measure of financial disclosure. We extend this line of research by investigating the 
relationship between mutual funds’ trading behaviour and textual disclosures in financial 
reporting.27     
Financial reporting, by disseminating information, decreases information asymmetry 
between corporate management and market participants (Welker, 1995; Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Fu et al., 2012). Thus, financial reporting provides an efficient information platform to 
investors. Moreover, financial information reporting may change investors’ perception of 
                                                             
27 Compared with positive tone, negative tone overcomes information asymmetry with management and is a 
credible source of information. Most studies in the prior literature focus solely on negative tone, as there is little 
incremental information in positive words (Core et al., 2008; Liu and McConnell, 2013). As such, following prior 
literature, our study investigates the negative financial reporting tone. 
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stocks (Kravet and Muslu, 2013), which then influence trading behaviours and subsequent 
performance. Given that trading behaviour is motivated by financial information (Lawrence, 
2013; Fang et al., 2014), we expect it to be associated with superior investment performance. 
We investigate if subsequent fund performance increases following managers’ propensity to 
sell negative-tone-covered stocks. 
We conjecture that the negative tone of quarterly financial reporting has an effect on 
funds’ sells; however, the effect may be driven by institutional investor type. We investigate 
what type of institutional investor is more sensitive to negative-tone-covered stocks. Bushee 
(1998, 2001) classifies three types of institutional investors: transient, dedicated, and quasi-
indexers. The author finds that transient investors trade actively for short-term profits rather 
than dedicated and quasi-indexers. Ke and Petroni (2004) expand Bushee (2001) and propose 
that transient institutional investors can achieve short-term trading profits because they possess 
information that allows them to avoid negative stock price shocks associated with the end of a 
string of consecutive earnings increases. We find supporting evidence that transient investors 
do sell stocks in response to negative information in financial reporting.  
The sample considers S&P 1500 firms over the interval of 1999–2016. We analyse the 
textual disclosure using the financial dictionary developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
We investigate whether negative financial reporting tone influences mutual funds’ trading, and 
its impact on fund performance. Following Fang et al. (2014), we construct the trading measure 
that captures fund managers’ propensity to trade stocks and relate these propensities to future 
fund performance in the cross-sectional fund analysis.  
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating the relation between negative 
financial reporting tone and mutual funds’ trading. The findings indicate that funds tend to sell 
more stocks that are associated with higher negative financial disclosure tone. Consistent with 
prior literature (Botosan, 1997; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Lawrence, 2013; Fang et al., 2014), 
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the results point to funds’ trading acting on public information. In contrast, we find that funds’ 
buy decisions are not significantly affected by negative tone. 
In addition, our study reports that fund managers’ propensity to sell stocks in response 
to negative financial disclosure tone has a positive impact on future fund performance. This 
suggests that financial disclosure influences fund managers’ trading behaviours which impacts 
on its subsequent fund performance. We find that the propensities of fund managers to sell 
stocks with negative disclosure are associated with an increase in next-quarter fund 
performance.  
Furthermore, we attempt to address the question of which type of institutional investor 
drives funds’ sell decisions for stocks that experience higher negative financial reporting tone. 
We find that transient investors are more likely to sell stocks that are associated with negative 
tone when compared with dedicated and quasi-indexing investors. The finding is consistent 
with Ke and Petroni (2004), who show that transient investors tend to focus more on short-term 
investment by analyzing and processing negative public information, so that they are able to 
sell stocks in order to avoid future negative return.  
Fund managers may rationally trade stocks with high negative tone to cater to investors' 
tastes because information disclosure appears to amplify individual investors’ return-chasing 
behaviours (Fang et al., 2014). In this case, managers' trades of high negative-tone-covered 
stocks are not the consequence of their trading skills in processing information but of their 
clients' demand. As such, the "flow-catering hypothesis", as proposed by Fang et al. (2014), 
may serve as an alternative explanation to our main findings. In our robustness test, we do not, 
however, find any evidence that fund flow is related to trading stocks with negative financial 
reporting tone. Therefore, the flow-catering hypothesis cannot explain the effect of financial 
disclosure on fund trades. 
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Our study makes several important contributions. First, this research extends the 
financial behavioural literature by exploring the relationship between financial reporting and 
mutual fund managers’ trading. To the extent that financial reporting changes fund managers’ 
trading perceptions (Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Lawrence, 2013), fund managers are able to 
analyse and process negative information in financial reporting to sell their stocks. Our paper 
also develops the proposition of Fang and Peress (2009) concerning the effect of information 
disclosure through financial reports on mutual funds’ trading and performance.   
Second, our study contributes to the literature on whether mutual fund managers are 
better at processing information. Fund managers, as sophisticated investors, are proficient at 
using public financial information to identify and target stocks that experience negative future 
returns (Dechow et al., 2001; Drake et al., 2011). The positive relation between managers’ 
propensity to sell stocks and fund performance suggests that fund managers, via processing 
information, make superior selling decisions.  
Third, our paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence that negative 
financial reporting tone is related to transient investors’ selling behaviours. Transient investors 
give greater attention to short-term performance when compared with other types of institutions, 
such as dedicated and quasi-indexing institutions (Bushee, 2001). Transient investors are more 
sensitive to information in the market. Our results are consistent with the proposition from Ke 
and Petroni (2004) that transient investors are more likely to sell shares to avoid the negative 
stock price response that is associated with bad news. Thus, this study contributes to the prior 
literature on the real effects of financial disclosure. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A literature review and hypotheses 
development are presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes our sample and the measure of 
the variables. The empirical methods and results are reported in section 4.4. Section 4.5 




4.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
4.2.1 Financial disclosure and investors’ trading 
Financial disclosure documents provide a comprehensive review of firms’ business operations 
and financial condition. These financial documents and filings increase firms’ visibility and 
decrease information asymmetry between managers and investors (Welker, 1995; Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Fu et al., 2012). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has made 
significant attempts to assess changes to the reporting framework that are necessary to ensure 
that investors can effectively rely on firms’ financial disclosures. The SEC (1997) requires 
firms to provide information about market risk factors related to their trading and non-trading 
instruments. In 2003, the SEC provided a disclosure guidance that companies are expected to 
consider all relevant information in identifying, discussing, and analysing known material 
trends and uncertainties, even if such information is not required to be disclosed. In 2009, the 
SEC established the Investor Advisory Committee to ensure the effectiveness of disclosure and 
initiatives to protect investor interests and promote investor confidence. The Dodd-Frank Act 
of 2010 created regulatory agencies and granted the SEC and the Federal Reserve more 
authority to improve transparency in the financial system. For investors, these changes in the 
regulatory environment have improved transparency in the financial system and corporate 
governance. As such, financial disclosure provides an important platform for investors to 
understand firms’ earnings and performance.  
Lawrence (2013) proposes that individual investors benefit from clearer financial 
disclosures. The author pays attention to the impact of financial reporting in influencing 
investors' shareholdings and returns. Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that annual increases in 
financial risk disclosures are associated with increased stock return volatility and trading 
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volume around and after the filings. The study documents the impact of financial disclosure on 
investors’ return and trading.  
Textual information in financial reports is associated with earnings persistence and 
investors’ decisions (Li, 2008; Kothari et al., 2009; Lehavy et al., 2011). Kravet and Muslu 
(2013) find that financial textual disclosures influence investors’ perceptions. Their finding 
also emphasizes the effect of tone on investors’ trading. In addition, the tone of financial reports 
may reflect firm performance. Li (2010) proposes that the tone in forward-looking statements 
in the Management Discussion and Analysis section of 10-K and 10-Q filings is associated 
with future earnings and liquidity where statements related to risk communicate a negative tone. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that a higher negative financial reporting tone provides a signal of 
poor firm earnings and performance for market participants which may facilitate investors’ 
trading. 
When investors are trading stocks, they can choose from a large set of available 
alternatives, while they can only sell what they hold (Fang et al., 2014; Liu and Ye, 2016). 
Thus, we argue that a negative information to one stock can lead informed investors to sell the 
stock. Information releases is important to trading behaviours. Baker et al. (2010) document 
that fund managers buy stocks with higher future return before earnings announcements, while 
they sell shares following the release of financial information disclosing lower stock return. 
Given the focus of our paper on negative financial reporting tone, we conjecture that funds are 
more likely to sell (rather than buy) stocks in response to the release of bad news. Thus, 
H1: Negative financial disclosure tone has a larger impact on funds’ sells than on their buys. 
 
4.2.2 Financial disclosures and fund performance 
The objective of mutual fund managers is to trade their stocks according to the fund’s 
investment objectives and achieve high future returns. Cohen et al. (2008) find that mutual 
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funds deliberately seek exposure to low-accrual stocks and make high future returns. Ali et al. 
(2008) find that mutual funds based their investments on personal connections with a good 
outcome. Shumway et al. (2009) propose that superior performance is associated with beliefs 
that are more closely in line with predicting future performance. Therefore, the mutual fund 
managers’ perceptions are important to fund performance. 
Additionally, financial reporting affects investors’ trades and investment in two ways. 
First, financial reporting, by disseminating information, increases the degree to which market 
participants know about firm earnings and investment (Welker, 1995; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Fu et al., 2012). Second, financial reporting characterizes a firm’s performance and, as a result, 
helps to shape perception of the firm, and even its managers. Cai and Lau (2015) find that 
informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. Therefore, 
financial disclosure may influence fund managers’ trading behaviours and subsequent fund 
performance. 
When compared with individual investors, mutual fund managers are better at 
processing publicly available financial information. Therefore, fund managers would be more 
likely to sell stocks in response to negative disclosures in order to avoid any potential negative 
impact on future fund performance. Our research attempts to investigate the relation between 
fund managers’ propensity to sell and fund performance. We conjecture that fund managers 
who have a greater propensity to sell stocks that are associated with negative financial reporting 
tone will be able to generate positive future fund performance. Therefore,  
H2: Fund managers’ propensity to sell stocks associated with negative financial disclosure tone 




4.3 Data  
The dataset used in the study is obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund database and the 
Thomson Reuters Holdings database for the period between January 1999 and December 2016. 
28 We focus on U.S. domestic equity open-ended funds in our sample. Our sample includes 
funds that are classified as aggressive growth, growth, and growth and income. We exclude 
index funds from our sample and funds that hold fewer than 10 stocks and manage less than $5 
million of assets under management. We also eliminate any duplicated funds and compute the 
fund-level variables by aggregating across different share classes using a value-weighted 
average approach.  
We obtain financial disclosure data in the form of 10-Q/10-K filings from Bill 
McDonald’s research website.29 We obtain a quarterly financial reports sample of 59,270 firm-
quarter observations and construct 738,987 fund trades’ observations. Other financial data for 
the stocks in our sample are obtained from the Compustat database. 
 
4.3.1 Mutual funds trading 
Following Fang et al. (2014), we compute the proportion of funds’ buys and sells for our sample 
of stocks. For each quarter t, we calculate the dollar value of fund f’s buys and sells in stock i 
as follows: 
$𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡−1),  
𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡−1                                           (4.1) 
$𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 × (𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡−1),  
𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 < 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡−1   ,                                        (4.2) 
                                                             
28 We acknowledge the limitation of relying on quarterly holdings data but it is a standard practice and well known 
limitation in the mutual fund studies that rely on mutual fund holdings data such as Baker et al. (2010) and Fang 
et al. (2014). 
29 The website of Bill McDonald’s research is https://sraf.nd.edu/.  
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where  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is stock i’s price at the end of quarter t, and 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑓,𝑖,𝑡−1 are 
fund f’s holdings in stock i at the end of quarter t and t-1, respectively. We then calculate funds’ 
buys or sells scaled by lagged fund total net assets (TNA). The stock price and number of shares 
are all adjusted for stock splits and dividends. We use the cumulative adjustment factor to make 
the necessary adjustment. Funds typically report holdings quarterly, in April, July, October, 
and January. We use a fund’s most recent report to infer its holdings in these months if it does 
not follow this schedule.  
 
4.3.2 Fund performance 
We use three performance measures: CAPM alpha, the Fama-French three-factor alpha, and 
Carhart’s four-factor alpha. These factor-model alphas have been widely used in the fund 
performance literature (Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Fang et al., 2014). For each fund in each 
month, we estimate factors loading from time-series regression of excess fund returns on factor 
returns using data from the previous 36 months. Alphas are calculated as the realized fund 
return minus the expected fund return. 
 
4.3.3 Financial disclosure 
We compute the quarterly negative financial reporting tone as a measure of financial disclosure 
based on the textual tone categories in the entire 10-Q/10-K filings. Using the financial 
disclosure data generated by Loughran and McDonald (2011), we capture the negative tone of 
each filing using the negative word counts. We use the percentage of the category words 
relative to total words in a given text as our financial disclosure measure. Negative variable is 
equal to the mean score for the negative words category from each financial report about a firm 




4.3.4 Funds’ propensity 
We construct fund managers’ propensity to buy and sell variables based on the methodology 
of Fang et al. (2014). For each fund, we regress its buys or sells on stocks’ negative financial 
reporting tone and stock characteristics variables to calculate the cross-sectional variation in 
funds’ propensities to buy or sell stocks with greater negative tone. For each fund in each 
quarter, we estimate the cross-sectional regression as follows: 
$𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡−1




= 𝛼𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓,𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑓,𝑖,𝑡.  
(4.4) 
where $𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 is the dollar amount of fund f’s buys in the stock i during quarter t, 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡−1 
is the total net asset of fund f at the end of quarter t-1. 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the negative tone in 
financial reporting of stock i during quarter t-1. We consider firm size and stock turnover as 
control variables in the regression. 30  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1  is the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization of equity i at the end of quarter t-1. 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 is the natural logarithm 
of one plus the dollar trading volume during quarter t-1 divided by the market capitalization of 
the stock i.  
We calculate fund f’s propensity to trade stocks with negative financial reporting tone 
for each quarter t. The estimation equation is shown as follows: 




























2 )             (4.5) 
  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 
                                                             
30
 Following Fang et al. (2014), the inclusion of control variables ensure that the estimated coefficient 𝛽𝑓,𝑡 






























2 )             (4.6) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑏𝑢𝑦_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 is funds’ propensity to buy stocks with negative financial 
reporting tone. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 is funds’ propensity to sell stocks with negative 
financial reporting tone. 𝜗𝑡−𝑞
2  is the variance of the estimated coefficient of 𝛽𝑓,𝑡−𝑞 . 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑏𝑢𝑦_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 are calculated by beta coefficient using 
four quarter estimation results from equations (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. 
 
4.3.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our analysis. We find that the 
mean of Buy/TNA is 3.527, while the average Sell/TNA is 5.684. The average Negative 
variable is approximately 1.632%. Thus, on average, 1.632% of the words in the financial 
reporting contain a negative tone. This table presents summary statistics for the control 
variables used in empirical analysis.31 These include stock turnover, firm size, book-to-market, 
and past return. We present the variable definitions in the Appendix B.  
 
4.4 Empirical results 
4.4.1 Financial disclosure and funds’ trading 
In this section, we discuss our empirical results concerning the association between financial 
disclosure and fund trading. As discussed above, we measure funds’ buys or sells scaled by 
lagged funds’ total net assets in year t, following Fang et al. (2014). All standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level to account for correlations within firm observations. The control 
                                                             
31 We provide descriptive statistics with the number of mutual funds for each year in Appendix E. 
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variables include stock turnover, firm size, book-to-market, and past return, along with fund 
and quarterly fixed effects. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4.2. 
Column 1 considers the relation between the funds’ buys and negative financial 
disclosure tone. The coefficient of the Negative variable is positive but insignificant after 
controlling for various other factors. The finding indicates that fund managers are not sensitive 
to buying stocks with more negative tone. As shown in Column 2, the coefficient of Negative 
is positive and statistically significant (p<0.05). Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in negative financial disclosure tone is associated with a 16% (0.560 × 0.286) increase in funds’ 
sells.  
Overall, these results indicate that funds tend to sell, but not buy, stocks with previous 
quarterly negative disclosures. The stronger influence of financial disclosure on sells compared 
with buys is consistent with our conjectured hypothesis.  
 
4.4.2 Propensities to trade stocks with negative financial reporting tone and fund 
performance 
The statistics for funds’ propensity to buy or sell stocks with negative financial reporting tone 
are presented in Table 4.3. In Panel A, we observe that negative tone has a positive impact on 
funds' buys. Both the raw β coefficients and shrinkage estimators are positive, on average. 
Similarly, the impact of negative tone on sells is positive. The median propensity measures are 
considerably smaller than the average value for both buys and sells, indicating the statistics are 
positively skewed. Additionally, Panel B presents summary statistics of the variables used in 
our analysis. The summary statistics for the fund performance variables show that the CAPM 
alpha, three-factor alpha, and four-factor alpha are around -0.002, -0.003, and -0.003, 
respectively. These values are comparable to the ones reported in Fang et al. (2014). The 
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average measures for expense ratio and turnover are similar to those reported by Indro et al. 
(1999) and Gottesman and Morey (2006), repectively.  
The correlation between funds’ propensities to trade and fund performance 
characteristics is presented in Table 4.4. It shows that propensity measures are not significantly 
correlated with fund characteristics. We observe Fund size to be highly correlated with Family 
size (32.1%) and Fund age (44.6%). The variance inflation factors from the empirical 
estimations for all variables are all below 1.2 (not reported), which indicates that 
multicollinearity is not a concern for the regression analysis. 
Next, we investigate the association between funds’ propensities to trade stocks with 
negative financial disclosure tone and their fund performance. As mentioned above, we 
measure fund performance measures following previous literature (Ferson and Schadt, 1996; 
Fang et al., 2014). All standard errors are clustered at the fund level to account for correlations 
within fund observations. The results of these estimations are presented in Table 4.5.32 
The pooled panel regression results, displayed in Columns 1, 3, and 5 of Table 4.5, 
indicate a strong negative association between Propensity_sell_neg and fund performance. In 
Column 1, the results indicate that a one-standard-deviation increase in Propensity_sell_neg is 
associated with a 4.19% increase in CAPM alpha. Similarly, in Columns 3 and 5, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the Propensity_sell_neg translates into an increase in the three-
factor and four-factor alphas of 5.03% and 5.87%, respectively. In contrast, there is no relation 
between of Propensity_buy_neg and fund performance in Column 2 and 4.  
Overall, we find a stronger positive relation between funds’ propensity to sell stocks 
with negative financial disclosure tone and their subsequent performance. Consistent with the 
                                                             
32 Following the study of Fang et al. (2014), our regression only controls for year fixed effects. In addition, the 
results don’t change after controlling for quarterly fixed effects. However, after controlling for fund and year (or 
quarter), the results are not consistent with our second hypothesis in Chapter 4 that fund managers’ propensity to 
sell stocks associated with negative financial disclosure tone is positively related to future fund performance. 
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second hypothesis, the findings provide some evidence that fund managers are able to increase 
fund performance by making superior sell decisions around financial reporting disclosures.  
 
4.5 Additional analysis 
4.5.1 The types of institutional investors’ classification 
In further tests, we extend our empirical analysis by considering the trading behaviours of 
different types of institutional investors in response to negative financial disclosure tone. We 
attempt to shed some light on which kind of institutional investors are more sensitive to 
negative-tone-covered stocks.  
Relying on the measure developed by Bushee (1998, 2001), we classify institutional 
investors into three groups: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexers. Dedicated and quasi-
indexing investors have a longer investment horizon and do not trade actively for short-term 
profits (Bushee, 1998). These two types of investors may be less focused on near-term earnings 
and be more likely to have preferences that are insensitive to the distribution of future value. 
Compared with other investors, transient investors tend to be short-term-focused 
investors whose interest in the firm’s stock is based on the likelihood of short-term trading 
profits (Porter, 1992). Transient investors create incentives for managerial myopia because a 
near-term earnings disappointment could trigger large-scale selling by such institutions and 
temporarily depress the firm’s stock price (Porter, 1992; Bushee, 1998, 2001). Ke and Petroni 
(2004) propose that in order to achieve short-term trading profits, transient institutional 
investors possess information that allows them to avoid negative stock price shocks associated 
with the end of a string of consecutive earnings increases. As such, we argue that the relation 
between negative financial disclosure tone and funds’ sells will be stronger for transient 
investors than dedicated and quasi-indexing investors.   
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In Table 4.6, as shown in Column 1, we find that the coefficient of the Negative variable 
is positive and statistically significant (p<0.01), indicating that transient investors are more 
likely to sell stocks with higher negative financial disclosure tone. Transient investors have an 
excessive focus on short-term firm performance. Once they capture a negative signal from 
financial disclosure for stocks, they prefer to sell these stocks in order to avoid losses for near-
term investment. Our finding provides supporting evidence that transient investors have a 
tendency to sell their shares whenever there is an earnings disappointment (Ke and Petroni, 
2004). However, there is no evidence of a relation between negative tone and funds’ sells for 
both dedicated and quasi-indexer investors. The finding supports the link between financial 
disclosure and funds’ trading.  
 
4.6 Robustness test 
4.6.1 The flow-catering hypothesis 
One potential concern that we need to consider is that fund managers may rationally trade 
stocks with high information disclosure to cater for investors' tastes because the information 
disclosure appears to amplify individual investors’ return-seeking behaviours (Fang et al., 
2014). This flow-catering hypothesis, as proposed by Fang et al. (2014), serves as our 
alternative explanation.33 Similar with news in the stock markets, the stocks with higher (lower) 
return and good (bad) performance that feature in financial reporting may attract more investor 
flows. If investors pay attention to funds that trade stocks with highly negative financial 
reporting tone, fund managers may sell more of these stocks to cater to fund flow. Based on 
this assumption, fund managers may have sold these stocks as a consequence of their clients’ 
tastes and flow-catering. 
                                                             
33  Fang et al. (2014) propose the influence of investors and fund flow-catering on fund managers’ trading 
behaviours. Our study considers this as an alternative hypothesis to test the relation between the negative tone of 
financial disclosure and fund flow. 
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In this section, we regress future fund flow (next-quarter new money growth) on the 
negative textual disclosure of stock sells. We consider a series of fund characteristics variables 
that may drive fund flow, including fund performance, size, age, expense ratio, and turnover 
ratio. Stock characteristics variables are included in the regression, such as stock size, book-
to-market ratio, and past return. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 4.7. The 
result shows that none of the coefficients on negative tone (Average Negative and % of stocks 
with high Negative) are significant, indicating that selling stocks with negative disclosure does 
not attract future fund flow. As such, the finding does not find a support for the flow-catering 
hypothesis, which provides further support to our main argument that fund managers are more 
sensitive to financial information.  
 
4.6.2 Consideration of positive textual disclosure on funds’ trading and performance 
Throughout the study, we only consider the influence of negative textual disclosure on funds’ 
trading, but we omit positive textual disclosure because prior literature has shown little 
incremental information from positive words (Kothari, 2000; Tetlock, 2007). In this section, 
we redefine our Negative variable (termed as Negative_new hereafter) by taking into account 
positive words in financial disclosures. The Negative_new variable is defined as the difference 
between the number of negative and positive words, divided by the number of words in each 
financial reporting disclosure. We then re-estimate the models reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.5 
using this measure. 
We investigate the impact of negative financial reporting tone using the Negative_new 
variable on mutual funds’ trading in Table 4.8. The results show that the coefficient of the 
Negative_new variable remains positive and is statistically significant at 10% in Column 2. 
The finding indicates that fund managers have a greater tendency to sell stocks with negative 
financial disclosures. In Table 4.9, we report the regression of fund performance on funds’ 
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propensity to trade negative disclosure covered stocks. The significant positive regression 
coefficient on the Propensity_sell_neg_new variable suggests a positive relation between funds’ 
propensity to sell stocks with negative financial disclosure and fund performance. The finding 
indicates that selling more negative-tone-disclosure stocks increases subsequent fund 
performance. This is consistent with the results in Table 4.5.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Previous literature proposes that disseminated public information informs investor decision 
making in the financial market (Botosan, 1997; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Lawrence, 2013; Fang 
et al., 2014). This study seeks to examine the link between textual disclosure and mutual funds’ 
trading activities. Rather than relying on media articles and private information as sources of 
information (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; Fang et al., 2014), Chapter 4 focuses on the effect 
of professional public information, in particular, financial reporting.  
Our results provide evidence that mutual fund managers, as professional investors, do 
respond to negative financial reporting tone. This finding supports the presumption that textual 
disclosure drives fund managers to sell stocks and increases future fund performance. In 
contrast, there is no evidence that funds’ buys are influenced by negative financial disclosure 
tone. One potential explanation is that buying behaviours may be active before releasing 
information because mutual fund managers are able to forecast earnings-related fundamentals 
(Baker et al., 2010). Increases in subsequent fund performance are associated with fund 
manager sales of negative-tone-covered stock.  
Further tests provide supporting evidence that transient institutional investors prefer to 
sell negative-tone-covered stocks. The findings support the view of Ke and Petroni (2004) that 
these investors possess information that allows them to avoid negative stock price shocks 
associated with the end of a string of consecutive earnings increases. 
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As a robustness test, we consider the alternative explanation, flow-catering hypothesis, 
to investigate the association between negative tone and funds’ sells. The alternative 
explanation is that fund managers selling stocks associated with negative financial reporting 
tone is the consequence of their clients’ tastes and flow-catering, but not of fund managers in 
processing information disclosure. We do not find any support for such explanation.  
Finally, the research documents that fund managers are proficient at using financial 
reporting information to make investment decisions and for stock trading. This presumption is 
supported through the finding of a positive association between fund managers’ propensity to 
sell stocks with negative financial reporting tone and fund performance.  
Our study raises a number of additional questions that could be considered in future 
research. Financial disclosure is not the only way to influence managers’ trading behaviours. 
We believe that information-technology enhancement and different types of social media, such 
as Twitter and Facebook, may drive fund managers’ propensities to trade their stocks. In 
addition, given the continuous change in the regulatory environment, it remains an open 
empirical question of whether financial reporting has an impact on investors’ trading choices 




Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics  
The table provides descriptive statistics for variables related to mutual funds’ trades for the 
period between January 1999 and December 2016. The sample contains 59,270 firm-quarter 
observations and constructs 738,987 fund trades’ observations from the CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database and the Thomson Reuters Holdings Database. Definitions for all variables are 
provided in Appendix B. 
Variable   Obs.    Mean    S. D.      P10     P25      P50     P75     P90     P95 
Buy/TNA 525,699 3.527 22.558   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 1.384 9.017 
Sell/TNA 213,288 5.684 30.148   0.000 0.001 0.014 0.290 5.178 20.139 
Negative (%) 767,643 1.632   0.560   0.976 1.239 1.564 1.945 2.361 2.653 
Stock turnover  767,643 1.738   0.550   1.079 1.342 1.683 2.081 2.491 2.757 
Firm size 767,643 16.010   1.704 13.735 14.746 16.022 17.179 18.413 18.940 
Book/Market (%) 767,643 0.043   0.031   0.013 0.022 0.036 0.057 0.083 0.100 





Table 4.2 Financial disclosure and mutual funds’ trades 
The table presents the panel regression of funds’ buys or sells (scaled by lagged TNA) on 
quarterly financial disclosures. Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), Negative variable 
is defined as the negative textual tone computed as the average ratio of negative words to total 
words. Control variables include stock turnover, firm size, book-to-market, and past return. All 
independent variable and control variables are measured in the past quarter. The models are 
fitted using fund fixed-effects regressions based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm 
level.34 The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include quarter fixed 
effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-




Negative 0.055   0.286** 
 (0.753) (2.138) 
Stock turnover     0.486***    0.489*** 
 (5.734) (2.904) 
Firm size       -0.619   -2.069** 
 (-1.163) (-2.117) 
Firm size2      0.056***      0.117*** 
   (3.315) (3.821) 
Book/Market    -3.129** -2.898 
  (-2.504) (-1.235) 
Past return     -0.033*** 0.027 
 (-3.087) -1.317 
Constant      -16.294     16.708 
 (-0.000)   (0.003) 
Observations 525,699 213,288 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.420 
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes 




                                                             
34 We consider the regression with robust standard errors clustered at the fund and quarter level. The coefficients 
of Negative have same sign and similar level of statistical significance.  
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Table 4.3 Summary statistics  
The table reports the descriptive statistics for funds’ propensity to buy or sell stocks with 
negative tone in quarterly financial reporting. For each quarter, we estimate the cross-sectional 
regression as follows: 
$𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡−1




= 𝛼𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑓,𝑡𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿𝑓,𝑡𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑓,𝑖,𝑡. 
where $𝑏𝑢𝑦𝑓,𝑖,𝑡 ($𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑓,𝑖,𝑡) is the dollar amount of fund f’s buys (sells) in the stock i during 
quarter t, 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡−1 is the total net asset of fund f at the end of quarter t-1. 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 is the 
negative tone of stock i during quarter t-1. Following Fang et al. (2014), we then calculate fund 
f’s propensity to trade stocks with negative tone for each quarter t. The estimation equation is 
shown as follows: 
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2 )              
where 𝜗𝑡−𝑞
2  is the variance of the estimated coefficient of 𝛽𝑓,𝑡−𝑞.  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑏𝑢𝑦_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡  and 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 are funds’ propensity to buy and sell stocks with negative tone, 
respectively.  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑏𝑢𝑦_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡 and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑓,𝑡  are calculated by 
precision-weighted average beta coefficient using four quarter estimation results from one 
current and three previous cross-sectional regression, respectively. Panel A shows the statistics 
for funds’ propensity measures. Panel B provide a descriptive statistics for variables related to 
fund performance, CAPM alpha, three-factor alpha and four-factor alpha, and funds’ 
propensity measures. The panel gives a summary for the control variables. Definitions for all 
variables are provided in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A : Statistics of Propensity_buy_neg and Propensity_sell_neg 
Variable Mean S.D. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 P95 
Buys                 
β 0.060 4.344 -0.330 -0.011 0.000 0.015 0.394 1.769 
Propensity_buy_neg 0.043 2.596 -0.146 -0.004 0.000 0.008 0.170 0.779 
Sells                 
β 0.397 10.165 -0.866 -0.024 0.000 0.024 1.161 5.304 
Propensity_sell_neg 0.506 8.380 -0.195 -0.007 0.000 0.015 0.878 3.456 
Panel B: Summary statistics of propensity to buy and sell stocks with negative tone and fund characteristics 
Variable          Obs. Mean S. D. Min Median Max   
CAPM alpha 16,599 -0.002 0.090 -2.743 0.001 0.199   
Three-factors alpha 16,599 -0.003 0.088 -2.687 0.001 0.399   
Four-factors alpha 16,599 -0.003 0.090 -2.697 0.001 0.185   
Propensity_sell_neg 8,109 0.506 8.380 -116.949 0.000 131.856   
Propensity_buy_neg 16,086 0.043 2.596 -43.565 0.000 39.426   
Fund size 16,685 3.367 2.139 0.095 3.343 9.498   
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Family size 16,640 6.145 1.946 0.000 6.588 9.851   
Expense ratio  16,004 0.013 0.006 0.000 0.013 0.048   
Turnover ratio 14,862 1.028 1.903 0.000 0.570 30.620   
Fund age 16,699 1.957 0.664 -0.087 1.946 4.426   
Aggressive growth 16,728 0.161 0.367 0.000 0.000 1.000   
Growth 16,728 0.279 0.448 0.000 0.000 1.000   





Table 4.4 Correlation between propensity to buy/sell stocks with negative tone and fund characteristics 
The table presents correlations between propensity to buy/sell stocks with negative tone and fund characteristics. Definitions for all variables are 
provided in Appendix B. 
 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Propensity_sell_neg 1.000          
2 Propensity_buy_neg 0.205 1.000         
3 Fund size -0.083 -0.018 1.000        
4 Family size -0.007 -0.002 0.321 1.000       
5 Expense ratio  -0.067 -0.052 -0.254 -0.145 1.000      
6 Turnover ratio -0.014 0.008 -0.075 -0.126 0.170 1.000     
7 Fund age -0.061 -0.040 0.446 0.127 -0.100 -0.039 1.000    
8 Aggressive growth -0.027 -0.014 -0.001 0.125 -0.144 -0.066 0.047 1.000   
9 Growth 0.033 -0.002 0.051 -0.047 0.028 -0.028 0.045 -0.272 1.000  





Table 4.5 Propensity to buy or sell stocks with negative financial reporting tone and fund 
performance 
The table shows the panel regression of fund performance on propensity to buy or sell stocks 
with negative financial reporting tone. Fund performance variables are measured at quarter t+1. 
Control variables include fund size, family size, expense ratio, turnover ratio, fund age, 
investment style, and average firm size. All dependent variables and control variables are 
measured at quarter t. The robust standard errors are clustered at the fund level. The variables 
are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
CAPM alpha  Three-factor alpha  Four-factor alpha 
Propensity_sell_neg  0.005*  
  0.006**  
   0.007***  
 (1.900)  
 (2.537)  
 (2.764)  










   (1.672) 
Fund size -0.003***   -0.001***    -0.003***   -0.001***    -0.003***  -0.001*** 
  (-3.909)  (-3.176) 
  (-3.985)   (-3.275)    (-3.903)  (-3.172) 
Family size 0.002***    0.001***    0.001***     0.001***      0.001***    0.001*** 
   (3.804) (4.046) 
  (3.537) (2.738)  (3.549)    (3.433) 
Expense ratio   2.025***     1.031***     1.951***     0.939***     2.026***    0.989*** 
   (4.634) (4.862) 
   (4.619) (4.575)  (4.661) (4.689) 
Turnover ratio     0.000   0.000*  0.000*   0.000**    0.000**   0.000** 
    (1.592)  (1.685) 
   (1.914) (2.439)  (2.021) (2.066) 
Fund age   0.006***     0.002***     0.006***    0.003***     0.006***    0.003*** 
 (4.675) (3.650) 
 (4.879) (4.626)  (4.902) (4.483) 
Aggressive growth    0.012***     0.007***     0.011***     0.007***     0.012***    0.007*** 
 (3.323) (3.534) 
 (3.303) (3.700)  (3.394) (3.654) 
Growth    0.016***    0.008***     0.015***    0.008***     0.016***    0.008*** 
 (4.633) (4.551) 
 (4.495) (4.529)  (4.453) (4.275) 
Average firm size -0.094***   -0.039***    -0.100***   -0.043***    -0.097***   -0.042*** 
  (-3.052)  (-3.624) 
  (-3.350)  (-3.981)   (-3.183)   (-3.956) 
Constant  0.235***    0.088***     0.255***   0.101***    0.243***     0.097*** 
   (2.765) (3.090) 
 (3.092) (3.527)  (2.904)    (3.490) 
Observations 7,243 14,294  7,243 14,294  7,243 14,294 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.014  0.025 0.013  0.025 0.013 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 





Table 4.6 Types of institutional investors 
The table presents the panel regression of funds’ sells on negative tone of quarterly financial 
reporting under three types of institutional investors. Using the method developed by Bushee 
(1998, 2001), we classify institutions into three groups: transient (TRA), dedicated (DED), and 
quasi-indexers (QIX). Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), Negative variable is defined 
as the negative textual tone computed as the average ratio of negative words to total words. 
Control variables include stock turnover, firm size, book-to-market, and past return. Sell/TNA 
is measured at quarter t+1. All independent variable and control variables are measured at 
quarter t. The models are fitted using management companies fixed-effects regressions based 
on robust standard errors clustered at the fund level. The variables are as defined in Appendix 
B. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Sell/TNA 
  TRA DED QIX 
Negative 1.508*** 0.151 0.105 
  (2.656) (0.167) (1.163) 
Stock turnover    0.369   1.945**     0.677*** 
   (0.622) (2.227)  (6.017) 
Firm size -15.468***    1.506 -0.672 
  (-6.043) (0.631) (-1.076) 
Firm size2    0.583***   -0.044    0.041** 
   (7.178)  (-0.586)  (2.094) 
Book/Market   36.995***   16.348 -1.663 
    (5.008) (0.991) (-1.069) 
Past return     0.190***  -0.492**  0.019 
    (2.610) (-2.101)  (1.453) 
Constant   90.061***  -1.174  -10.463** 
 (4.515) (-0.054) (-2.107) 
Observations 54,171 1,388 73,910 
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.223 0.091 
Management fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 





Table 4.7 Fund managers’ incentives to trade stocks with high negative tone 
The table examines whether selling stocks with high negative tone drives future fund inflow. 
The table presents the panel regression of fund flow on propensity to trade stocks with negative 
financial reporting tone. Negative variable is defined as the negative tone computed as the 
average ratio of negative words to total words. Average Negative variable is the average 
Negative about a stock in previous quarter. % of stocks with high Negative is the percentage 
of the number of high Negative relative to total Negative. High Negative is defined that the 
value of Negative is greater than mean value of Negative. New money growth is the percentage 
flow of funds into a mutual fund in a quarter, calculated as the difference between TNA and 
lagged TNA multiplied by fund return, then scaled by lagged TNA. We include CAPM alpha, 
three-factor alpha, and four-factor alpha in the panel regression. Control variables include fund 
size, fund age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, stock size, book-to-market, and past return. The 
models are fitted using style fixed-effects regressions based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the fund level. The variables are as defined in Appendix B. All regressions include quarter 
fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
New money growth 
Average Negative -0.016  -0.016  -0.016  
 (-1.015)  (-1.016)  (-1.017)  
% of stocks with high Negative  -0.094  -0.093  -0.094 
  (-1.016)  (-1.017)  (-1.015) 
CAPM alpha(t-1) -0.748 -0.759     
 (-0.983) (-0.984)     
CAPM alpha (t-1)2 -0.341 -0.340     
 (-0.976) (-0.977)     
CAPM alpha(t-2) 0.143 0.146     
 (0.770) (0.776)     
CAPM alpha (t-2)2 0.113 0.109     
 (0.949) (0.945)     
Sd. of CAPM alpha -0.505 -0.502     
 (-0.920) (-0.919)     
Three-factor alpha(t-1)   -0.312 -0.308   
   (-0.821) (-0.818)   
Three-factor alpha (t-1)2   -0.121 -0.118   
   (-0.824) (-0.817)   
Three-factor alpha(t-2)   -0.137 -0.141   
   (-0.772) (-0.778)   
Three-factor alpha (t-2)2   -0.055 -0.058   
   (-0.598) (-0.614)   
Sd. of three-factor alpha   -0.260 -0.265   
   (-0.914) (-0.915)   
Four-factor alpha(t-1)     -0.439 -0.446 
     (-0.840) (-0.842) 
Four-factor alpha (t-1)2     -0.163 -0.163 
     (-0.843) (-0.843) 
Four-factor alpha(t-2)     -0.142 -0.142 
     (-0.733) (-0.734) 
Four-factor alpha (t-2)2     -0.057 -0.060 
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     (-0.798) (-0.810) 
Sd. of four-factor alpha     -0.506 -0.499 
     (-0.847) (-0.843) 
Fund size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.120) (-0.164) (-0.205) (-0.242) (-0.141) (-0.183) 
Fund age -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-1.151) (-1.158) (-1.168) (-1.176) (-1.160) (-1.168) 
Expense ratio  0.620 0.648 0.568 0.595 0.596 0.624 
 (1.535) (1.511) (1.584) (1.559) (1.551) (1.526) 
Turnover ratio 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (1.230) (1.236) (1.326) (1.334) (1.298) (1.305) 
Stock size -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
 (-1.061) (-1.053) (-1.059) (-1.052) (-1.061) (-1.053) 
Book/Market -40.249 -43.276 -41.336 -44.410 -42.259 -45.319 
 (-0.775) (-0.789) (-0.781) (-0.795) (-0.783) (-0.797) 
Past return 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (1.222) (1.221) (1.243) (1.242) (1.235) (1.234) 
Constant 0.083 0.126 0.087 0.130 0.086 0.129 
 (0.935) (0.968) (0.943) (0.972) (0.942) (0.971) 
Observations 12,979 12,979 12,979 12,979 12,979 12,979 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 
Quarter fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Style fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Table 4.8 Negative financial reporting tone and funds’ trading 
The table presents the panel regression of fund’s buys or sells (scaled by lagged TNA) on 
financial disclosures. The Negative_new variable is defined as the difference between the 
number of negative and positive words, divided by the number of words in each financial 
reporting. Control variables include stock turnover, firm size, book-to-market, and past return. 
Fund performance variables are measured at quarter t+1. All independent variable and control 
variables are measured at quarter t. The models are fitted using fund fixed-effects regressions 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the fund level. The variables are as defined in 
Appendix B. All regressions include quarter fixed effects. ***, ** and * represent significance at 





Negative_new 0.043 0.232* 
 (0.588) (1.676) 
Stock turnover     0.487***   0.490*** 
 (5.726) (2.896) 
Firm size    -0.620 -2.060** 
 (-1.163) (-2.112) 
Firm size2     0.056***   0.117*** 
 (3.318) (3.825) 
Book/Market -3.138** -2.963 
   (-2.498) (-1.259) 
Past return -0.033*** 0.027 
  (-3.086) (1.327) 
Constant    1.024 8.787 
   (0.245) (1.117) 
Observations 525,699 213,288 
Adjusted R2 0.258 0.420 
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes 
Quartered fixed effects Yes Yes 




Table 4.9 Propensity to buy or sell stocks with negative financial reporting tone and fund 
performance 
The table shows the panel regression of fund performance on propensity to buy or sell stocks 
with negative financial reporting tone. Following the methodology of Fang et al. (2014), we 
construct two measure of funds’ propensity, Propensity_sell_neg_new and 
Propensity_buy_neg_new, respectively. Control variables include fund size, family size, 
expense ratio, turnover ratio, fund age, investment style, and average firm size. Fund 
performance variables are measured at quarter t+1. All independent variable and control 
variables are measured at quarter t. The robust standard errors are clustered at the fund level. 
The variables are as defined in the Appendix. All regressions include year fixed effects. ***, ** 




(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
CAPM alpha  Three-factor alpha  Four-factor alpha 
Propensity_sell_neg_new 0.003   0.004
*   0.005
*  
 (1.042)   (1.695)   (1.937)  
Propensity_buy_neg_new  -0.001   -0.000   0.002 
  (-0.295)   (-0.061)   (0.344) 
Fund size   -0.003***    -0.001***     -0.003
***   -0.001***   -0.003
***   -0.001*** 
 (-3.906) (-3.181)  (-3.977) (-3.251)  (-3.894) (-3.167) 
Family size    0.002***     0.001***     0.001
***   0.001***    0.001
***   0.001*** 
 (3.801) (4.012)  (3.529) (2.588)  (3.541) (3.394) 
Expense ratio     2.022***   1.032***      1.948
***    0.940***    2.023
***   0.992*** 
 (4.636) (4.847)  (4.621) (4.567)  (4.664) (4.684) 
Turnover ratio 0.000 0.000*  0.000
* 0.000**  0.000
** 0.000** 
 (1.588) (1.709)  (1.909) (2.385)  (2.015) (2.063) 
Fund age   0.006***   0.002***     0.006
***   0.003***    0.006
***   0.003*** 
 (4.675) (3.611)  (4.880) (4.600)  (4.903) (4.457) 
Aggressive growth   0.012***   0.007***    0.011
***    0.007***    0.012
***   0.007*** 
 (3.323) (3.517)  (3.303) (3.669)  (3.395) (3.639) 
Growth    0.016***    0.009***     0.015
***   0.008***    0.016
***    0.008*** 
 (4.631) (4.524)  (4.493) (4.475)  (4.450) (4.258) 
Average firm size   -0.094***    -0.039***    -0.100
***   -0.042***    -0.097
***   -0.042*** 
 (-3.049) (-3.546)  (-3.343) (-3.917)  (-3.175) (-3.881) 
Constant    0.235***    0.089***     0.254
***   0.094***    0.242
***   0.098*** 
 (2.761) (3.106)  (3.084) (3.419)  (2.895) (3.509) 
Observations 7,243 14,294  7,243 14,294  7,243 14,294 
Adjusted R2 0.025 0.015  0.025 0.014  0.025 0.014 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 









5.1 Summary of Main Finding 
This thesis consists of three empirical studies that provide a better understanding of how 
information disclosure influences corporate finance and mutual fund investment. Using a large 
sample of information disclosures, including press articles and financial reporting documents, 
we attempt to extend the research on the economic importance of information disclosure to 
market participants and the corporation by studying the influence of textual tone.  
Chapter 2 seeks an approach around the dilemma cited by Core et al. (2008) by 
considering CPS as a measure of CEO dominance to investigate the association between media 
tone and CEO matters. We find that greater negative media tone is negatively related to 
subsequent CEO dominance. Our finding reports a potential missing link between media tone 
and CEO benefits. Chapter 2 provides a potential channel through which media tone can impact 
the behaviour of top non-CEO executives, but not CEOs themselves, to moderate CEO 
dominance. This finding indicates that top executives play a complementary role in response 
to negative media tone. Using a self-constructed governance index, the results in Chapter 2 
show that the negative relation between negative tone and CEO dominance is stronger for firms 
with good internal governance. The further finding provides evidence to support the 
explanation from the results of Core et al. (2008) that there is no relation between media tone 
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and CEO characteristics because poorly governed firms do not respond to external pressure 
from media.  
Chapter 3 investigates the relation between media uncertainty and firm risk-taking. We 
find that media uncertainty is positively associated with subsequent stock return volatility. The 
finding implies that investors are more sensitive to the uncertain information in media coverage, 
thereby resulting in higher trading turnover and subsequently higher stock return volatility. In 
addition, we propose that greater media uncertainty is associated with firms experienced with 
risky investment and financial policies. The explanation of a positive relation between media 
uncertainty and firm risk-taking indicates that uncertain information in media coverage reflects 
overestimated expectations of managers, which affects corporate investment and financial 
decision-making. Moreover, the positive relation between media uncertainty and firm risk-
taking explores the importance of transparent information for market participants and company 
executives. 
Chapter 4 examines the association between financial disclosure and mutual funds’ 
trading behaviours. We find that negative financial reporting tone has a larger impact on mutual 
funds’ sales but not for buys. Consistent with our presumption, the finding implies that selling 
behaviour is more sensitive after releasing negative financial information. It appears that 
financial reporting about a firm is a salient trigger for mutual fund managers to trade their 
stocks. We also propose that managers selling stocks in response to negative financial reporting 
tone are able to generate higher subsequent fund performance. Furthermore, the study provides 
evidence that transient investors, rather than dedicated and quasi-index investors, prefer to sell 
stocks with higher negative financial reporting tone. The result is consistent with the notion 
that transient investors are more sensitive to bad information so as to avoid negative stock price 





5.2 Limitations and Further Research  
One limitation of the study that could improve future research arises from the construction of 
our sample. The influence of information disclosure could be different for firms in different 
industries. In particular, the sample of media coverage in Chapters 2 and 3 focus on S&P 500 
firms. The construction of the sample neglects the influence of media on small firms that may 
receive less coverage form major media outlets. Additionally, industries in newspapers, books, 
and entertainment may influence the preference of media coverage. These industries have 
social links and business ties with the media outlets. As a result, the firms in these industries 
could receive less bad news and more good news when compared with the other firms.   
Another limitation of the research is the information outlets. The thesis only considers 
information resources derived from major media outlets (Chapters 2 and 3) and financial 
reporting (Chapter 4). They are not the only way to investigate the effect of information 
disclosure on corporate finance and mutual fund investment. Following information-
technology enhancement, various types of social media outlets, such as Twitter and Facebook, 
may affect the view of market participants, and even shape the reputation of firms and managers. 
Thus, an avenue for future research would be to consider different types of information outlets.  
One may build on this research and investigate whether the current results extend to 
different contexts. In this thesis, the sample concentrates on firms listed in the United States.  
Future work could explore the effects of textual tone in different countries and cultures. 
Furthermore, the constant change in media coverage and the regulatory environment of 
financial reporting means that future studies can consider the impact on market participants 
and managers and their firms in the long term.  
Overall, it is our expectation that the work from the thesis will not only provide an 
antecedent to the research on information disclosure but that it will also prompt future study 
138 
 
about the relation between information disclosure and behavioural finance, including 
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Appendix A. Adjusted CEO compensation 
     The annual compensation pre-2006 and post-2006 is not strictly comparable because 
following FAS 123R, ExecuComp changed the format used to compute compensation data in 
2006. We elaborate pre-2006 equations on TDC1, cash, equity, and option as below. 
𝑇𝐷𝐶1 = 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐺𝑅𝑁𝑇 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 
+𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐴𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐿𝐾_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 
+𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐴𝑁𝑁 + 𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐻𝑇𝑂𝑇                                                                              (A1) 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 = 𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝑌 + 𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆                                                                                         (A2) 
𝐸𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌 = 𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐾𝐺𝑅𝑁𝑇 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑                                     (A3)                                  
   𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 = 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝐴𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆_𝐵𝐿𝐾_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸 + 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑              
(A4) 
     We subtract long-term incentive plans (LTIP) from TDC1 and then add the performance-
based stock awards (SHRTARG × PRCC_F) and the performance-based option awards to 
TDC1 (LTIP and SHRTARG as reported in ExecuComp and PRCC_F as reported in 
Compustat).35 Cash compensation includes salary and bonus in our data. Equity compensation 
includes the value of stock grants and option grants. We adjust the pre-2006 data that are from 
options granted using Black-Scholes methodology (item OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_ 
VALUE), restricted stock grant (item RSTKGRNT), the performance-based stock awards, and 
the performance-based option awards, respectively. This measure is based on the grant-date 
fair value of option awards and stock awards after 2006 (item OPTION_AWARDS_FV and 
STOCK_AWARDS_FV, separately). Option compensation is from options granted using 
Black-Scholes methodology before 2006 and the grant-date fair value of option awards after 
2006.  
                                                             
35 Following Coles et al. (2014), we estimate performance-based option awards using the target number of options, 
the reported exercise price, time-to-maturity, and other variables needed for the Black-Scholes value. 
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Appendix B. Variable definitions 
Panel A: Variable definitions of Chapter 2 
Variables Definition 
CEO dominance measures  
CPSt The ratio of CEO total compensation (ExecuComp item TDC1) 
relative to the sum paid to the top five paid executives including the 
CEO. 
Compensation measures  
CEO pay ($million) Total compensation of the CEO. 
CEO long-term pay 
($million) 
Include the total value of restricted stock granted, value of stock 
options granted, long-term incentive payouts and others. 
Top4 Pay ($million) The average total pay of Top4 executive except for the CEO. 
Top4 long-term pay 
($million) 
The average long-term pay of Top4 non-CEO executive. 
Media variables   
Negtone (%) The average ratio of negative toned words to total words based on 
financial dictionary following Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
Number of articles The number of articles for each firm in a given year. 
Positive favourability The difference between the number of positive and negative words, 
divided by the number of words in each article. 
Firm-specific variables   
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q Tobin's Q is defined as the book value of assets plus market value of 
equity minus the sum of book value of common stock and deferred 
taxes, all divided by book value of assets. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s 
Q adjusted for industry median based upon the four-digit SIC industry 
codes. 
Firm size The natural logarithm of the book value of assets. 
Leverage The ratio of long-term debt to assets. 
ROA (%) Return on assets, the operating income divided by book value of assets 
Capex/assets (%) The ratio of capital expenditures to assets. 
R&D The ratio of research and development expense to sales. 
Company age The current year minus the year in which the company was first listed 
on the center for research in security prices (CRSP) database. 
Diversified A dummy variable equal to one if the firm reports more than one 
segment. 
CEO-specific variables   
Relative equity  The ratio of the fraction of equity compensation of the CEO to the 
average fraction of equity compensation of the other four top 
executives. 
CEO age  The age of CEO in years. 
CEO tenure Number of years the CEO is in office. 
CEO outsider A dummy equal to one if the CEO was working at the firm for less 
than one year before becoming CEO. 
Governance-specific variables 
CEO ownership A dummy equal to one if the CEO holds at least 20% of outstanding 
shares. 
Chairman A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is the chairman of board, 
zero otherwise. 
Founder A dummy variable equal to one if the CEO is a founder of the firm, 
zero otherwise. 
Number of VPs Number of vice presidents. 
Insider ownership The fraction of shares held by all insiders. 
Appointed  The percentage of new directors appointed during the CEO's tenure. 
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Independent  The percentage of outsider directors sitting on the board of directors 
Board interlock A dummy variable equal to one if the firm has at least one director 
who serves on board of another firm, zero otherwise. 
Board size The number of directors. 
Internal governance index The average of the sum of the four metrics including board size 
indicator, independent director indicator, CEO duality indicator, and 
key subordinate executives’ horizon. The board size indicator equals 
one if board size is greater than the median value in a given year and 
zero otherwise. The independent director indicator equals one when 
the percentage of independent directors is greater than the median 
value in a given year and zero otherwise. The CEO duality indicator 
equals zero if the CEO is a chairman and one otherwise. The 
subordinate executive horizon equals one if their horizon is greater 
than the median value in a given year and zero otherwise. 
Instrumental variable   
Location A dummy variable equal to one if both the firms and the headquarters 




Appendix B. Variable definitions (continued) 
Panel B: Variable definitions of Chapter 3 
Variables                                    Definition 
Dependent variables 
Total risk The natural logarithm of the variance of daily returns in year t. 
Systematic risk 
The coefficient on the stock market portfolio from market model 
regression 
Idiosyncratic risk  
The natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the residuals from 
Fama-French three factors model in year t. 
R&D/Assets 
The ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets in 
year t. 
Capex/Asset The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets in year t. 
Total book leverage The total debt divided by total assets. 
Free cash flow 
The earning before interests and taxes minus change in net working 
capital, minus capital expenditures and then plus depreciation. 
Media variable 
Media uncertainty The percentage of uncertain words to total words in year t-1. 
Control variables 
Number of articles The number of articles for each firm in a given year. 
Log of firm age The natural logarithm of firm age. 
Log of assets The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Market to book The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of assets. 
Sales growth The percentage of total sales in year 𝑡 to that in year t-1. 
Stock return The firm’s stock return over the prior year. 
Debt to equity The ratio of total debt to market value of equity.  
Cash surplus 
Net cash flow from operating less depreciation and amortization plus 
research and development expenditure divided by the book value of 
total assets. 
Trading volume (billions) The number of common shares traded 
Board size The number of directors 
Board interlock 
A dummy variable equals to one if the firm has at least one director 
who serves on board of another firm, zero otherwise 
Independent (%) The percentage of outsider directors sitting on the board of directors. 
CEO tenure (years) Number of years the CEO is in office. 
Log of CEO age The natural logarithm of CEO age. 
Log of cash compensation The natural logarithm of salary and bonus. 
CEO delta (thousands) The dollar changes in compensation per 1% increase in stock return. 
CEO vega (thousands) 
The dollar changes in compensation per 1% increase in a firm’s 
standard deviation of stock return. 
Instrumental variable 
Media expert 
A dummy equal to one if the director’s biography states that the 
director is or ever has been employee of a television, radio, or 
newspaper company, zero otherwise. 
Others 
Small 
A dummy equal to one if firm size is lower than median value in year 
t. 
Post 
A dummy variable equal to one if year of firm observation is greater 
than 2002. 
POS uncertainty 
The media uncertainty for those firms with a positive tone that 
exceeds the industry median in a given year. 
NEG uncertainty 
The media uncertainty for those firms with a negative tone that 




The ratio of average value per vested option to average strike price. 
Average value per vested option is the percentage of value of vested 
unexercised options to number of vested unexercised options. 
Average strike price is defined as the stock price at the end of the 





Appendix B. Variable definitions (continued) 
Panel C: Variable definitions of Chapter 4 
Variable Definition 
Fund trading 
Buy/TNA Fund buys during a quarter, scaled by lagged total net assets (TNA). 
Sell/TNA Fund sells during a quarter, scaled by lagged total net assets (TNA). 
Textual disclosure 
Negative (%) The negative tone computed as the average ratio of negative words to total 
words. 
Negative_new (%) The difference between the number of negative and positive words, divided 
by the number of words in each financial reporting disclosure 
Stock characteristics 
Stock turnover  Natural logarithm of one plus the previous quarter's dollar trading volume 
divided by the market capitalization of equity.  
Firm size Natural logarithm of the market capitalization of equity measured at the end 
of the previous quarter. 
Book/Market (%) Book-to-market ratio of the stock measured at the end of previous quarter. 
Past return A discrete variable indicating the decile rank of the stock's return in the 
previous quarter. 
Fund performance 
CAPM alpha The realized fund return minus the expected fund return based on CAPM 
model. 
Three-factor alpha The realized fund return minus the expected fund return based on four-factor 
model. 
Four-factor alpha The realized fund return minus the expected fund return based on three-factor 
model. 
Managers' propensity 
Propensity_buy_neg Fund’s propensity to buy stocks with negative financial reporting tone for each 
quarter.  
Propensity_sell_neg Fund’s propensity to sell stocks with negative financial reporting tone for each 
quarter.  
Fund characteristics 
Fund size Natural logarithm of one plus the fund's TNA. 
Family size Natural logarithm of one plus the fund family TNA. 
Expense ratio  Fund expense ratio. 
Turnover ratio Fund turnover ratio. 
Fund age Natural logarithm of fund in years. 
Growth A dummy variable equal to one if fund is growth fund. 
Aggressive growth A dummy variable equal to one if fund is aggressive growth fund. 
Average firm size Average firm size score on scale from one (small cap) to five (large cap) of 
stocks that the fund holds. 
Institutional investors Relying on the measure developed by Bushee (1998, 2001), institutional 
investors includes transient (TRA), dedicated (DED), and quasi-indexers 





Appendix C. Words list 
This table provide examples of negative-tone and uncertain-tone words in Panel A and B, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Negative-tone words 
ABANDON BACKDATING CANCELLATION DEADLOCKED EMBARRASS 
ABANDONED BAD CANCELLED DEADLOCKING EMBARRASSMENT 
ABANDONING BAIL CANCELLING DEADWEIGHT EMBEZZLE 
ABANDONMENT BAILOUT CARELESS DEBARMENT EMBEZZLEMENT 
ABDICATED BALK CARELESSLY DEBARRED ENCROACH 
ABDICATES BALKED CARELESSNESS DECEASED ENCROACHMENT 
ABDICATING BANKRUPT CATASTROPHE DECEIT ENCUMBER 
ABDICATION BANKRUPTCY CATASTROPHIC DECEITFUL ENCUMBRANCE 
ABERRANT BANKRUPTED CATASTROPHICALLY DECEITFULNESS ENDANGER 
ABERRATION BANKRUPTING CAUTION DECEIVE ENDANGERMENT 
ABERRATIONAL BAN CAUTIONARY DECEIVED ENDANGERS 
ABETTING BARRED CAUTIONED DECEIVING ENJOIN 
ABNORMAL BARRIER CAUTIONING DECEPTION ERODE 
ABNORMALITY BOTTLENECK CEASE DECEPTIVE ERODED 
ABNORMALLY BOYCOTT CEASED DECEPTIVELY EROSION 
ABOLISH BOYCOTTED CEASING DECLINE ERRATIC 
ABOLISHED BOYCOTTING CENSURE DECLINED ERRATICALLY 
ABOLISHING BREACH CENSURED DECLINING ERRED 
ABROGATE BREACHED CENSURING DEFACE ERRONEOUS 
ABROGATED BREACHING CHALLENGE DEFACED ERRONEOUSLY 
ABROGATING BREAK CHALLENGED DEFACEMENT ERROR 
ABROGATION BREAKAGE CHALLENGING DEFAMATION ERRS 
ABRUPT BREAKDOWN CIRCUMVENT DEFAMATORY ESCALATE 
ABRUPTLY BREAKING CLAIMING DEFAME ESCALATED 
ABRUPTNESS BRIBE CLAWBACK DEFAMED ESCALATING 
ABSENCE BRIBED CLOSED DEFAMING EVADE 
ABSENTEEISM BRIBERY CLOSEOUT DEFAULT EVADED 
ABUSE BRIBING CLOSEOUTS DEFAULTED EVASION 
ABUSED BRIDGE CLOSING DEFAULTING EVASIVE 
ABUSING BROKEN CLOSURE DEFEAT EVICT 
ABUSIVE BURDEN DAMAGE DEFEATED EVICTED 
ABUSIVELY BURDENED DAMAGED DEFEATING EVICTION 
ABUSIVENESS BURDENING DAMAGING DEFECT EXACERBATE 
ACCIDENT BURDENSOME DAMPEN DEFECTIVE EXACERBATED 
ACCIDENTAL BURNED DAMPENED DEFEND EXACERBATING 
ACCIDENTALLY CALAMITY DANGER DEFENDANT EXACERBATION 
ACCUSATION CANCEL DANGEROUS EGREGIOUS EXAGGERATE 
ACCUSE CANCELED DANGEROUSLY EGREGIOUSLY EXAGGERATED 






Appendix C. Words list (continued) 
Panel B: Uncertain-tone words 
ABEYANCE DEVIATE PRECAUTIONS REVISE UNEXPECTED 
ABEYANCES DEVIATED PREDICT REVISED UNEXPECTEDLY 
ALMOST DEVIATES PREDICTABILITY RISK UNFAMILIAR 
AMBIGUITIES DEVIATING PREDICTED RISKED UNFAMILIARITY 
AMBIGUITY DEVIATION PREDICTING RISKIER UNFORECASTED 
AMBIGUOUS DIFFER PREDICTION RISKIEST UNFORSEEN 
ANOMALOUS DIFFERED PREDICTIONS RISKINESS UNGUARANTEED 
ANOMALOUSLY DIFFERING PREDICTIVE RISKING UNHEDGED 
ANOMALY DOUBT PREDICTOR RISKY UNIDENTIFIABLE 
ANTICIPATE DOUBTFUL PRELIMINARILY ROUGHLY UNIDENTIFIED 
ANTICIPATED EXPOSURE PRELIMINARY RUMORS UNKNOWN 
ANTICIPATION FLUCTUATE PRESUMABLY SELDOM UNOBSERVABLE 
APPARENT FLUCTUATION PRESUME SELDOMLY UNPLANNED 
APPARENTLY HIDDEN PRESUMING SOMETIME UNPREDICTABLE 
APPEAR HINGES PRESUMPTION SOMETIMES UNPREDICTABLY 
APPROXIMATE IMPRECISE PROBABILISTIC SOMEWHAT UNPREDICTED 
APPROXIMATION IMPRECISION PROBABILITY SOMEWHERE UNPROVED 
ARBITRARILY IMPROBABILITY PROBABLE SPECULATE UNPROVEN 
ARBITRARINESS IMPROBABLE PROBABLY SPECULATION UNQUANTIFIABLE 
ARBITRARY INCOMPLETENESS RANDOM SPECULATIVE UNQUANTIFIED 
ASSUME INDEFINITE RANDOMIZE SPECULATIVELY UNRECONCILED 
ASSUMPTION INDEFINITELY RANDOMIZED SPORADIC UNSEASONABLE 
BELIEVE INDEFINITENESS RANDOMIZES SPORADICALLY UNSEASONABLY 
CAUTIOUS INDETERMINABLE RANDOMIZING SUDDEN UNSETTLED 
CAUTIOUSLY INDETERMINATE RANDOMLY SUDDENLY UNSPECIFIC 
CAUTIOUSNESS INEXACT RANDOMNESS SUGGEST UNSURE 
CLARIFICATION INEXACTNESS REASSESS SUGGESTED UNUSUAL 
CONCEIVABLE INSTABILITY REASSESSED SUGGESTING UNUSUALLY 
CONCEIVABLY INTANGIBLE REASSESSING SUSCEPTIBILITY UNWRITTEN 
CONDITIONAL LIKELIHOOD REASSESSMENT TENDING VAGUE 
CONDITIONALLY MAY RECALCULATE TENTATIVE VAGUELY 
CONFUSES MAYBE RECALCULATED TENTATIVELY VAGUENESS 
CONFUSING MIGHT RECALCULATING TURBULENCE VAGUER 
CONFUSINGLY NEARLY RECALCULATION UNCERTAIN VAGUEST 
CONFUSION NONASSESSABLE RECONSIDER UNCERTAINLY VARIABILITY 
CONTINGENCY OCCASIONALLY RECONSIDERED UNCERTAINTY VARIABLE 
CONTINGENT ORDINARILY RECONSIDERING UNCLEAR VARIABLY 
CONTINGENTLY PENDING REEXAMINATION UNCONFIRMED VARIANCE 
CROSSROAD PERHAPS REEXAMINE UNDECIDED VARIANT 
DEPEND POSSIBILITY REEXAMINING UNDEFINED VARIATION 
DEPENDENCE POSSIBLE REINTERPRET UNDESIGNATED VARY 
DEPENDENCY POSSIBLY REINTERPRETATION UNDETECTABLE VOLATILE 
DEPENDENT PRECAUTION REINTERPRETED UNDETERMINABLE VOLATILITY 





Appendix D. Descriptive statistics (Chapter 2) 
The table provides descriptive statistics with the number of industries and firms for each year. The SIC is based upon the two-digit SIC industry 
codes. 
Name of industry SIC 
No. of firms 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Metal 10   1   2   2   2   2   0   1   1   1   3   3   2   1   2   2   2   2   1   2 
Coal Mining 12   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   0 
Oil & Gas Extraction 13 13 15 12 12 14 12 11 11 17 19 20 21 21 19 20 17 16 18 16 
Nonmetallic Minerals,except fuels 14   1   1   1   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   1   2   2   2   1 
General Building Contractors 15   2   1   1   2   2   1   1   1   2   3   3   3   3   2   2   2   2   2   2 
Heavy Construction, Except Building 16   2   2   1   1   2   2   1   1   2   2   1   1   2   2   2   1   1   2   1 
Special Trade Contractors 17   0   0   0   0   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   0   0   1   1 
Food & Kindred Products 20   9   7   9 12 10   8 10 15 16 13   9   9 11 16 20 16 15 17 18 
Tobacco Products 21   1   1   1   1   1   2   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   2   2   2   2   1 
Textile Mill Products 22   1   1    1   1   1   0   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1 
Apparel & Other Textile Products 23   1   3   2   2   3   3   3   2   2   3   3   3   4   5   5   5   5   6   6 
Lumber & Wood Products 24   1   0   0   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   2   1   2   2   2   2   1   0 
Furniture & Fixtures 25   2   2   1   1   2   2   1   1   2   2   1   0   1   2   2   2   2   1   1 
Paper & Allied Products 26   4   4   4   5   5   4   4   4   5   4   4   6   6   6   6   6   5   4   3 
Printing & Publishing 27   1   1   1   1   0   0   1   1   1   0   0   1   1   1   1   0   0   1   1 
Chemical & Allied Products 28 24 26 24 22 21 22 25 25 24 24 24 25 30 29 27 30 31 32 31 
Petroleum & Coal Products 29   4   4   5   5   4   5   5   5   5   4   3   6   6   5   4   5   5   6   5 
Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Products 30    1   2   2   2   2   2   2   1   1   1   1   2   2   2   1   1   2   2   2 
Leather & Leather Products 31   0   0   0   0   0   0   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   0 
 Stone, Clay, & Glass Products 32   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   1   0   0   0   0   1   1   1   0   0   0   0 
Primary Metal Industries 33   2   2   2   0   0   1   2   2   2   3   3   3   2   2   3   2   2   2   3 
Fabricated Metal Products 34   3   3   3   3   4   1   2   4   3   3   4   2   2   4   4   3   3   4   3 
Industrial Machinery & Equipment 35 13 14 17 16 15 16 20 21 18 15 19 20 19 16 16 20 19 19 16 
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 36 11 12 16 18 16 15 19 16 16 14 15 18 22 23 25 23 21 21 19 
Transportation Equipment 37   9   6   7   9 11 10 10 10 10   9   9 11 12   7   8 10 10   7   5 
Instruments & Related Products 38 14 17 14 10 11 16 17 18 19 20 20 20 22 22 19 20 19 17 16 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 39   2   1   2   3   1   1   2   2   2   2   2   3   2   2   3   2   1   3   3 
Railroad Transportation 40   4   3   4   4   3   3   4   3   4   3   2   4   4   4   3   3   3   3   4 
Trucking & Warehousing 42   0   0   0   1   1   1   0   1   1   1   1   1   0   1   1   1   1   1   1 
Water Transportation 44   1   1   1   1   1   1   0   0   1   1   1   1   2   2   2   2   2   1   1 
Transportation by Air 45   2   1   1   3   3   2   2   3   1   2   3   2   2   3   3   3   3   3   3 
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Appendix D. Descriptive statistics (Chapter 2 continued) 
Name of industry SIC 
No. of firms 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Transportation Services 47 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 
Communications 48 6 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8 9 10 13 15 16 16 16 16 11 
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods 50 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Wholesale Trade – Nondurable Goods 51 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 4 5 
Building Materials & Gardening Supplies 52 1 0 1 2 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 
General Merchandise Stores 53 6 5 5 5 5 7 6 5 5 7 7 7 5 4 7 8 7 8 6 
Food Stores 54 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 
Automative Dealers & Service Stations 55 1 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Apparel & Accessory Stores 56 2 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 6 6 6 5 5 4 
Furniture & Homefurnishings Stores 57 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Eating & Drinking Places 58 2 2 1 2 2 3 4 3 2 1 3 4 3 4 5 5 4 4 3 
Miscellaneous Retail 59 5 5 4 4 5 6 4 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 4 
Hotels & Other Lodging Places 70 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Personal Services 72 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 1 
Business Services 73 14 16 17 16 15 18 21 22 25 25 23 25 27 28 1 32 30 26 25 
Auto Repair, Services, & Parking 75 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Motion Pictures 78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Amusement & Recreation Services 79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 1 1 1 1 
Health Services 80 3 2 2 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 6 5 6 5 2 6 5 5 4 
Engineering & Management Services 87 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 






Appendix E. Descriptive statistics (Chapter 4) 
The table provides descriptive statistics with the number of mutual funds for each year. 













2011    5 
2012    0 
2013 257 
2014 360 
2015 353 
2016 251 
 
 
